Notes and Comments by Law Review, North Carolina
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 43 | Number 3 Article 4
4-1-1965
Notes and Comments
North Carolina Law Review
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
North Carolina Law Review, Notes and Comments, 43 N.C. L. Rev. 557 (1965).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol43/iss3/4
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Minimum Capital Requirements of Broker-Dealers
The basic function of a broker-dealer' is the execution of orders
for the purchase and sale of securities either for himself or his
customers. The activities2 of broker-dealers result in the accumula-
tion of a large aggregate of customers' property. Today more than
46 billion dollars in securities and one billion dollars in cash are
entrusted to broker-dealers by customers.3 Large customer cash
accounts result from dividends paid on shares held in street name,
proceeds of sales, and deposits in anticipation of future purchases.
Brokers hold shares as security until payment is made by customers
for their purchases. Shares listed in street name or customer name
are often left with a broker for trading convenience. Shares are
also held by the broker-dealer to secure the loans of margin cus-
tomers, to whom the broker-dealer has advanced a portion of the
purchase price.' In addition, the broker-dealer's business activities
go beyond that of trading; he may engage in underwritings, carry
inventories of stock in which he makes a market, or trade ex-
tensively for his own account, all accomplished largely by borrow-
ing from banks and other broker-dealers or by using funds of his
customers. With a large extent of borrowing by the broker-dealer,
I Sections 3(A) (4) and 3(A) (5) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 define the terms "broker" and "dealer" as follows: a broker is "any
person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others . . . ." 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4) (1958); a
dealer is "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for his own account . .. ." 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (5)
(1958). The term "broker-dealer" is used here to indicate a situation where
an individual (including sole proprietorships, partnerships, and corpora-
tions) combines the activities of both broker and dealer, or where there is
uncertainty as to whether a person is acting in one capacity or the other.
Furthermore, "broker-dealer" refers to one that affects purchases or sales
of securities that take place on the over-the-counter markets.
2 There are approximately 6,000 broker-dealers engaged in the over-the-
counter business in the United States. About 5,000 are registered with the
SEC, meaning that they use the mails and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce to effect transactions. The remainder do business that is ex-
clusively intrastate or exclusively in exempt securities such as federal gov-
ernment, state and municipal issues. The bulk of the over-the-counter busi-
ness is handled by the approximately 5,500 broker-dealers who are members
of the NASD. LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 402-09 (3d ed. 1963).
8 Note, 77 HARv. L. Rnv. 1290 (1964).
'Id. at 1292.
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coupled with the accumulation of customer's property, any insolvency
on the part of the broker-dealer and resulting inability to meet
loan calls and other financial obligations presents a serious danger
to the investing public. Thus, the financial responsibility of broker-
dealers is necessary to afford protection to the individual customer
and the investing public in general.
The financial responsibility of broker-dealers is subject to
regulation by one or all of three sources: ('1) the federal government,
(2) the self-regulatory bodies, i.e., the stock exchanges and the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), and (3) state
governments. We shall examine the tripartite imposition of net
capital requirements that take three forms: (1) net capital-to-in-
debtedness ratios, (2) minimum net capital requirements, and (3)
bonding requirements.
I. FEDERAL REGULATION
Federal regulation5 of the financial responsibility of broker-
dealers is accomplished mainly by rule 15c3-1,0 promulgated under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, section 8(b) 7 of the
Exchange Act, which establishes a net capital-to-indebtedness ratio
requirement for brokers-dealers who are members of national
securities exchanges or those broker-dealers who transact business
through members of such exchanges, also regulates broker-dealers
in this area. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate this provision
briefly before examining rule 15c3-1.
A. Section 8(b)
Section 8(b) makes it unlawful for any broker-dealer who is
a member of a national exchange or who transacts a business in
securities through the medium of an exchange member, directly or
indirectly,
to permit in the ordinary course of business as a broker, his
aggregate indebtedness to all other persons including customers'
credit balances (but excluding indebtedness secured by exempted
securities) to exceed such percentage of the net capital (exclusive
of fixed assets and the value of exchange membership) employed
in business, but not exceeding in any case 2,000 per centum, as
'A broker-dealer first entering the over-the-counter market is required
to register with the SEC as a condition to dealing across state lines. 78 Stat.
570 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (Supp. 1964).
6 SEC Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1964).
748 Stat. 888 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78h(b) (1958).
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the Commission may by rates and regulations prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.8
The section's obvious purpose is to safeguard customers against
the risk of a broker-dealer's insolvency by prohibiting him from
borrowing more than twenty times his net capital. But section 8(b)
is inapplicable to dealers who do no brokerage business, even though
they may hold customer's funds or securities, or to brokers who do
not transact business through the medium of an exchange member.
Even as to those broker-dealers covered by section 8(b), it applies
only to indebtedness incurred in the normal course of business as a
broker-dealer and not to any obligations outside of that business.
The SEC applied the 20:1 ratio of section 8(b) in a few early
cases'0 of broker-dealer insolvency. However, the section has never
been implemented by rule, and for approximately four decades, the
Commission has generally chosen to proceed against broker-dealers
under rule 15 c3-1 rather than under section 8(b)."
B. Rule 15c3-1
The rule was first announced in 1942 in the case of National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. SEC,'2 where the Com-
mission stated that it had promulgated its own net capital-to-in-
debtedness ratio rule applicable to the entire over-the-counter
industry because it recognized a need for general rules to achieve
customer protection against financially unsafe broker-dealers. The
rule was adopted under section 15(c) (3) of the Exchange Act,
which prohibits any broker-dealer from using the mails or inter-
state facilities to effect any transaction in or to induce the purchase
of any security otherwise than on a national securities exchange
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors to provide safeguards with re-
spect to the financial responsibility of brokers and dealers. 13
8 Ibid.
'2 Loss, SEcuRiTIEs REGULATiON 1350 (2d ed. 1961).
" E.g., Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944) ; SEC v. Lawson, 24 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D. Md. 1938).
2 SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No.
95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 407 n.377 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Special Study].
' National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 12 S.E.C. 322 (1942).1' 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1958).
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The rule itself, as adopted under section 15(c) (3), is simple
in statement: "No broker or dealer shall permit his aggregate
indebtedness to all other persons to exceed 2,000 per centum of his
net capital." 4
It should be emphasized from the outset that rule 15c3-1 is both
an entry requirement for the broker-dealer and a continuous, opera-
tional requirement that the broker-dealer must meet throughout
the course of business. However, it is not so much a qualification
device as it is a continuous, operational requirement. 5
The rule is vigorously enforced by the SEC and is one of the
most important weapons in the Commission's arsenal for assuring
the solvency of broker-dealers. By limiting the ratio of broker-
dealer's indebtedness to his capital, and thereby restricting the
amount which he may borrow, the rule operates to some extent to
assure confidence and safety to the investing public."0
C. Definition of Rule 15c3-1 and Explanation of Its Operation
Although the rule itself is simple in statement, it is complex in
its definition of the terms "net capital" and "aggregate indebted-
ness." The complexity has been justified, however, because the
rule, and its technical wording, is intended for particular application
to those with expertise in the specific business of executing orders for
the purchase and sale of securities.
The rule is imposed on all broker-dealers who are subject to the
broad jurisdictional language of the registration section' of the
Exchange Act, with two exceptions. First, those brokers who act
solely as agents for issuers in soliciting subscriptions to issuers'
securities, promptly transmitting the securities and proceeds, and
who hold or owe no customers' securities or funds are not covered
14 SEC Rule 15c3-1 (a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (a) (1964).
' Special Study, pt. 1, at 86.
10 Blaise D'Antoni & Associates, Inc. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276, 277 (5th
Cir. 1961).
"' SECv. Fairfax Investment Corp., CCH Fmn. SEc. L. REP. 91432
(1964). Any objections to the accounting techniques required by the rule
on grounds that the procedures are not in accord with standard accounting
practices have been rejected thus: "Unless it can be shown that rule 15c3-1
is clearly an abuse of the Commission's rulemaking power, it is not in-
cumbent on the courts to look behind the rule and determine how it might
have been drafted more in accordance with concepts of good accounting. So
long as the accounting procedure is in conformity with the rule, it must be
deemed proper." SEC v. Graye, 156 F. Supp. 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).1878 Stat. 570 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (Supp. 1964).
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by the rule.19 Clearly, there is little possibility of large borrowing
by the broker-dealer in such a transaction and hence no immediate
fear of insolvency. Also, since the broker-dealer holds no customer
funds or securities, there is no danger to the customer. Second,
members of seven specified stock exchanges whose rules and settled
practices impose more comprehensive requirements than rule 15c3-1
are also exempted from coverage.
2 0
The rule defines "aggregate indebtedness" as the total money
liabilities of a broker-dealer arising in connection with any trans-
action he engages in, including such items as money borrowed,
money payable against securities loaned and securities "failed to
receive" that have not been sold by the broker-dealer, market value
of securities borrowed, and credit balances in any customers' ac-
counts that have "short positions" in securities. 2 It has been held
that a reasonable provision for accrued taxes must also be included
under "aggregate indebtedness."2 2 However, certain items are ex-
cluded from "aggregate indebtedness." They are:
(1) Indebtedness that is "adequately collateralized" by securi-
ties owned by the broker-dealer.2 8 An "adequately collateralized"
indebtedness is one that would be considered a fully secured loan
by banks in the community making comparable loans to broker-
dealers.2 For example, if banks generally were lending fifty per
cent of the value on collateral consisting of common stock, a 10,000
dollar indebtedness secured by at least 20,000 dollars of common
stocks would be "adequately collateralized." The term has the same
meaning throughout the rule.
(2) Indebtedness to other broker-dealers that is "adequately
collateralized" by securities owned by the broker-dealer.25
" SEC Rule 15c3-1(b) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(b) (1) (1964).
"0SEC Rule 15c3-1(b) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(b)(1) (1964), ex-
empting the American, Boston, Midwest, New York, Pacific Coast, Phila-
delphia-Baltimore-Washington, and Pittsburgh stock exchanges.
" SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1) (1964). For
a discussion of the borrowing and loaning of money and securities on the
part of a broker-dealer, "fails to receive," and "positioning" in securities,
see LEFFLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 409-10, 432-33.22 Cornelis de Vroedt, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5628 (1958).
" SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (1) (A), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (1) (A)
(1964).
"SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (6), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (6) (1964).
'SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(1)(B), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1)(B)
(1964).
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(3) Amounts that are payable against securities that have been
loaned if the securities are owned by the broker-dealer.2" This ex-
clusion operates to qualify the definition of "aggregate indebted-
ness," for, as seen above, the term includes money payable against
any securities loaned. The result is that only money payable against
securities loaned, but not owned by the broker-dealer, are included
in the computation of "aggregate indebtedness."
(4) Amounts that are payable against securities "failed to re-
ceive" that were purchased for the account of the broker-dealer and
have not been sold by him.2" This exclusion also operates to qualify
"aggregate indebtedness," leaving included in "aggregate indebted-
ness" money payable against securities "failed to receive" that have
not been sold by the broker-dealer but were not purchased for the
account of the broker-dealer.
(5) Indebtedness that is "adequately collateralized" by exempted
securities, i.e., federal government or state and municipal issues.28
(6) Fixed liabilities that are secured by real estate or any other
assets that are not included in the computation of "net capital"
under rule 15c3-1 29 -in other words, as we shall see under the defi-
nition of "net capital," any other asset that can not be readily
converted into cash.
(7) Liabilities on open "contractual commitments."8 0  The
term "contractual commitments" generally means firm commitment
underwritings that have been contracted for, but for which settle-
ment has not been made."' Thus, the firm obligation of a broker-
dealer, acting in the capacity of an underwriter, to purchase securi-
ties to be offered to the public would be an open "contractual com-
mitment" and excluded from "aggregate indebtedness." But the
exclusion is limited to firm commitment underwritings and is inap-
plicable to a best efforts underwriting, presumably on the theory that
with a firm commitment underwriting the exact number of securities
" SEC Rule 1563-1(c)(1)(C), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1)(C)(1964).
"'SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(1)(D), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1)(D)(1964).
" SEC Rule 1563-1(c) (1) (E), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1)(E)
(1964).
" SEC Rule 1563-1(c) (1) (G), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1)(G)(1964).
0 SEC Rule 153-1(c) (1) (H), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (1) (H)
(1964).1 NASD Training Guide 100 (1963).
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to be purchased is known, whereas with a best efforts underwriting
the exact number is not known. 2 The reason why liabilities on
open "contractual commitments" are omitted from the computation
of "aggregate indebtedness" is that the securities purchased in the
underwriting are considered to be in inventory and hence are subject
to the net capital "haircut," explained below.33
(8) Indebtedness of the broker-dealer to one who has loaned
him cash or securities that is subordinated to the claims of general
creditors in accordance with a "satisfactory subordination agree-
ment.13 4 Since the indebtedness is made "junior" to the claims of
general creditors, it is not thought necessary to include it in "ag-
gregate indebtedness." Since the indebtedness that is subordinated
to such an agreement is also excluded from the computation of
"net capital," the effect is to treat the proceeds of such liabilities,
more properly denominated loans, as capital.35 However, the term
"satisfactory subordination agreement" is strictly defined under the
rule as a written agreement between the broker-dealer and the lender,
binding on the lender and his creditors, that (a) subordinates any
right of the lender to demand payment of cash or securities loaned
to the claims of general creditors of the broker-dealer, (b) is not
subject to cancellation at the will of either party for a term greater
than one year, and (c) provides that it will not be rescinded if the
effect of such recission would be to lower the net capital-to-indebted-
ness ratio below the prescribed limit of 20:1.30
An attempted summary of the above indicates that "aggregate
indebtedness" essentially means the money liabilities of a broker-
dealer that are not adequately collateralized by his own assets, are not
subordinated by a satisfactory subordination agreement, and are
not liabilities on an open contractual commitment.
"Net capital" is defined as the net worth (excess of assets over
" SEC v. Keith Richard Securities Corp., 148 F. Supp. 358, 360 (S.D.N.Y.
1957). See also SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Co., 186 F. Supp. 830, 859 (S.D.
Cal. 1960), where the court stated that "open contractual commitment" does
not include such items of indebtedness as customers' credit balances, even
though the broker-dealer impliedly asserted that it had a contract with a
customer with respect to the balances.
" The term "contractual commitments" also includes when issued, when
distributed, and delayed delivery contracts. SEC Rule 15c3-1 (c) (5), 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (5) (1964).
", SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (1) (I), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (1) (I) (1964).
" NASD Training Guide 100 (1963).
" SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (7), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (7) (1964).
19651
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liabilities) of a broker-dealer, with certain adjustments that are
designed generally to reflect the current liquid position of the broker-
dealer." These adjustments are:
(1) The addition of unrealized profits and the deduction of un-
realized losses in securities held in the broker-dealer's accounts as
inventory or in trading accounts. 38 Broker-dealers will often carry
inventories in securities as part of the function of making markets
in the securities. Any unrealized profits or losses in the inventories
would result in an adjustment of "net capital." But the profits or
losses must necessarily relate to a broker-dealer's inventory in issued
securities and not to trading profits or losses in "when issued"
securities, for, if the shares are not in fact issued, the unrealized
profits or losses will be permanently unrealized."
(2) The deduction of all assets that cannot be readily converted
into cash.40 This would include such non-liquid assets as real estate,
furniture and fixtures, insurance, and good will. Where there is an
indebtedness secured by such an asset, the deduction made is the
excess of the value of the asset over the amount of the indebted-
ness." In some cases the Commission has softened this provision
by allowing non-marketable assets a value to the extent that a
broker-dealer can demonstrate that he has received a firm bid for
such assets or that they would be taken as collateral for a bank
loan.42 There is no fixed policy here; it is simply a discretionary
withholding by the SEC, in certain circumstances, of compliance
with the letter of the law.
(3) The deduction of specified percentages (colloquially called
a "haircut") of the market value of all securities, except exempted
securities, in long or short positions of the inventory or trading
accounts of a broker-dealer.43 The "haircut" percentages to be de-
ducted vary from zero per cent for the exempted securities to thirty
" SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2) (1964).
"6 SEC Rule 15c3-1 (c) (2) (A), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (c) (2) (A)
(1964).
" SEC v. Peerless-New York, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 328, 329 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
'"SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(B), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(B)
(1964).
,
1 NASD Training Guide 104 (1963).
'
2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1354 n.257.
'
3 SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(C), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(C)(1964).
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per cent. In the case of undefaulted, non-convertible debt securi-
ties with a fixed interest rate and maturity date, the deduction is five.
per cent, unless the securities are selling at a discount of more than
five per cent, in which event the deduction is the amount of the dis-
count up to a maximum of thirty per cent.44 With cumulative,
non-convertible first preferred stock not in arrears as to dividends,
the deduction is twenty per cent.45 On all other securities, the de-
duction is thirty per cent.40  The effects of these deductions, in
addition to providing a margin of safety, is to provide a salutary
brake on the accumulation of securities by a broker-dealer and to
prevent him from over-extending himself. Thus, if a broker-dealer
invested 100,000 dollars from his capital in the purchase of stock for
his own account, it would be necessary to provide an additional
30,000 dollars of capital in order to remain in the same net capital
position as he had before the purchase. Similarly, if he contracted
to purchase 100,000 dollars worth of securities, he would have to
enter the full purchase price as a liability, but would value the stock
to be acquired at only 70,000 dollars, so that 30,000 dollars in cash
would be required to carry the commitment.4 Arguments have been
interposed by broker-dealers to the effect that whether or not they
are within compliance with rule 15c3-1 is not in their control, as a
market fluctuation may so vary the value of their securities that they
could be thrown out of compliance through no fault of their own.48
While this is the case, such an argument has been rejected by at
least one court as merely going to the wisdom of the rule.49
(4) The exclusion of liabilities subordinated under a "satis-
factory subordination agreement," the term having the same defi-
nition as it did under "aggregate indebtedness." 50 The result of
excluding such liabilities in computing both "aggregate indebted-
"SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (2) (C) (i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (2) (C) (i)
(1964).
'4 SEC Rule 15c3-1 (c) (2) (C) (ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (2) (C) (ii)
(1964).
" SEC Rule 15c3-1(c) (2) (C) (iii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c) (2) (C)(iii) (1964).
" Hearings Before the Subcommittee on SEC Legislation of Senate Com-
inittee on Banking & Currency on S. 1178-82, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 354
(1959).
" For an example of how such a situation might occur, see Special Study,
pt. 1, at 409 n.386.
," SEC v. Graye, 156 F. Supp. 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
" SEC Rule 15c3-1 (c) (2) (F), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (c) (2) (F)(1964).
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ness," as seen above, and "net capital" is to handle the proceeds
of such liabilities, cash and securities, as capital.
(5) For broker-dealers who are sole proprietors, the deduction
of the excess of liabilities not incurred in the securities business
over assets not used in the business.51
In summary, "net capital" means the liquid net assets of a
broker-dealer reduced by certain percentages of the market value
of most securities and excluding indebtedness subordinated by a
satisfactory subordination agreement.
D. Is Rule 15c3-1 Sufficient?
By the terms of the rule, aggregate indebtedness cannot be more
than twenty times greater than net capital. Thus, so long as a
broker-dealer maintains a minimal amount of indebtedness, he may
enter the market and continue to operate on a limited net capital.
For example, each 10,000 dollar increment of indebtedness requires
an increase of only 500 dollars in net capital to satisfy the rule.
Thus, it appears that the rule is of limited effectiveness in fulfilling
the purpose of assuring the financial responsibility and stability of
broker-dealers. While it may be of importance in helping to insure
the solvency of broker-dealers, it does not guarantee any minimum
capital commitment and does little to screen broker-dealers at the
crucial point of entry. The SEC has expressed its opinion of the
rule thus: "The ease with which almost anyone can start his own
securities firm has permitted many an amateur to embark on the deep
water of broker-dealer entrepreneurship." 5
The SEC has recommended in its Report of Special Study of
Securities Markets53 that broker-dealers be subjected to a "mini-
mum net capital requirement" as a requisite of entry into the
over-the-counter market and as an operational requirement there-
after.54 Such a requirement would be adopted, as was rule 15c3-1,
under section 15 (c) of the Exchange Act. The Special Study listed
several reasons why a minimum capital rule should be adopted.
First, securities laws depend heavily on the sanction of civil liability
81 SEC Rule 15c3-1 (c) (2) (G), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (c) (2) (G)
(1964).
12 Wall Street Journal, July 31, 1964, p. 6, col. 3.
Is SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No.
95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinbefore and hereinafter cited as Spe-
cial Study].
5 Id., pt. 1, at 161.
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in favor of those who may be injured by violation of the laws by a
broker-dealer; if a broker-dealer has little or no capital, he may be
judgment proof, and hence the securities laws will not have the
effect intended. Second, no broker-dealer should be permitted to
carry on business on so thin a margin of capital that he must de-
pend on day-to-day transactions to continue business; nor should
he be permitted to rely on customers' funds and securities as a source
of working capital. Third, the "smooth and speedy handling of
securities transactions within the financial community itself require
that all members of that community have at least such minimum
of personnel and resources that they may reasonably rely on one
another's ability to do business responsibly."" Finally, a minimum
capital rule would insure that broker-dealers entering the securities
business have such a sense of commitment to their business as is
likely to produce responsible, reliable operations. 6 The minimum
net capital rule recommended was 5,000 dollars, plus 2,500 dollars
for each branch office and 500 dollars for each salesman employed at
any time.5 7 The nature of the recommendation suggests that the
Special Study recognizes that the requirement should not be uni-
form for all broker-dealers, but should reflect the type and size of
business engaged in.
Although the SEC has yet to follow the suggestion of the
Special Study, it is very likely to adopt a minimum net capital rule
in the near future. In the spring of 1964, the Commission infor-
mally circulated a proposed minimum net capital rule. It followed
the Special Study recommendation by proposing a minimum figure
of 5,000 dollars, plus 500 dollars for each salesman, but did not use
the number of branch offices as a standard of scaling up the mini-
mum. For broker-dealers dealing exclusively in mutual fund shares,
the requirement would have been 2,500 dollars minimum net capital
plus 250 dollars for each salesman. No action was taken, and the
rule has not been formally proposed, evidently because of sub-
stantial industry opposition. Later in 1964, the SEC again infor-
mally circulated a proposed minimum net capital rule. This pro-
posal would have required broker-dealers to maintain liquid reserves
equal to at least twenty-five per cent of the cash left with them by
customers. However, it too received criticism, and no formal action
5 Id. at 84.
11 Id. at 84.
'
7Id. at 162.
1965]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
was taken. The Commission has announced that a new proposal is
being drafted."'
The industry's principal objections to a minimum net capital
rule are that it alone cannot assure financial or other responsibility
of a broker-dealer and that a broker-dealer can engage in overly
risky business practices, either in the selection of debtors or by way
of speculative ventures, even though he is required to maintain a
prescribed level of capital. Also, the objection is made that worthy
individuals without capital may be excluded from the business.5"
Nevertheless, it appears likely that a minimum capital rule will be
adopted by the SEC.
E. Relief for Violation of Rule 15c3-1
Basically, the forms of relief available to the Commission for
violation of its net capital-to-indebtedness ratio rule are injunctive
relief, revocation or suspension of the registration of the broker-
dealer with the SEC, and, if the broker-dealer is a member of a
registered national securities association, suspension or expulsion
from that association. Violations of the rule are detected by the Com-
mission under section 17 (a), where authority is given to make such
inspection of the books and records of a broker-dealer "as the Com-
mission may deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors."60
1. Injunction.--The issuance of an injunction under the Ex-
change Act is governed by section 21 (e), which conditions the right
to injunction upon sufficient proof that "any person is engaged or
about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will con-
stitute a violation" of the act or of any rule or regulation prescribed
under its authority.6 An injunction does not seek to put the broker-
dealer out of business or to harm him. It seeks only to restrain him
from doing business while he is in violation of the Commission's
rules.'2 The Commission is not entitled to an injunction against a
broker-dealer for violation of rule 15c3-1 unless it can make a clear
showing of a violation of the rule-a showing that the broker-dealer
"Wall Street Journal, July 31, 1964, p. 6, col. 3. See also N.Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 1964, p. 59, col. 5.
"' National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 12 S.E.C. 322, 325 (1942).
6048 Stat. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1958). See also SEC Rule
17a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (1964).6148 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1958).
6" SEC v. Graye, 156 F. Supp. 544, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
[Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
subjected his customers to risk by conducting its business with an
excess of indebtedness.13  Furthermore, where the violation is
the broker-dealer's first and the deficit is made good immediately
after the commencement of the SEC's action, an injunction will not
likely issue, because it is improbable that the violation will be
resumed. But where there have been repeated violations of the
rule in the past, an injunction will lie. 5
2. Revocation or Suspension of Registration with the SEC.-
Section 15 (b) (5) (D) of the Exchange Act provides that the Com-
mission, after notice and hearing, may revoke the registration of a
broker-dealer for a period not exceeding twelve months or suspend
him if it finds it is in the public interest and that such broker-dealer
has willfully violated any of the provisions of the act or any rule
or regulation thereunder. 6 This provision also authorizes the Com-
mission to censure a broker-dealer for violation of the act. Censure
can be an effective sanction against a broker-dealer, for it puts the
investing public on notice that he has willfully violated the securi-
ties laws. The Commission has held that where a broker-dealer
permits his aggregate indebtedness to exceed more than twenty
times his net capital, this, in and of itself, is a willful violation of
rule 15c3-1. 7 Substantially the same principles apply here as with
injunctions. If the violation is remedied as soon as it is called to
the broker-dealer's attention, there will be no suspension, revoca-
tion, or censure. But where the broker-dealer continuously violates
the rule and it is likely that he will continue to do so, suspension,
revocation, or censure will follow."8
3. Expulsion or Suspension from NASD.-Section 15A(1) (2)
(b) authorizes the Commission, after opportunity for notice and
hearing, to suspend for a maximum period of twelve months or to
expel from a national registered securities association any member
" SEC v. Robert A. Martin Associates, Inc., CCH FED. S-c. L. REP.
91178 (1962).
" SEC v. Casper Rogers & Co., 194 F. Supp. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ; SEC
v. Reither, 146 F. Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); SEC v. Norman Lemmons,
Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91040 (1961); Douglass & Co., 35 S.E.C.
586 (1954).
SEC v. Cohn, 216 F. Supp. 636 (D.N.J. 1963). Accord, SEC v.
Whitaker, CCH FED. SEc. L. RnP. 90998 (1960).
78 Stat. 571 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (5) (D) (Supp. 1964).
'
7 Hammill & Co., 28 S.E.C. 634 (1948).
"Whitney & Co., 40 S.E.C. 1100 (1962); Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C.. 436
(1958).
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thereof who has violated any provision of the Exchange Act or any
rule or regulation thereunder. As the NASD is the only national
securities association registered with the SEC, violation of rule
15c3-1 would result in the suspension or expulsion from that as-
sociation, assuming the broker-dealer was a member."0
6. Other Forms of Relief.-Section 32(a)7 1 of the Exchange
Act, which provides for fines up to 10,000 dollars or imprisonment
up to two years for violations of the act, is inapplicable to the net
capital-to-indebtedness ratio requirement, because section 32(c) 7 2
specifically exempts any violation of any rule prescribed pursuant
to section 15 (c) (3).
The general fraud provisions78 of federal securities regulation
would seem to give rise to civil liability on the part of a broker-
dealer if any refusal or failure to comply with rule 15c3-1 could be
interpreted as a manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent action. How-
ever, there appear to be no cases or rulings where a civil liability
was imposed on a broker-dealer for a violation of the rule under
the general fraud sections. Section 18(a)74 of the Exchange Act
would appear to be another possible source of civil liability on the
part of the broker-dealer for violation of the net capital-to-indebted-
ness ratio rule. It provides that any person who makes any state-
ment in a report or document that is required to be filed with the
SEC under the act and was false or misleading with respect to a
material fact will be liable to any person who, in reliance on the
statement, purchased or sold a security at a price that was affected
by such statement. Thus, if a broker-dealer filed a false or mis-
leading statement in the financial ledgers required by rule 17a-376
in an attempt to portray compliance with rule 15c3-1, when in fact
his aggregate indebtedness exceeded net capital by more than 2,000
per cent, and a person purchased or sold a security in reliance upon
such compliance, it would seem that such person could bring a
civil action against the broker-dealer under section 18(a). How-
" 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3(1)(2)(b) (1958).
70 Heft, Kahn & Infante Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 76897 (1963).
'148 Stat. 904 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1958).
7248 Stat. 904 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (1958).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c) (1), 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c)(1) (1958); § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958);
Securities Act of 1933 § 17(A), 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(A) (1958);
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
?4 Stat. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1958).
7' SEC Rule 17a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (1964).
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ever, there are no cases or rulings indicating that a civil action could
be brought under section 18(a) in such a situation. At any rate,
it would be difficult to show that a person bought or sold securities
in reliance on a statement in a financial ledger which indicated com-
pliance with rule 15c3-1.
II. REGULATION BY THE SELF-REGULATORY BODIES-
THE STOCK EXCHANGES AND NASD
A. The Stock Exchanges
The purpose of this section is to inquire into the net capital
requirements that are imposed on broker-dealers who are members
of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the major regional
stock exchanges. Our concern will be primarily with the NYSE.
Any reference to broker-dealers here will be to those who have mem-
berships on one or more of the organized exchanges. Such broker-
dealers usually have specialized departments that engage in trading
on the over-the-counter market. The members of seven specified
stock exchanges-the American, Boston, Midwest, New York,
Pacific Coast, Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington, and Pittsburgh
-are exempted from rule 15c3-1 because their "rules and settled
practices are deemed by the Commission to impose requirements
more comprehensive than the requirements of this rule."
76
Generally, the net capital-to-indebtedness ratio rules of the
exchanges are the same in principle as rule 15c3-1. The primary
differences are three: (1) Many exchanges have a fixed minimum
net capital rule as well as a net capital-to-indebtedness ratio rule.
Members of such exchanges must meet either one or the other of
the rules, depending on whichever requires a greater net capital.
(2) The rules of some of the exchanges require a ratio of indebted-
ness to net capital lower than the 20:1 ratio prescribed by rule
15c3-1. (3) The rules of certain exchanges require greater "hair-
cuts" on certain types of securities and also give the exchanges
authority to demand larger "haircuts" on securities than prescribed
by the rules, if it is considered necessary and advisable.
1. The NYSE.-The NYSE imposes net capital requirements
on broker-dealer members by virtue of its rule 325, which prescribes
a net capital-to-indebtedness rule and demands a fixed minimum
net capital maintenance requirement. The net capital-to-indebtedness
"SEC Rule 15c3-1(b) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(b) (2) (1964).
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ratio required is identical to the SEC's rule 15c3-1: "No member...
doing any business with.., members... or with the public. . ., shall
permit, in the ordinary course of business as a broker, his or its Ag-
gregate Indebtedness to exceed 2,000 per centum of his or its Net
Capital. ' 77 As to the minimum net capital requirement, rule 325 de-
mands that member broker-dealers carrying accounts for customers
maintain a fixed net capital of at least 50,000 dollars; those members
doing business with other members or member organizations, or do-
ing general business with the public but not carrying customers' ac-
counts, must maintain a net capital of at least 25,000 dollars. 78 The
rule further provides that initial net capital must be at least 120 per
cent of that required to be maintained at all times. Therefore, a
broker-dealer carrying customer accounts and thereby subject to the
50,000 dollar minimum capital requirement, would need 60,000 dol-
lars of minimum net capital on initially becoming a member of the
NYSE, the required amount dropping to a level 50,000 dollars after
admittance. Both the ratio rule and the minimum net capital rule ap-
ply with particular force to broker-dealers having transactions with
the public. However, rule 325 does not cover floor brokers, traders,
and specialists having no public business. The result of prescribing
both requirements is that the broker-dealer must meet either one or the
other of the rules, depending on whichever requires a greater net
capital. For example, assume that a broker-dealer carries no cus-
tomer accounts and that therefore the 25,000 dollars minimum net
capital requirement applies to him. If his aggregate indebtedness
exceeded 500,000 dollars, which would be more than twenty times
greater than 25,000 dollars, he would then fall under the net capital-
to-indebtedness ratio rule (requiring a 20:1 ratio between capital
and debt) and would be required to maintain a net capital of more
than 25,000 dollars to support that indebtedness and comply with the
ratio rule. But if aggregate indebtedness was less than 500,000
dollars, i.e., less than twenty times greater than 25,000 dollars, he
would be subject to the minimum net capital requirement and would
have to maintain a fixed level of 25,000 in minimum net capital.
2. NYSE's Definition of Net Capital and Aggregate Indebted-
ness.-Rule 325's definition of "aggregate indebtedness" and "net
capital" closely parallels that of rule 15c3-1. "Aggregate indebted-
" NYSE Rule 325 (a), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.
'1 Ibid.
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ness" is defined under rule 325 as the total money liabilities of a
broker-dealer with specified exclusions such as liabilities adequately
collateralized, liabilities subordinated by a satisfactory subordina-
tion agreement to the claims of general creditors, liabilities on open
contractual commitments, and numerous other exclusions that
accord with the SEC's rule."9 "Net capital's" definition also con-
forms with that found under rule 15c3-1. It is defined under rule
325 as net worth less such items as fixed assets, prepaid rent, assets
not readily convertible into cash, and so on. 0 However, the defi-
nition does differ in one major respect in that it requires greater
"haircuts" than the SEC's rule. For example, it prescribes a thirty
per cent "haircut" on all securities in inventory positions instead of
the SEC's varying "haircuts" of five to thirty per cent.81 Also, per-
centage deductions from federal and state government securities are
required whereas no such deduction is imposed by rule 15c3-1. These
deductions decrease as the bonds approach maturity, ranging from
zero per cent with less than one year to maturity to ten per cent
with five years or more to maturity.8 2 Moreover, the amount of
"haircut" deduction on securities not held in inventory may depend
on the quality of the security. As an illustration, in the case of a
non-convertible bond, the percentage deduction may vary from five
per cent to fifteen per cent, depending on the rating given the bond
by a nationally known statistical service such as Standard and
Poor or Moody's. 8 3 The SEC's rule does not inquire into the
quality of the security.
It should be emphasized that the definition of "net capital" ap-
plies to both the net capital-to-indebtedness ratio rule and the mini-
mum net capital rule. Hence, when rule 325 speaks of requiring a
minimum net capital of 25,000 dollars or 50,000 dollars, this refers
to a level of net worth reduced by such items as "haircut" deductions.
3. Remedy for Violation of Rule 325.-The NYSE remedy for
violation of its ratio rule or minimum net capital requirement is to
suspend trading privileges.8" In light of the prestige and large
customer market this privilege brings, the remedy would appear to
' NYSE Rule 325(b) (2) (A)-(H), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.NYSE Rule 325(b) (4) (A)-(I), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.
NYSE Rule 325(b) (4) (B), (C), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.
82 NYSE Rule 325(c) (1) (A), (B), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.
NYSE Rule 325(c) (4)-(6), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.8
,NYSE Const. art. XIV, §§ 6, 7, 2 NYSE Guide 9 1656, 1657.
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be most effective in thwarting violations of rule 325. However,
the argument can be made that this remedy may add to the diffi-
culties of a broker-dealer firm in a precarious liquidity position and
harm the customers by forcing an insolvency. The NYSE is able
to detect violations by surprise audits.85
4. Unannounced Policies of NYSE.-In addition to the above
two rules,
the NYSE has certain unpublished policies which have the effect
of rules. While the 20:1 rule is the formal requirement of the
exchange, on occasion, when a firm has come close to this level,
the exchange staff has recommended to the firm that in the future
it should maintain a ratio of aggregate indebtedness to net capital
of 17.5:1. Likewise, the exchange staff at times will bring to
bear pressure on its members to keep inventories of securities at a
value of not more than ten times excess net capital, i.e., the ex-
cess of the broker-dealer's net capital over the capital required to
support its aggregate indebtedness. 86
These policies appear to be specifically authorized by rule 325,
for it provides: "The Exchange may at any time ... in the case of
a particular member . . . prescribe greater requirements than those
prescribed herein."8 7
5. Fidelity Bond.-The NYSE recently instituted a require-
ment under rule 319 that all member broker-dealers doing business
with the public or other members carry fidelity bonds covering the
broker-dealers' general partners, officers, and employees.88 These
bonds indemnify member broker-dealers from losses resulting from
dishonest or careless acts of officers and employees, such as theft,
embezzlement, loss or misplacement of property, check forgery, or
fraudulent trading. Although the bond does not confer a right of
action directly on the customer who may be adversely affected by
such acts, it does serve indirectly as a protection to the public in-
vestor since the bond proceeds would add to the broker-dealer's
assets and might prevent or ameliorate bankruptcy." The required
minimum coverage of the bond varies with the type of business
done by the member broker-dealer and with the amount of net
capital he must have to support his aggregate indebtedness. For
"' See NYSE Rule 418, 2 NYSE Guide 2418.
" Special Study, pt. 1, at 408-09.
" NYSE Rule 325(a), 2 NYSE Guide 2325.
" NYSE Rule 319, 2 NYSE Guide 2319.
"N ote, 77 HAgv. L. REv. 1290, 1293 (1964).
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example, for broker-dealers who do business with other members
of the exchange and do not carry customers accounts, the minimum
coverage required is 100,000 dollars. For broker-dealers who carry
customers' accounts and do business with the public, the minimum
coverage changes with the net capital required under the ratio rule,
ranging from a 200,000 dollar minimum coverage where the net
capital required is 50,000 dollars to 5 million dollars where the net
capital required is 12 million dollars.90
6. Central Indemnification Fund.-In 1964, the NYSE approved
amendments to its constitution that have the effect of providing
even greater safeguards for customers of member broker-dealer
firms. These amendments provide for a permanent central in-
demnification fund totaling 25 million dollars for repaying customers
of a member broker-dealer that becomes insolvent. 1 This pro-
tection was triggered by the collapse of Ira Haupt & Co. When Haupt
failed, the firm was holding for customers approximately 9 million
dollars in cash and 490 million dollars in securities. The Exchange
took the lead in liquidating Haupt, spending 9.5 million dollars of
its own funds to repay customers who had left securities with the
firm. It then levied on its members a special assessment. 2 The
amendments soon followed.
7. Other Exchanges.-Discussion here will be limited to those
major regional exchanges that have been exempted from rule 15c3-1
because their requirements are more comprehensive. The require-
ments of these exchanges are more comprehensive in several re-
spects. First, the net capital-to-aggregate indebtedness ratios are
stricter on some exchanges.93 Second, all of the exchanges ex-
empted from coverage by rule 15c3-1 have minimum net capital
maintenance requirements in addition to ratio rules. The American
Stock Exchange requires of member broker-dealers having public
customers a minimum net capital of 50,000 dollars, and of those
without public customers a net capital of 25,000 dollars; the Boston
Stock Exchange requires members to maintain a minimum net
capital of 25,000 dollars; the Midwest Stock Exchange requires
" NYSE Rule 319, 2 NYSE Guide 2319.
"NYSE Const. art. X, § 9, 2 NYSE Guide 1459.
"' Wall Street Journal, July 31, 1964, p. 6, col. 3.
" The maximum permissible ratios of the Midwest and Pittsburgh stock
exchanges are 15:1 rather than the SEC's 20:1 ratio. Special Study, pt. 1, at
408.
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corporate members to have a net capital of 25,000 dollars, whereas
individuals must have net capital of 10,000 dollars; the Pacific Coast
Stock Exchange requires its members doing business with the pub-
lic to maintain a minimum net capital in an amount at least 5,000
dollars in excess of five per cent of aggregate indebtedness, or not
less than 25,000 dollars, whichever is greater. Similar requirements
are in force on the other exchanges exempted from rule 15c3-1."A
Third, the "haircut" requirements of the exempted exchanges are
more comprehensive. A prime example of this is the "haircut" re-
quirements of the Midwest Stock Exchange, where government is-
sues, both federal and state, have a two and one half per cent "hair-
cut," whereas rule 15c3-1 requires no "haircut" on such securities.
Also, it prescribes a flat thirty per cent "haircut" on all securities
in inventory instead of the Commission's varying "haircuts" of five
to thirty per cent. Finally, the rules of this exchange provide that
"inactive securities" may be discounted in a greater amount than
thirty percent, i.e., if a broker-dealer keeps a class of securities in
his inventory for a substantial length of time, a higher "haircut"
will be required. 5 No comparable rule is found in federal broker-
dealer requirements.
B. National Association of Securities Dealers
1. Membership.-Membership in the NASD is not required by
the SEC, 6 although it has proposed that membership be made com-
pulsory for all broker-dealers engaged in an interstate over-the-
counter business. 9T Even though membership is not compulsory,
of the approximately 6,000 broker-dealer firms actively engaging
in the over-the-counter business only about 620 firms are not mem-
"Id. at 408.
"Halsted, Riles and Regulations of Midwest Stock Exchange, 1961 U.
ILL. L.F. 257, 258.
" In 1938, Congress passed the Maloney Act, which amended the Ex-
change Act of 1934 by expressly authorizing the voluntary formation by over-
the-counter broker-dealers of "national securities associations." Act of June
23, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1958). A national securities
association may be registered with the SEC if it adopts rules for the regula-
tion of its members that conform to certain requirements, such as demon-
strating to the SEC that "such association will be able to comply with the
provisions of this title [the Exchange Act]. . . ." 78 Stat. 574 (1964), 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (1) (Supp. 1964). The NASD is the only association
registered with the SEC, and since 1939, it has been the major self-regula-
tory arm of the over-the-counter business.
"' Special Study, pt. 1, at 159. The proposal was rejected by Congress
when it enacted the 1964 amendments without such a requirement.
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bers of the NASD; the bulk of the nonmembers are broker-dealers
engaged in issues not considered to be securities, such as oil royalties
and savings and loan shares."
2. Pre-1964 Amendments.-Before the 1964 amendments to
the Exchange Act, the fundamental philosophy of the act was one of
free entry by broker-dealers into the over-the-counter business. This
philosophy was evident in the lenient requirements for membership
in the NASD, which in effect allowed membership in the association
if broker-dealers conducted an honest and responsible business.9 9
Accordingly, although the NASD enforced the SEC's rule 15c3-1, it
did not have any minimum capital or bonding requirements on which
it could have based a refusal to grant membership.' ° Previous at-
tempts by the NASD to impose such requirements had been opposed
by the SEC as inconsistent with congressional intent that NASD
membership be open to anyone conducting an honest and responsible
business. The SEC felt that such a rule would result in the ex-
pulsion of over one-fourth of the association's membership and
restrict it to the larger broker-dealer concerns.1 1
3. The 1964 Amendments.-The 1964 amendments to the Ex-
change Act abandoned this philosophy of free-entry, because of con-
gressional belief that it made entry too easy for the inexperienced
and unqualified broker-dealer.' °2 The result is that Congress has
now provided the NASD with broad authority to impose stricter
requirements for membership. Section 15A(b) (5) authorizes and
requires the NASD to prescribe rules barring from membership any
broker-dealer that does not meet "specified and appropriate" require-
ments with respect to the financial responsibility of such member. 0 3
It provides that a national securities association will not be registered
with the SEC unless it appears to the Commission that "the rules of
the association provide.., no person shall become a member ... un-
less such person is qualified to become a member in conformity with
specified and appropriate standards with respect to... the financial
responsibility of such member."' 0' This new authority will in all
8 LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 405 (3d ed. 1963).
" SORG PRINTING Co., SECURITIES ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1964 WITH Ex-
PLANATION 31 (1964).
100 Special Study, pt. 1, at 86.
... National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 12 S.E.C. 322, 325 (1942).
102 SORG PRINTING Co., op. cit. supra note 99, at 31.
10078 Stat. 574, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(5) (Supp. 1964).
10478 Stat. 574, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (5) (Supp. 1964).
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probability result in the adoption of a minimum net capital require-
ment for broker-dealers as a condition of membership in the NASD.
The amount of such a requirement is difficult to forecast. However,
in view of the new provision that NASD rules may classify pro-
spective members by taking into account their type of business,'"
it appears unlikely that there will be a uniform minimum capital
requirement for all NASD members. Account will probably be
made for size of the broker-dealer, number of employees, or the
type of business the broker-dealer engages in. Any indication of
what the exact dollar amounts will be can only be had from the
Special Study recommendations. 0 6
4. Disciplinary Powers.-The Exchange Act provides that an
association cannot be registered as a national securities association
unless "the rules of the association provide that its members . . .
shall be appropriately disciplined, by expulsion, suspension, fine,
censure,... or any other fitting penalty, for violation of its rules." 107
The NASD has established such power.' ° Thus, if the NASD
does adopt a minimum net capital rule, it will have effective sanc-
tions against a member broker-dealer for violation of such a rule
as it does now for members who violate rule 153-1.
5. "Mirror" Provision.-As noted above, Congress rejected the
SEC's proposal that all broker-dealers engaged in interstate over-
the-counter business be required to join the NASD. However, by
the enactment of a new section, 15(b) (8),109 Congress has pro-
vided for regulation of broker-dealers who refuse to join the NASD.
This regulation is comparable to that which the NASD is authorized
and required to adopt under section 15A(b) (5) for its members.
The new law provides that, even though a registered broker-dealer
is not a member of the NASD, he may not engage in the over-the-
counter business unless he meets standards relating to training, ex-
perience, and other necessary and desirable qualifications as the
SEC may prescribe. The point to be noted here is that, while the
SEC has been given power to provide standards and rules for broker-
dealers who are not members of the NASD that largely "mirror"
10578 Stat. 574, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (5) (A) (Supp. 1964).
10 See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
10778 Stat. 574, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (9) (Supp. 1964).
10'NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. VII, § 3(c), NASD Manual at
C-40 (1962).
109 78 Stat. 570 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (8) (Supp. 1964).
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those given to the association, the new provision makes no mention
of standards of financial responsibility for nonmember broker-
dealers. As seen above, however, the NASD has been given express
authority to establish standards of financial responsibility for mem-
ber broker-dealers. The reason for this difference is that Congress
felt that, in view of the authority already established in the SEC
under section 15(c) (3) to provide safeguards with respect to
financial responsibility, "it was unnecessary to mention this power
again in connection with the new power of the SEC to provide other
qualification standards for nonmembers.""'
III. REGULATION BY THE STATES
At present there are thirty-four states that have enacted blue-
sky provisions to assure the financial responsibility and stability
of broker-dealers. These states impose upon broker-dealers within
their jurisdiction either net capital-to-indebtedness ratio require-
ments, minimum net capital rules, and/or bonding requirements,
all of which apply both as conditions to entry and as continuous
operational requirements after entry. Although the blue-sky pro-
visions vary significantly from state to state, six patterns can be
derived:
(1) Those states imposing bonding requirements solely. There
are fifteen states in this class. They are (with the dollar amount of
the bond required) : Alaska (up to 10,000 dollars),"' Arizona (up
to 25,000 dollars), 2 California (5,000 dollars)," 3 Florida (5,000
dollars)," 4 Hawaii (5,000 dollars)," 5 Indiana (25,000 dollars), 6
Iowa (5,000 dollars) ,' 7 Maine (10,000 dollars),"' Michigan (up
to '100,000 dollars),"" Missouri (5,000 dollars) ,120 Nebraska (dis-
cretionary), 1- North Dakota (discretionary),122 Oregon (10,000
... SORG PRINTING Co., op. cit. supra note 99, at 38.
"'ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 45.55.040 (1962). See also BLUE SKY
L. REP. 6046.
""' ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1943 (1956).
.. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25703.
2' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.12(4) (1962).
I" HAWAII REV. STAT. § 199-11(c) (Supp. 1960).
... IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-839(2) (1960).
1 IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.18 (1949).
11 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, § 229 (Supp. 1963).
1 1 9MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 19,762 (1964).12o Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 409.140 (1952).
... NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 81.321 (1958).
""N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-10 (Supp. 1963).
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dollars), 23 South Dakota (5,000 to 15,000 dollars), 24 and Ver-
mont (1,000 to 25,000 dollars). 2 5
(2) Those states imposing minimum net capital requirements
solely. There are three states in this class. They are (with the re-
spective amounts required): New Hampshire (25,000 dollars),12
New York (10,000 dollars),127 and Pennsylvania (25,000 dollars) .128
(3) Those states imposing minimum net capital and bonding
requirements. This class includes seven states: Arkansas (minimum
net capital of 12,500 dollars and bond of 5,000 and up to 50,000
dollars),129 Colorado (minimum net capital of 10,000 dollars and
bond up to 10,000 dollars), 30 Georgia (minimum net capital of
100,000 dollars and bond of 10,000 dollars),' Kentucky (minimum
net capital of 10,000 dollars and bond up to 10,000 dollars), "'
Oklahoma (minimum net capital of 10,000 dollars and bond of
10,000 dollars),"' South Carolina (minimum net capital up to
10,000 dollars and bond of 10,000 dollars), 134 and Utah (minimum
net capital discretionary and bond of 10,000 dollars).'
(4) Those states imposing minimum net capital or bonding
requirements. These states require a bond only if net capital is
below a prescribed amount. This class includes four states: Ala-
bama (minimum net capital of 25,000 dollars or bond up to 10,000
dollars), 136 Minnesota (minimum net capital of 15,000 dollars or
bond of '15,000 dollars),' 3 7 New Jersey (minimum net capital of
12. ORE. REv. STAT. § 59.310(7) (1963).
124 S.D. CODE § 55.1912 (1960).
... VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4216 (1958).
.. N.H. Reg. 2, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 32610, promulgated under N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 421 (1955).
'
21N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-K.
... Pa. Reg. 1501, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP 41302, promulgated under PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 57 (Supp. 1964).
"'2 1 BLUE SKY L. REp. 1704.
'"
2CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 125-10-4(4), (5) (Supp. 1961).
... Ga. Reg. 2(d) (2), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 14303, promulgated under
GA. CODE ANN. tit. 97, § 105(f) (Cum. Supp. 1963).
2KY. REv. STAT. §§ 292.300(3)(b), (c) (1962).
.. Okla. Rules 59-1 and 64-14, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 39605, 39639,
promulgated under OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 202(d), (e) (Cum. Supp.
1964).
1.. S.C. CODE §§ 62-110, 111 (1962).
...UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-4(4), (5) (Supp. 1963).
... ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 29(c) (Cum. Supp. 1963).
." Minn. Reg. VIII, 2 BLUE SKY L. RE,. 26608, promulgated under
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80.12(2) (Cum. Supp. 1964).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
25,000 dollars or bond of 25,000 dollars),"" Ohio (minimum net
capital of 10,000 dollars or bond discretionary),' 9 and Virginia
(minimum net capital of 25,000 dollars or bond of 25,000 dol-
lars) .140
(5) States imposing bonding and net capital-to-indebtedness
ratio requirements. There is only one state in this class: Mississippi
(ratio requirement of 20:1 and bond of 5,000 dollars).141
(6) Those states imposing net capital-to-indebtedness ratio re-
quirements, minimum capital requirements, and bonding require-
ments. This class includes three states: Kansas (minimum net
capital of 10,000 dollars, ratio requirement of 20:1, and bond of
5,000 dollars),142 Maryland (minimum net capital of 15,000 dol-
lars, ratio requirement of 20:1, and bond up to 10,000 dollars) ,143
and New Mexico (minimum net capital of 5,000 dollars, ratio re-
quirement of 20:1, and bond up to 100,000 dollars) .144
A. Bonding Requirements
The bonds required by any of the above states, either as the
sole requirement or in conjunction with a net capital-to-indebted-
ness ratio requirement or a minimum net capital requirement, are
surety bonds and typically permit an aggrieved person to sue directly
on the bond for violation by the bonded broker-dealer of civil lia-
bilities provisions of the applicable blue-sky law. In fact, the bonds are
conditioned on strict compliance with the blue-sky laws.145 The bonds
are required before the broker-dealer can register and thus conduct
his business within the state, and usually run to the state for the
benefit of aggrieved persons. The sureties required on the bond
must be approved by the state. 4
It should be noted that these bonds differ from the fidelity
bonds required by rule 319 of the NYSE in that the fidelity bond
188 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-1-(e) (Cum. Supp. 1964).
1' Ohio Reg. DS-4, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP 38664, promulgated under
OHIO CODE ANN. § 1707.20 (1964).
... VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-505(b) (1964).
14 Miss. Rule D-5, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 27651, promulgated under Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 5373, 5368 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
" Kan. Regs. 81-17-1, D, 3A and 3B, 1 BLUE SxY L. REp 19703,
promulgated under KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 88 17 -1254(c), 1270(f) (1961).
... MD. CODE ANN. art. 32A, §§ 16(d), (e) (Cum. Supp. 1964)'.
1,, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-18-20.2, 20.3 (Supp. 1963).
E.g., ARIZ. Ruv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1943 (1956).
E.g., CAL. CORP. CODy § 25703.
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does not confer a right of action directly on the customer, 47
whereas the surety bonds required by state blue-sky laws do. How-
ever, there is a limitation on this right, as most blue-sky laws de-
mand that the action be brought within two years from the time the
act complained of occurred.148
All of the states requiring bonds provide that deposits of cash
or securities will be accepted in lieu of such bonds.1 40 Also, most
of the states that require bonds do so regardless of a broker-dealer's
net capital. 50 But a few states demand a bond only in the event
that a broker-dealer's net capital, as defined in the statute or by
appropriate regulation, is less than a given amount. 1 Furthermore,
the bonds required are usually for a determined amount; but a few
states leave the amount of the bond to the discretion of their com-
missioner of securities laws, who is to base his decision on such
factors as the financial condition of the broker-dealer 5 2 or the
volume of business and number of salesmen employed.' However,
even though the bond required may be for a determined amount,
the amount may vary within a prescribed range, depending on the
number of salesmen a broker-dealer has.' 5
4
Clearly, the surety bonds required by a majority of the states
assure the financial responsibility of the broker-dealer at least to the
extent of the face value of the bond, because they allow only broker-
dealers with a substantial amount of money to pay for the bonds
(and who are able to get sureties) to enter into the business.
Furthermore, they prevent a broker-dealer from being judgment
proof when suit is brought for any violation of the civil liabilities
sections of the respective blue-sky laws.
B. Minimum Net Capital Requirements
The minimum net capital requirements, which are imposed either
as the sole requirement or in conjunction with a net capital-to-
indebtedness ratio requirement or a bonding requirement, appear in
varying forms with respect to the dollar amounts required. A
"' See NYSE Rule 319, 2 NYSE Guide 2319.
... E.g., COLo. REv. STAT. § 125-10-4(4) (Supp. 1961).
2' E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.14 (1962).
°E.g, S.C. CODE § 62-111 (1962).
... E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 29(c) (Cum. Supp. 1963).1' E.g, S.D. CoDE § 55.1912 (1960).
1 E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-10 (Supp. 1963).
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1704.
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majority of the blue-sky laws prescribe 10,000 dollars or 15,000
dollars as the necessary level of minimum net capital. Georgia re-
quires the highest level of minimum net capital-100,000 dollars.' 5
A few states provide for more than one level of minimum net
capital. 1'5
Most states fail to define the term "minimum net capital" ("mini-
mum capital" in the words of several blue-sky laws), thus creating the
presumption that minimum net capital simply means a level of cash
that is required to be maintained by the broker-dealer. However, a
few states have defined the phrase either by using their own ter-
minology 17 or by using the same terms that define "net capital"
under the SEC's rule 15c3-1. 55 The few states that define minimum
net capital do so by regulations or rules rather than by the enabling
statute itself. Such a method is essential in light of the technical
nature of minimum net capital rules.
C. Net Capital-to-Indebtedness Ratio Requirement
The four states' 59 imposing a net capital-to-indebtedness ratio
requirement in conjunction with minimum net capital and/or bond-
ing provisions all prescribe a 20:1 ratio. The terms "net capital"
and "aggregate indebtedness" are defined in the statutes of the
respective states by using the terminology of rule 15c3-1.
D. Relief for Violation of Blue-Sky Provisions
The forms of relief available for violation of the above pro-
visions are fairly uniform throughout the states and roughly parallel
those found under the Exchange Act of 1934. First is suspension
or revocation of registration;100 second is injunctive relief."' Fine
and/or imprisonment is a third possible form of relief, one not
"I Ga. Reg. 2(d) (2), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP 14303, promulgated under
GA. CODE ANN. tit. 97, § 105(f) (Cum. Supp. 1963).
... For example, in New Mexico a broker-dealer must have a minimum of
10,000 dollars upon registration, but once registered, only 5,000 dollars.
N.M. Order 61-421B, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 34613, promulgated under N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 48-18-20.2 (Supp. 1963).
"* E.g., N.M. Order 61-421G, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 34613, promulgated
under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-20.2 (Supp. 1963).
' E.g., Okla. Rule 64-14, 2 BLUE SxY L. REP. 39639, promulgated
under OXLA. STA.T. ANN. tit. 17, § 202(d) (Cum. Supp. 1964).
"' Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, and New Mexico. See notes 141-44
supra and accompanying text.
.. 'E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-11(a) (Cum. Supp. 1964).
... E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 292.470 (1962).
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available under federal securities law.'1 2 However, the majority of
the states require that the broker-dealer had knowledge of the pro-
vision or rule before there can be any fine or imprisonment for its
violation.' 63
Most blue-sky laws provide for periodic examinations of broker-
dealers' records and financial statements. 6 4 Thus, violations can be
readily detected.
E. An SEC Ruling
In 1963, the SEC advised broker-dealers in New York that a
violation of a New York statute that specified a minimum net
capital requirement would be considered a violation of the anti-
fraud provisions. 5 The ruling goes beyond the scope of state regu-
lation because the majority of states do not provide for civil liability
for violating capital requirements. Thus, a result unintended by the
states may result from the operation of their laws. Whether the
ruling will be enforced is unknown, but it will undoubtedly serve
as a warning to those in the business.
F. North Carolina
North Carolina does not specifically provide for bonding, mini-
mum capital, or net capital-to-indebtedness ratio requirements.
The only provision expressly dealing with the financial responsibility
of broker-dealers provides that the Secretary of State may cancel the
registration of a broker-dealer if the broker-dealer is insolvent or
in danger of insolvency.'66 However, it requires registration with
the SEC as a prerequisite for registration in the state. This require-
ment subjects broker-dealers in North Carolina to rule 15c3-1 and
thus assures financial responsibility of broker-dealers, at least by
present federal standards.
G. Uniform Securities Act
The Uniform Securities Act contains two provisions directed
toward the financial responsibility of broker-dealers. The first is
section 202(d), which provides: "The [Administrator] may by
rule require a minimum capital for registered broker-dealers"16
7
16248 Stat. 904 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (1958).
E.g., MD. CoDn ANN. art. 32A, § 33(a) (Cum. Supp. 1964).
264E.g., S.C. CoDE § 62-120 (1962).
1"a CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 76927 (1963).
10 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-19 (1965).
21 7 UNIqFoRpM SEcurrlEs AcT § 202(d).
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No net capital to aggregate indebtedness ratio is provided for.
However, the Official Comment to section 202(d) states that any
state that adopts the act and wants to prescribe such a ratio may do
so by adding at the end of section 202(d) : "or prescribe a ratio
between net capital and aggregate indebtedness." 168 Any definition
of the terms "minimum capital" or "ratio between net capital and
aggregate indebtedness" is left to section 412(a), which provides:
"The [Administrator] may from time to time make ... such rules
* . . as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this act ....
Such a relegation of the definition of these terms to administrative
rules or regulations is essential in view of their technical nature.
The second provision, section 202(e), relates to the posting of
surety bonds by broker-dealers:
The [Administrator] may by rule require registered broker-
dealers, to post surety bonds in amounts up to 10,000 dollars, and
may determine their conditions. Any appropriate deposit of cash
or securities shall be accepted in lieu of any bond so required.
No bond may be required of any registrant whose net capital,
which may be defined by rule, exceeds 25,000 dollars. Every
bond shall provide for suit thereon by any person who has a cause
of action under section 410 [section dealing with civil liabilities
under the act], and if the [Administrator] by rule or order re-
quires, by any person who has a cause of action not arising under
this act. Every bond shall provide that no suit may be maintained
to enforce any liability on the bond unless brought within two
years after ... the act upon which it is based.
170
The Official Comment to section 202 (e) states that the administrator
has no discretion whether to accept a deposit of cash or securities
in lieu of a bond but that he has discretion to ascertain if the
amount of the deposit and the type of securities deposited are
proper. '71 Many of the previously discussed blue-sky provisions re-
lating to the requirements of posting bond are similar to section
202(e).
IV. CONCLUSION
Among 215 new broker-dealers registering with the SEC in a
six month period in 1956, twenty-seven per cent had net capital of
"' Loss & Cow'r, BLUE Slx- LAw 265 (1958).
""UNIFORM SECURITIEs ACT § 412(a).
17o UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 202(e).
171 Loss & Cowmr, op. cit. supra note 168, at 266.
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less than 1,000 dollars. 172 Hence, the present pattern of federal
regulation of the financial responsibility of broker-dealers is inade-
quate. More than a net capital-to-aggregate indebtedness ratio is
needed; a minimum net capital rule should be adopted. As recently
as November 22, 1964, the SEC announced that such a rule is to
be formally proposed within a short time. 17  Therefore, barring suc-
cessful opposition to its adoption, a minimum net capital require-
ment will soon exist, and adequate protection of the investing public
will be further assured.
With the adoption of a minimum net capital rule by the NASD,
the regulation of the financial responsibility of broker-dealers by
the self-regulatory bodies will likewise become adequate; the pat-
tern of regulation by the stock exchanges is already sufficient.
While adoption of the pertinent provisions of the Uniform
Securities Act is recommended, it appears unlikely that many states
will provide this further assurance of financial responsibility in the
near future. However, any concern over the lack of sufficient assur-
ances by the states is mitigated by the extensive regulation by
federal and self-regulatory bodies.
BARRY A. OsmuN
Conflicts-Most Significant Relationship Rule
Decedent, a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, purchased a ticket
in Pennsylvania from an air line, a Delaware corporation with
principal offices in Illinois, for a flight from Pennsylvania to Ari-
zona. The plane crashed while landing at a scheduled stop in
Colorado, causing the decedent's immediate death. The executor
of his estate brought an action against the air line in Pennsylvania
for breach of contract of carriage, seeking recovery under Pennsyl-
vania's law of damages which allowed recovery for decedent's
probable earnings during the period of his life expectancy.1 The
lower court sustained the contract action, but denied recovery
under Pennsylvania's law of damages, holding that the law of the
Special Study, pt. 1, at 85.
1 N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1964, p. 59, col. 5.
'See, e.g., Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 335, 191 A.2d
822, 828-29 (1963).
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place of wrong, Colorado, controlled. A Colorado statute denied
recovery for prospective earnings after death.2 The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.,3 reversed and
held that Pennsylvania's law of damages should govern. The court
first concluded that negligence rather than contract principles
should be applied because the contract characterization ignored the
realities of the situation. The court then overruled the state's
traditional choice of law rule for personal injuries, which required
the application of the law of the place of wrong,4 and formulated
a more flexible rule that permits analysis of the interests and policies
of the states involved in determining which jurisdiction's law should
apply.
The traditional choice of law rule for tort actions, previously
followed in Pennsylvania and embodied in the first Restatement,5
is the lex loci delicti principle that the substantive rights and liabili-
ties of the parties are determined by the law of the place of wrong.0
This rule has been justified by the vested rights doctrine,7 under
which the rights and obligations incurred under the law of the juris-
diction where the wrong occurs8 are said to vest in the parties
and follow them into any jurisdiction in which suit is brought.
The forum, or court in which suit is brought, ascertains "the place
2 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 152-1-9 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1960). See also
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1-3 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1960), which limits
recovery to an amount not exceeding $25,000 in a cause of action based on
a wrongful act.
'416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
"See, e.g., Vant v. Gish, 412 Pa. 359, 365-66, 194 A.2d 522, 526 (1963);
Bednarowicz v. Vetrone, 400 Pa. 385, 162 A.2d 687 (1960); Rennekamp v.
Blair, 375 Pa. 620, 101 A.2d 669 (1954); Rodney v. Staman, 371 Pa. 1, 89
A.2d 313 (1952).
SRESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934): "(1) If a cause of
action in tort is created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recog-
nized in other states. (2) If no cause of action is created at the place of
wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state." See generally
GOODRICHI, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92 (4th ed. 1964).
a Ibid.
See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-92 (1935); STUMBERG, CON-
FLICT OF LAWs 8 (3d ed. 1963).
8 REsTATEFENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934): "The place of wrong
is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an
alleged tort takes place."
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (Holmes, J.). "The
theory of foreign suits is that the act complained of was subject to no law
having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which,
like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever
the person be found." Id. at 126.
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where a right arose and the law that created it . . ."1 and applies
that law to the particular case, thus giving effect to a foreign created
right through the forum's law of conflicts-in this case the lex loci
delicti rule." The first Restatement recognized two exceptions to
the rule: the forum applies its own procedural rules,' 2 and the
forum applies its own law when the law of the place of wrong is
contrary to a strong public policy of the forum.'8
Because of the long-standing adherence to the predictable and
uniform rules of the first Restatement, forums are reluctant to
overrule them even when their application produces an unjust result.
To avoid abrogation of the place of wrong rule and yet reach
equitable results, some forums have devised avenues of escape,
technically within the first Restatement's rules, by which they apply
law other than that of the place of wrong. Since the first Restate-
ment recognized that the forum applied its own rules of procedure, 14
some courts seeking to avoid applying the law of the place of wrong
have characterized substantive problems before them as procedural,
and thus subject to the law of the forum.' 5 For example, one forum
characterized survival of a cause of action not as an essential
part of the cause of action, but rather as a matter of enforcement
of the claim for damages, and hence a procedural question subject
to the law of the forum.' 6 Other courts have characterized actions
10 1 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 8A.8.
' RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 1, 5 (1934).12Id. § 585. See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 124-25 (1962);
STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 7, at 133, 154-55.
" RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934). See, e.g., Gordon
v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949); Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal. App.
2d 76, 136 P.2d 116 (1949) (cause of action for alienation of affections
against forum's public policy); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d
34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (limitation on damages in
place of wrong against forum's public policy). See generally Paulsen &
Sovern, Public Policy in Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 969 (1956).
" See note 12 supra.
"0 See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 42, 172 N.E.2d
526, 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 137 (1961) (damage limitation classified as
procedural; see note 13 supra for an alternative basis for applying the
forum's law). Contra, Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126
(1904) (damage limitation considered a substantive matter) ; Northern Pac.
R.R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894). But see Davenport v. Webb, 11
N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962) (subsequent decision
withdrawing the procedural classification in Kilberg).
1 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 866, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953).
Contra, RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390 (1934), which considers
survival of a cause of action to be a substantive matter governed by the
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essentially sounding in tort as questions of contract law to avoid
the place of wrong rule." On the other hand, some courts have
found exception to the place of wrong rule and have formulated
specific new choice of law rules in tort actions involving questions
of intrafamilial immunity from tort liability,"8 decedent's estates
law,'" and workmen's compensation, 0 in order to apply the law of a
jurisdiction other than that of the place where the wrong occurred.
For example, one forum characterized an action involving inter-
spousal immunity from tort liability as family law to be governed
by the law of the domicile of the parties, which, in this case, was
the forum.2 ' Other courts have ignored the place of wrong rule
and applied the forum's statutory liability for a certain act where
the law of the place of wrong imposed no such liability.
22
The results reached by these courts have been said to be
desirable, but the means of reaching them have been criticized.23
Many commentators have advocated abolition of the first Restate-
law of the place of wrong. For an alternative basis of McAldiffe, see note
19 infra.
"' See Dyke v. Eire Ry., 45 N.Y. 133 (1871) (personal injury action
arising out of train accident characterized as breach of contract).
8 See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (un-
emancipated minor permitted to recover from parent under law of domicile);
Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
See generally Ehrenzweig, Parental Immunity in Conflict of Laws, 23 U.
CHi. L. REv. 474 (1956) ; Ford, Intersponsal Immunity for Automobile Ac-
cidents in Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 15
U. PiTT. L. REv. 397 (1954).
10 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 866, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953)
(survival of tort action is question of administration of decedent's estate
governed by law of decedent's domicile).
20 See, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packer Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 294 U.S.
532 (1935).
" Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 103, 137, 95 N.W.2d 814,
818 (1959).
" See Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365
(1957) (forum's dram shop act applied to hold innkeeper liable for negligent
act occurring outside forum).
2 Commenting on his opinion in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859,
264 P.2d 944 (1953), Judge Traynor says:
It may not be amiss to add that although the opinion in the case is my
own, I do not regard it as ideally articulated, developed as it had to be
against the brooding background of a petrified forest. Yet I would
make no more apology for it than that in reaching a rational result it was
less deft than it might have been to quit itself of the familiar speech of
choice of law.
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAs L. Rav. 657, 670
n.35 (1959).
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ment's mechanical rules2 4 and the adoption of other approaches, some
emphasizing an analysis of the policies and interests of the com-
peting states,25 some the interests of the parties involved,20 and
others the significant contacts of the states with the tortious oc-
currence and the parties2 7 to determine which jurisdiction's law
applies. The latter approach has been adopted by the second Restate-
inent in place of the le% loci delicti rule.28 However, it was not until
"2 Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUm. L. REV.
959 (1952); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confiesion in New York, 1963
DuKE L.J. 1; Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 754 (1963); Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in
the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1963);
Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1243
(1963); Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Re-
reading Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947); Morris,
The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARv. L. REV. 881 (1951); Reese, Conflict
of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 679
(1963); Stumberg, "The Place of the Wrong": Torts and the Conflict of
Laws, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 388 (1959); Traynor, supra note 23.
"' Most critics agree that any approach to the solution of a conflicts
problem must include an analysis of the policies of the competing states, but
there is a divergence of views as to the methods to be used in analyzing the
policy interests in order to determine which state's law should be applied.
Some critics prefer to analyze the policy interests underlying the respective
laws in terms of each state's contact with the events and parties, weighing
the respective policies in light of their contacts. See Cheatham, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1229 (1963); Lefar, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1247 (1963); Weintraub, A
Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215
(1963). On the other hand, Professor Currie prefers an analysis by the forum
of its governmental interests in the issues. If the forum finds a legitimate
interest, Currie believes the forum should apply its law even if the foreign
state has a contrary interest. See Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson,
63 CoLum. L. REv. 1233 (1963); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in
New York, 1963 DuxE LJ. 1.
"' Analysis of the interests of the parties in light of the forum's policy
is the solution proposed by Professor Ehrenzweig. This approach emphasizes
the interests of the defendant by applying the law of the forum if such ap-
plication will not be prejudicial to the defendant. Ehrenzweig says the pri-
mary interests the forum should consider are the ability of the defendant
to procure liability insurance adequate under the applicable law and the
ability of the insurer to reasonably calculate the premium. Ehrenzweig,
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 24.
2 This approach analyzes the competing state's contacts with the events
and parties to determine which state has the most significant relationship
to the events and parties and applies that state's law. See note 28 infra.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1964, approved May 21, 1964):
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant rela-
tionship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights
and liabilities in tort.
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1963 that a court overruled the place of wrong rule in a tort action.
In this case, Babcock v. Jackson,29 the New York Court of Appeals
formulated a jurisdiction-selecting test in which the forum analyzes
the policies of each state as expressed in their conflicting laws and
weighs the interests of each in vindicating its policy in light of its
physical contacts with the events and the parties. This test com-
bined several of the approaches that have been urged by critics to
replace the traditional rule.30
The Pennsylvania court in Griffith followed the test set forth in
Babcock. In determining that Pennsylvania's damage law applied,
the court first analyzed the interests of Colorado and the policies
behind her damage law in light of her contacts with the events and
parties. Colorado's lone contact with the occurrence was place of
wrong. The court found that the state where the wrong occurs
has no interest in compensation where, as here, death is immediate
and the site of the accident is fortuitous. In considering the policy
reasons behind the damage limitation, the court indicated Colorado's
lack of interest in the amount of recovery in a Pennsylvania court,
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining
the state of most significant relationship include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicil, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contracts, the forum
will consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant pur-
poses of the tort rules of the interested states.
See Reese, supra note 24. For a criticism of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
approach, see Comment, The Second Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A
Caveat, 51 CALIF. L. RFv. 762 (1963).
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), 77 HARV.
L. REv. 355 (1963); 42 N.C.L. REv. 419 (1964); 49 VA. L. REV. 1362
(1962). The court allowed a New York domiciliary who was injured in
Ontario while riding as a guest passenger in a New York automobile to re-
cover against the host driver who was also a New York domiciliary, al-
though Ontario prohibits recovery by a guest against a host driver. See
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,
63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212 (1963). But cf. Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson--A
Practicing Attorney's Reflections upon the Opinion and Its Implications,
31 IN s. COuNsEL J. 428 (1964).
80 See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Con-
flict of Laws, supra note 29. Professor Currie, referring to the reasoning of
the Babcock court, says: "Indeed, the majority opinion contains items of com-
fort for almost every critic of the traditional system." Currie, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1233, 1234 (1963).
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because the policy behind the limitation could only be intended to
prevent Colorado courts from engaging in "speculative computation
of expected earnings"'" or to prevent large verdicts against Colorado
defendants. On the other hand, the court concluded that Pennsyl-
vania had an interest in the amount of compensation. The relation-
ship giving rise to the air line's duty to the decedent arose in
Pennsylvania, and more important, the decedent and his surviving
dependents were domiciled in that state. Because of these con-
tacts, the court considered Pennsylvania to be vitally concerned with
the administration of the decedent's estate and the well-being of
the surviving dependents to the extent of granting full recovery,
including expected earnings. 2 Finally, the court examined the
interests of the defendant and concluded that subjecting the air line
to unlimited recovery placed no undue burden on it or its insurer for
both could protect against this eventuality.
The jurisdiction-selecting rule followed in Griffith is designed
to choose the law of one state for each particular issue presented. 8
In Griffith, the issue was damages. Presumably, if asked to decide
which state's standard of care should apply, the court would look
to Colorado law because Colorado has a greater interest that Penn-
sylvania in requiring a given standard of care within its borders.
In contrast to this approach, both the first and second Restatement
rules choose the law of one state to govern all issues of the case.84
' Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 807 (Pa. 1964).
3 Pennsylvania's policy of granting full recovery is found in its constitu-
tion which prohibits the state legislature from limiting recovery for in-juries resulting in death. PA. CONST. art. III, § 21. Conceivably, the court
in Griffith could have refused to apply Colorado's damage limitation as being
against the strong public policy of the forum and thus avoided overruling
the place of wrong rule. See Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 472, 3 N.E.2d
597, 599 (1936) (public policy defined as "the law of the state, whether
found in the Constitution, the statutes or judicial records"); Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 40, 172 N.E.2d 526, 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133, 136 (1961) (damage limitation of place of wrong against forum's public
policy of allowing full recovery, defined in the forum's constitution).
"' See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963); Dym v. Gordon, 411 Misc. 2d 657, 245 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
"REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 384, (1934); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964, approved
May 21, 1964). The introductory note to § 379 of the RESTAREmENT (SEC-
OND) states that "the law selected governs all issues dealt with in Title B
(§ 3791-390g)." For example, § 380 provides that "the law selected by ap-
plication of the rule of § 379 determines the standard of care by which
the actor's conduct shall be judged."
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The latter approach arbitrarily ignores the often valid interests of
another jurisdiction in one or more issues of the case.
The underlying concept of any test that rejects the traditional
rules of conflicts seems to be that the forum will avoid, where pos-
sible, laws that deny or limit the injured party's recovery. The
Griffith test places certain limitations on such a policy. The forum
may apply the law of another jurisdiction if the forum determines
that that jurisdiction has a greater policy reason than the forum
in seeing its laws vindicated. Except where the defendant is
domiciled in the state, it is questionable if the place of wrong ever
has a policy interest in the determination of the amount of recovery,
because its policies of limiting recovery have no relationship to
the events and parties.3 5 Where the defendant is domiciled in the
place of wrong, it may have a policy interest in protecting its
domiciliary from excessive tort liability.36 On the other hand, the
place of wrong always has a greater interest in requiring a given
standard of conduct within its borders. 7 Another limitation on
the policy of allowing full recovery is the protection of the de-
fendant's personal interests. If the defendant cannot reasonably
protect against the application of the liability of the forum, the
forum may apply the law of the place of wrong. In the case of in-
terstate enterprises in general and specifically in the case of air
lines, this consideration is meaningless, for such concerns must pro-
tect against all forms of liability in all jurisdictions in which they do
business.38 Finally, the Griffith test may be used by courts to select
the law of the place of wrong where obligations, such as medical
"* Weintraub, smpra note 25, at 220, 227. See Grant v. McAuliffe, 41
Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249
Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co.,
7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
" See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526,
211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (place of wrong said to have a policy interest in
limiting liability of domiciled air line). See generally Currie, Conflict,
Crisis and Confusion in New York, supra note 24. It is questionable whether
the place of wrong has an interest in protecting its domiciled corporation
when that state has no interest in protecting the defendant if the tort
occurs in another jurisdiction. Weintraub, supra note 25, at 228-29.
" Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 750-51 (1963). Referring to the issue of the defendant's
standard of care, the court said: "[I]t is appropriate to look to the law of
the place of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdiction's interest in
regulating conduct within its borders, and it would be almost unthinkable
to seek the applicable rule in the law of some other place." Ibid.
" EuRENZWEIG, CorFLicT OF LAws § 213 (1962).
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expenses, are incurred in that jurisdiction, because that jurisdiction
has an interest in seeing that the obligations are met. This interest
seems relevant only where application of the forum's law would
completely deny recovery, because where damage limitations are
involved some recovery is always assured if a tort has been com-
mitted; hence such obligations will be met regardless of which
state's law is applied.
The fact situation in Griffith posed an ideal situation for the
application of the forum's law. By varying the facts to bring into
play any of the limitations that may deny the use of the forum's law,
there is created what has been called a true conflicts problem
because each state has a valid interest in seeing its laws ap-
plied. 9 Under the Griffith rationale, if the forum is the domicile
of the injured party, the conflict will usually be resolved in favor
of the forum, for in balancing the interests and policies in light of
the contacts, the forum will give greater weight to its interests
and policies than those of another jurisdiction.4" But if a disin-
terested forum were to apply the same test, the balancing of the
interests and policies would be made without the emphasis on the
law of the domicile of the injured parties, and a different con-
clusion could be reached. 4
By subjecting the law of conflicts to a test that balances the
interests and policies of the states involved in order to yield a
socially desirable result, the Pennsylvania court may have opened a
"' See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, supra note 24, at 764.
Currie considers Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172
N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), to be an example of a true conflict
problem because the forum has an interest in protecting its domiciled
plaintiff by granting full recovery and because the place of wrong has an
interest in protecting its domiciled corporation, which is also doing business
in the state, from unlimited liability. In Kilberg, a New York domiciliary
was allowed full recovery under New York law as a matter of public policy
in a wrongful death action arising out of a plane crash in Massachusetts.
The defendant air line was domiciled in Massachusetts, which limited re-
covery in wrongful death actions.
"0 See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 39. In Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962) (rehearing in banc),
reversing 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963),
the court held that the result reached in Kilberg did not violate the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution because "a state with substantial
ties to a transaction in dispute has a legitimate constitutional interest in
the application of its own rules of law." 309 F.2d at 559. Cf. Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
" See Skahill v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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Pandora's box of judicial uncertainty. With the introduction of such
a rule, uniform treatment would not be given to a cause of action
in all jurisdictions where it might be litigated.42 Lack of uniformity
between jurisdictions encourages forum-shopping to find the juris-
diction with the most advantageous law in which to bring the ac-
tion.43 Lack of predictability and certainty lengthens courtroom
procedure through drawn-out adjudication of conflict problems.44
Instability and confusion enters the field of conflicts under such a
rule. On the other hand, the place of wrong rule totally ignores the
policy considerations behind the laws of the other jurisdictions
having contact with the occurrence. It ignores the interests of the
parties by applying the law of a jurisdiction that does not purport
to account for their interests. Furthermore, as the court in Griffith
said, the standard it used is no less clear than the concepts of reason-
ableness and due process which the courts presently employ. 5
In deciding to apply the law of the forum, the Pennsylvania court
did not avoid the traditional rules by some devious characterization . 4
It chose to overrule the place of wrong rule in favor of a new test
now followed by two jurisdictions . 4  The merits of such a test out-
weigh the place of wrong rule, which is still followed and reaffirmed
by a majority of courts, including North Carolina.4 ' The ideal
conflict of laws rule is one that is uniform and predictable and yet
produces just results. The traditional place of wrong rule is pre-
dictable and uniform, but its application often leads to unjust and
arbitrary results. The Griffith test is designed to give socially
desirable results. Although it is not uniform and certain at present,
sophisticated judicial application of the Griffith test to numerous
choice of law problems will hopefully produce sound precedents
that establish its certainty and uniformity.
RIcHARD G. ELLIOTT, JR.
"See Sparks, supra note 29, at 434-35.
,
8 Id. at 435. But see Cravers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and
the Federal Court, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 373 (1963).
"Cf. Texas v. Nev Jersey, 85 Sup. Ct. 626 (1965).
,203 A.2d at 806.
,8 For possible alternatives the Griffith court could have used to avoid
overruling the place of wrong rule, see notes 15, 17 & 32 supra.
"' Though other states have avoided the effects of the place of wrong rule,
see notes 15-22 supra, only New York and Pennsylvania have overruled it.
" See, e.g., Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963), where
the court, when asked to overrule the place of wrong rule, replied, "We
do not deem it wise to voyage into such an uncharted sea, leaving behind
well established conflict of laws rules." Id. at 616, 129 S.E.2d at 293.
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Constitutional Law-Right to Counsel and Transcript on Appeal-
Waiver-Retroactivity-Post-Conviction Hearing Act
Following his conviction in 1959, the defendant gave notice of
appeal in open court. Two months later the defendant again ap-
peared in open court, and expressed a desire to withdraw his ap-
peal. Although he had been represented by his own counsel
at the trial, the defendant was indigent the second time he appeared
in court, was without counsel, and had not been furnished a tran-
script of his trial even though he had asked the clerk of court for
one. Four and one-half years later, the defendant filed a petition
for a post-conviction hearing under the North Carolina Post-Con-
viction Hearing Act.' At the post-conviction hearing the defendant
asserted a denial of his constitutional rights to have counsel on
appeal and a transcript of his trial furnished by the state. The
judge, however, ruled that the defendant had waived his right to
a transcript by the withdrawal of his notice of appeal.' This ruling
was reversed in 1964 by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
State v. Roux.' Accordingly, the case was remanded to the superior
court with an order that the defendant be permitted to appeal to
the supreme court with appointed counsel.
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with
the rights of an indigent appealing his conviction would seem to
require such a holding. The principles set forth by these decisions
also indicate that the North Carolina Supreme Court was correct
in first ruling on whether the defendant had been denied the right
to counsel and a transcript before deciding whether there was a
waiver of the right to appeal. In Douglas v. California,4 the Su-
preme Court held that the equal protection clause requires that an
indigent have the benefit of counsel when the merits of his one
and only appeal as of right are decided. Douglas applies to appeals
from criminal convictions in the superior courts of North Carolina,
because a defendant has as a matter of right only an appeal to the
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1953, Supp. 1963). See generally
29 N.C.L. REv. 390 (1951).
'Although the defendant asserted a denial of counsel, the judge ap-
parently did not rule on this question.
8263 N.C. 149, 139 S.E.2d 189 (1964).
'372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
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supreme court.' Therefore, the court in Roux correctly held that
the defendant as an indigent had a constitutional right to have
counsel appointed to represent him on appeal.
The court in Roux held that under Griffin v. Illinois6 the de-
fendant had a constitutional right to a free transcript of his trial.
However, in Draper v. WashingtoY the Supreme Court established
that an indigent defendant's right to a transcript is not absolute,
but depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.' Where
the indigent needs a transcript of his trial in order to prepare an
adequate record for appeal, the state must provide him with "means
of presenting his contentions to the appellate court which are as good
as those available to a nonindigent defendant . . . ." Assuming
that the defendant in Rou% needed a transcript of his trial in order
to prepare a record for appeal, the court was correct in holding
that he had a constitutional right to a free transcript.'0
The court in Roux was then faced with the question of whether
the purported waiver of appeal by the defendant constituted a
waiver of the constitutional rights to counsel and transcript. The
court ruled that the defendant's withdrawal of his notice of appeal
did not constitute a waiver of his rights of counsel and transcript."
The Supreme Court has recognized that constitutional rights may
be waived by an individual, 2 but has made it clear that the waiver
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-180 (1953) provides: "In all cases of conviction
in the superior court for any criminal offense, the defendant shall have
the right to appeal, on giving adequate security to abide the sentence, judg-
ment or decree of the Supreme Court; and the appeal shall be perfected and
the case for the Supreme Court settled, as provided in civil actions."
8 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
" 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
"Moreover, part or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases
will not be germane to consideration of the appeal, and a State will not
be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such circumstances.
If, for instance, the points urged relate only to the validity of the statute
or the sufficiency of the indictment upon which conviction was predi-
cated, the transcript is irrelevant and need not be provided.
Id. at 495-96.
'Id. at 496.
" See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 (Supp. 1963), which provides:
"When an appeal is taken under this section the county shall make available
trial transcript and records required for an adequate and effective appellate
review."
" 263 N.C. at 157-58, 139 S.E.2d at 195.
1" See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Moore v. Michi-
gan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317
U.S. 269 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
1965]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of constitutional rights will not be lightly inferred 8 and that the
Court will indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver
of fundamental constitutional rights.' 4 In Carnley v. Cochran5
the Court held that before there could be a waiver of the right to
counsel in state criminal proceedings the state must have offered
counsel to the indigent defendant. The Court said: "Presuming
waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show,
or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an
accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly
rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver."'
Although Carnley involved the right to counsel at the trial
level and was based on the due process clause17 whereas Douglas
involved the right to counsel on appeal and was based on the equal
protection clause,'" this distinction should make no difference in
the application of the Carnley test of waiver to the right recognized
in Douglas.19 The defendant in Roux was not informed of his
right to appointed counsel on appeal. Furthermore, his request for
a transcript had been denied. Under the test of waiver formulated
by Carnley, he did not waive his right to counsel and a transcript.
After holding that the defendant had not waived the right to
counsel and a transcript, the court in Roux ruled that he had not
waived his right to appeal when he had voluntarily and without
duress withdrawn his prior notice of appeal. Although the court
apparently based this holding on a finding that the defendant had
not "intelligently and understandingly" waived the right to appeal,
" Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949).
' See Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Smith v. United
States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301
U.S. 389 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408 (1882).
1 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
11 Id. at 516.
17 Id. at 512-13.
28 372 U.S. at 358.
" In this tradition, our own constitutional guaranties of due process and
equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow
no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of
persons. Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central
aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must,
so far as the law is concerned, "stand on an equality before the bar of
justice .... ." Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from
invidious discriminations.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 18 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
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the result should be the same regardless of the nature of the pur-
ported waiver of appeal--i.e., without attempting to apply the
Carnley test of waiver. Once a state grants the right to appeal a
criminal conviction,20 an indigent defendant is entitled under Doug-
las and Griffin- to have this appeal decided with the aid of appointed
counsel and a transcript furnished by the state.2 A holding that
an indigent defendant, uninformed of his rights under Douglas
and Griffin, has waived the right to appeal is a denial of these rights,
since the appeal is in effect being decided without the defendant hav-
ing the benefit of counsel and a transcript. In short, where an ap-
pellate court finds that an indigent defendant was not offered coun-
sel and a transcript following his conviction in the trial court, it
apparently need not inquire further, since any adverse determina-
tion of the defendant's right to appeal would necessarily be an un-
constitutional denial of the right to counsel on appeal and a tran-
script.
Roux also involved the retroactive application of Douglas,
decided in 1963. In holding the defendant was entitled to counsel
on appeal in 1959, Roux implicitly held Douglas to be retroactive.
Retroactivity was not discussed in Roux, however; nor has it been
in Supreme Court decisions applying Douglas. The result in Roux
apparently follows the application that the Supreme Court has
given to Douglas. In three instances22 the Supreme Court has
vacated the judgment of a state court where the indigent defendant's
appeal without counsel occurred prior to the time of the decision in
Douglas. In each of these cases, however, the defendant's appeal
was decided in the state court during the interval between the state
court's decision on the appeals of the petitioners in Douglas and
the decision of the Supreme Court in Douglas. Because the decision
2 The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to appeal is not a con-
stitutional right and that the right depends on the state's having provided
for appellate review. See id. at 18; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508
(1903) ; McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
21 The holding in Douglas is expressly limited to apply only to the first
appeal which is granted as a matter of right from a criminal conviction.
The Court stated that it was not dealing with a denial of counsel for the
preparation of a petition for discretionary or mandatory review beyond the
initial appeal granted as a matter of right. 372 U.S. at 356. In a state
having two levels of appellate review, the above statement in the text
should be limited to this extent.
"Daegele v. Kansas, 375 U.S. 1 (1963) (memorandum decision);
Ausbie v. California, 375 U.S. 24 (1963) (memorandum decision); Tabb v.
California, 375 U.S. 27 (1963) (memorandum decision).
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in Douglas would have to apply back to the time the right was denied
the petitioners in Douglas in order to assure equal protection of the
law,28 these cases cannot be considered conclusive as to the retro-
activity of Douglas. In Smith v. Crouse,24 however, the indigent
defendant's petition for appointment of counsel for appeal had been
denied some four months before the petitioners in Douglas had ap-
pealed to the state court without counsel. In a memorandum
opinion,25 the Supreme Court cited Douglas and reversed the state
supreme court's ruling28 that Douglas was not retroactive; the effect
appears to be a retroactive application of Douglas. In all four of
these cases the Court declined to write an opinion ;27 thus the full
import of the decisions is not clear.28
Unquestionably, many inmates of North Carolina prisons were
indigent at the time of their trial and were not offered counsel for
appeal following their convictions. Under the retroactive applica-
tion given Douglas in Roux, these individuals have been denied a
constitutional right, i.e., the right to counsel on appeal.
A simple and effective means of asserting the denial of this
right is found in the North Carolina Post-Conviction Hearing
Act,29 as applied in Roux. General Statutes section 15-217 provides
that no action shall be commenced under the act more than five
years after the judgment resulting from an allegedly unconstitu-
tional conviction unless the petitioner shows the delay was not caused
by laches or negligence on his part."0 One who was denied counsel
2 See United States ex rel. Durocher v. La Vallee, 330 F.2d 303, 310
n.4 (1964).
- 378 U.S. 584 (1964) (memorandum decision).
25Ibid.
28 Smith v. Crouse, 192 Kan. 171, 386 P.2d 295 (1963).
27 The Supreme Court has treated cases involving lack of counsel at the
trial level arising after the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), in the same manner. In Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S.
2 (1964), the Court vacated and remanded ten pre-Gideon convictions back
to the state court "for further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wailt-
wright."
28 In this respect a statement from Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting
opinion in Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1964), seems ap-
propriate: "In the current swift pace of constitutional change, the time
has come for the Court to deal definitively with this important and far
reaching subject [i.e., retroactivity of decisions]."2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1953, Supp. 1963).
,oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217 (Supp. 1963). It has been held that a state
may attach reasonable time limitations on the assertion of constitutional
rights under a post-conviction hearing act and that a provision similar to §
15-217 is constitutional. United States ex reL. Dopkowski v. Randolph, 262
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in proceedings occurring more than five years before the decision
in Douglas in 1963 should not be barred by section 15-217, since
one could hardly be considered negligent in failing to assert the
denial of a right that neither he nor anyone else knew existed prior
to 1963. If a time limitation must be placed on the use of the
act in this situation, it is suggested that the limitation should run
from the time of the Douglas decision in 1963 and should certainly
be no shorter than the five-year period of section 15-217. Defen-
dants who were denied counsel on appeal less than five years before
1963 raise a different question, namely whether they should have
the suggested five-year period beginning in 1963 or only such part
of the statutory five-year period as remains after 1963. Although
there is some authority indicating that the defendant would have
only that part of the five-year period remaining in 1963,1 it would
be more in keeping with the purpose of the act to allow such a de-
fendant the full five-year period beginning in 1963.2 Of course,
defendants who were denied counsel subsequent to 1963 call for an
ordinary application of the act and thus pose no problem.
WILLIAM L. STOCKS
F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1004 (1959). Although such pro-
visions have in some instances been given a strict interpretation, see, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Lilyroth v. Ragen, 222 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 939 (1956), the post-conviction hearing acts should not be
construed so strictly that their purpose is defeated. See People v. Reeves,
412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 681 (1952). Accordingly, it has been held that a
defendant is not barred by such a time limitation if he is feeble minded,
Jablonski v. People, 330 Il. App. 422, 71 N.E.2d 361 (1947), or if the as-
serted grounds for relief were fraudulently concealed from him. See Merkie
v. People, 15 Ill. 2d 539, 155 N.E.2d 581, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1015 (1959).
However, a defendant's incarceration will not alone be sufficient to prevent
the running of the limitation. See United States ex rel. Lilyroth v. Ragen,
supra; People v. Austin, 329 Ill. App. 276, 67 N.E.2d 883 (1946).
3 See United States ex rel. Lilyroth v. Ragen, supra note 30, where the
defendant was in Indiana in prison when the Illinois Post-Conviction Hear-
ing Act was enacted. He was returned to Illinois and imprisoned for a
parole violation when only two months of the five-year limitation remained.
It was held that he was barred by the time limitation because he did not
file the petition for review under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act within
the two-month period.
"2 See State v. Cruse, 238 N.C. 53, 76 S.E.2d 320 (1953) (purpose of
the act is to provide an "adequate, simple and effective" post-conviction
remedy); State v. Miller, 237 N.C. 29, 74 S.E.2d 513 (1953) (purpose of
the act is to provide an "adequate and available" post-conviction remedy).
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Credit Transactions-Mortgages-Purchase by Life Tenant
In Morehead v. Harris,' a husband, joined by his wife, had
executed a deed of trust on two tracts of land as security for a loan.
The husband died intestate with the debt outstanding. At a fore-
closure sale pursuant to the terms of the deed of trust, the wife
purchased the property for an amount equal to the unpaid balance of
the loan plus the cost of foreclosure. She received a deed from the
trustee purporting to vest in her a fee simple title to the property,
which was worth considerably more than she had paid at the sale.
The wife sold one tract of the property and devised the remaining
tract to her sisters. Before her death, the children of her mortgagor-
husband had begun litigation to recover both tracts of land. In
granting a recovery to the children,' the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the wife purchased the property to protect her dower
interest and, as a life tenant, she held the excess above her life estate
in one-third of the property as trustee for the remaindermen.3 By
dictum, the court stated that if the wife, as life tenant, had paid
more than her proportionate share, she would be a creditor of the
estate for that amount.4 The case gives rise to two issues that merit
discussion: can a life tenant ever purchase mortgaged property free
of trust and, when he cannot, how much of the purchase price can
be recovered from the remaindermen as the excess above the life
tenant's proportionate share?
262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174 (1964). The case had come before the
court once before, but was remanded to the superior court because of an omis-
sion of necessary parties. Morehead v. Harris, 255 N.C. 130, 120 S.E.2d
425 (1961).
2 This statement should be qualified in that a recovery was granted to
the children as opposed to the wife, but as to the tract conveyed by the wife,
the court remanded for a new trial on the grounds that the purchasers of
the property may be in the position of bona fide purchasers for value and
that the children had done nothing to protect their title. 262 N.C. at 344,
137 S.E.2d at 187.
'The wife was also the administratrix of the husband's estate, and the
court said that she was acting in a fiduciary capacity. It was stated that
when the fiduciary purchased at his own sale, he was a "trustee for tile
benefit of the estate to prevent loss to the estate." Id. at 336, 137 S.E.2d
at 180. Even though the wife did not purchase at her own sale (since this
sale was conducted by the trustee and not the administratrix of the estate),
the rule was said to apply. However, this reasoning is not important since
the trust would have been implied even if the wife had not been the ad-
ministratrix.
'Id. at 336, 137 S.E.2d at 181.
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North Carolina seems to be within the majority rule5 that the
life tenant becomes a trustee for the remaindermen when he pur-
chases directly at the foreclosure sale.6 However, the court makes a
distinction where the life tenant purchases from a third party who
bought at the sale. In an earlier North Carolina case,7 a wife had
executed a deed of trust to secure a loan. After her death, her
husband, a life tenant by curtesy, allowed a foreclosure. 8 The land
was purchased by a stranger who, on the same day, transferred the
title to the husband for a consideration equal to the purchase price.
When the children of the wife sought to recover the property, the
court held that no trust was implied absent a jury finding of fraud
or that the stranger acted as agent for the husband. Therefore, the
husband received a valid fee simple title to the property.
In considering the rationale and policy in the cases imposing a
trust on the life tenant, there seems to be justification for different
results when the life tenant purchases directly at foreclosure and
when he purchases from a third person. It is clear that any person
claiming an interest in the property under the intestate mortgagor
may redeem the property until foreclosure, at which time the re-
' Bullock v. Peoples Bank, 351 Mo. 587, 602, 173 S.W.2d 753, 759 (1943) ;
Tindall v. Peterson, 71 Neb. 160, 98 N.W. 688 (1904); MaGee v. Carter,
31 Tenn. App. 141, 148-49, 212 S.W.2d 902, 906 (1948). In Tindall, the
wife of the mortgagor resigned as administratrix of his estate and purchased
the property at the foreclosure sale. Without calling it a trust, the court
held that she protected her life interest and the interest of the remaindermen.
'See Farabow v. Perry, 223 N.C. 21, 25 S.E.2d 173 (1943); Creech v.
Wilder, 212 N.C. 162, 193 S.E. 281 (1937).
1 Miller v. Marriner, 187 N.C. 449, 121 S.E. 770 (1924).
'Even though the life tenant holds the property as trustee for the re-
maindermen, there are times when the life tenant is justified in allowing
a foreclosure on the deed of trust which will terminate the rights of the
remaindermen in the property. It has been established in North Carolina
that the life tenant is only liable to pay the interest on the encumbrance for
the duration of the period in which the interest was due, and then only to
the extent of the amount of "rent or actual value" received from the property.
Therefore, the life tenant is not a trustee for the remaindermen in that he
has to pay the interest to prevent a foreclosure under any circumstances.
Id. at 455, 121 S.E.2d at 773. See also Williams v. Williams, 120 So. 2d
202 (Fla. 1960).
o In addition to the situation where the third party is acting as agent
for the life tenant or there is fraud, it has been stated that the implied trust
will also arise where there is an agreement between the life tenant and
the third party that the life tenant provide an opportunity for the remainder-
men to reimburse him and claim their interests. Clark v. Cantwell, 40 Tenn.
202 (1859).
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demption rights are cut off.10 It is also clear that the wife holds a
dower right in the equity of redemption, the interest remaining in
her mortgagor husband." Since the wife is entitled to redeem the
property before foreclosure, she is in an advantageous position to
protect her dower interest from outside purchasers ;12 in saving such
interest, she also protects the remaindermen from losing their rights
in the property."8 Therefore, if the wife does not redeem and is justi-
fied in allowing a foreclosure,' 4 the courts will not allow her to bid
in and purchase the property at a price below the fair value to the
detriment of others claiming from the husband's estate. 5 In other
words, she cannot obtain through a foreclosure purchase any estate in
the property greater than she would obtain through redemption, and
any attempt to do so will be barred by the court through imposition
of a trust.
Aside from the fact that the life tenant will not usually be able
to purchase at a price below the fair market value of the property
when he buys from a third party who took under the foreclosure
sale,'6 the main reason for allowing him to do so is that there is no
detriment to the remaindermen. As previously stated, any person
claiming under the intestate mortgagor has the power to redeem.' 7
If the life tenant is justified in allowing a foreclosure, the rights of
the remaindermen are cut off and there is no reason why the subse-
quent purchase by the former life tenant should be deemed to pro-
tect the interests of the remaindermen whose claims to the property
are lost through their own inaction.
Assuming that the dowress does purchase at a foreclosure sale
giving rise to an implied trust, or redeems the property in which
case the mortgagee is entitled to the full amount of the encum-
10 Brown v. Jennings, 188 N.C. 155, 124 S.E. 150 (1924); I SCRIBNER,
DowFa 461 (1867).
" Gay v. J. Exum & Co., 234 N.C. 378, 67 S.E.2d 290 (1951), 30 N.C.L.
Rxv. 310.
1" The heirs could also redeem at any time before foreclosure if they were
financially in a position to do so. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
18 Brown v. Jennings, 188 N.C. 155, 124 S.E. 150 (1924).
1, See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
"For this basic proposition, see Tindall v. Peterson, 71 Neb. 160, 98
N.W. 688 (1904) ; Miller v. Marriner, 187 N.C. 449, 456, 121 S.E. 770, 774
(1924).
1" Of course, the person bidding in at the foreclosure sale may not always
be able to purchase the property for the amount of the encumbrance, but
this was the case in both Morehead and Miller v. Marriner, supra note 15.
" See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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brance,'8 is she entitled to recover anything from the remainder-
men for protecting their interests? North Carolina is in accord
with the majority rule'9 that the wife is entitled to recover reim-
bursement from the remaindermen who wish to claim their interest
in the property." However, in using the language "if the life
tenant pays more than his proportionate share, he simply becomes a
creditor of the estate for that amount," 2 1 the court in Morehead
left two questions open: of whose estate is the life tenant a creditor
and what is the "proportionate share" of the life tenant that must
be determined to decide how much reimbursement he is entitled to?
In tracing the authority cited by the court, it is clear that the
life tenant paying the encumbrance redeems from the mortgagee
an interest in excess of the life estate and is subrogated to the rights
of the mortgagee against this interest.2 2 Moreover, the life tenant,
having paid an obligation of the mortgagor, is entitled to a claim
against his estate for the proportion of the amount paid by him
for the interest beyond the life estate.2
As to a determination of the "proportionate share" of the wife,
" McCabe v. Bellows and Another, 73 Mass. 148 (1856). However,
there are certain situations in which the wife does not have to pay the full
amount of the encumbrance in order to get her dower allotment in the prop-
erty. If the holder of the mortgage does not wish to enforce payment of the
principal, the wife may be allowed to continually contribute an amount to the
mortgagee which is sufficient to pay one-third of the yearly interest on the
amount due. Bell v. Mayor &c. of New York, 10 Paige 49 (N.Y. 1843).
Where the heirs of the deceased mortgagor have redeemed, the widow
must make contribution to them "in proportion to the value of her life estate
in one-third of the property" in order to redeem such life estate. Swaine v.
Perine, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 482 (N.Y. 1821).
" Murphy v. May, 243 Ala. 94, 8 So. 2d 442 (1942) ; In re Daily's Estate,
117 Mont. 194, 159 P.2d 327 (1945); 2 WASHBuRN, REAL PROPERTY § 1142
(6th ed. 1902). However, it should be noted that the remaindermen may
not be compelled to contribute because he may feel that it is in his best
interest not to have the property redeemed. Of course, the remainderman
cannot claim his interest free of the mortgage without contributing his
proportionate interest. I SCRIBNER, DowEa 461 (1867).
2 Farabow v. Perry, 223 N.C. 21, 25 S.E.2d 173 (1943); Creech v.
Wilder, 212 N.C. 162, 193 S.E. 281 (1937).
21262 N.C. at 336, 137 S.E.2d at 181.
"Whitney v. Salter, 36 Minn. 103, 30 N.W. 755 (1886); Keller v.
Fenske, 123 Wis. 435, 101 N.W. 378 (1904). It has also been held that
the wife of the mortgagor husband can redeem the property before the
death of the mortgagor husband since she has an interest, although inchoate,
in the equity of redemption and can recover reimbursement from the estate
because her position is analogous to that of a surety for her husband.
Fitcher v. Griffiths, 216 MAss. 174, 103 N.E. 471 (1913).
" Whitney v. Salter, supra note 22; Keller v. Fenske, supra note 22.
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however, the authority does not lead to a specific conclusion and
the North Carolina court has never decided the question. A review
of the case law from other jurisdictions reveals two different views
in determining the amount of reimbursement which the life tenant
is entitled to recover from the remaindermen exercising their rights
to the property. In an early Maine case,4 the wife's allotted dower
included an entire mortgaged tract giving her a life estate in the
whole mortgaged premises instead of just one-third of it. The court
stated that after payment of the encumbrance on the mortgaged
tract by the wife she would hold for her life, and at her death, the
remaindermen could claim their interests by paying the wife's estate
the full amount paid by her in extinguishing the debt." Such a
result raises two interesting points: the wife is not entitled to any
reimbursement during her life, and when reimbursement is made,
the wife's estate is not held responsible for the value of the use
of the land during her life since at the time of the reimbursement
the remaindermen get the entire property. On the other hand, the
New York court2" discussed the more usual case in which the wife's
dower was a life estate in one-third of the mortgaged premises.
Having paid the full amount of the encumbrance on the entire
property, it was decided that the wife was required to contribute
the present value of an annuity attributable to her life estate in
one-third of the property and could only recover the excess paid
from the remaindermen. The annuity for which the wife was re-
sponsible was determined by multiplying one-third of the yearly in-
terest on the sum unpaid at the death of the husband by the number
of years in the wife's life expectancy."' In contrast to the Maine
view, the New York view holds the wife, as between her and the
remaindermen, responsible for her proportional part.
In referring to a "proportionate share" in Morehead, the court
seems to indicate that proportionate contribution would be required
from the life tenant, thus following the New York view; it is pos-
sible that the New York court's method of determining the pro-
portion to be paid by the dowress and the remaindermen would also
be followed. If no interest were due on the loan to the mortgagor,
" Wilkins v. French, 20 Me. 111 (1841).
"Id. at 119.
"House v. House, 10 Paige 158 (N.Y. 1843).
Id. at 165. Accord, Tindall v. Peterson, 71 Neb. 160, 98 N.W. 688
(1904).
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as appears to be the case in Morehead, there may be nothing upon
which to base the wife's proportionate share under the annuity prin-
ciple. However, under such circumstances, it seems that the wife's
proportion of the mortgage obligation could be derived by using
the proportion that the cost of an annuity,2 8 equal to the value of
the use of one-third of the property for the period of the wife's life
expectancy, bears to the whole value of the property.
Even with the abolition of dower under the present intestate
law,29 it is still possible for the Morehead situation to arise. Under
the election provision,80 if the widow of an intestate chose to become
a life tenant in one-third of the mortgagor-husband's estate, the same
problem of proportionate payment would arise. Absent an elec-
tion, when the husband dies intestate the widow now receives a por-
tion of his property in full fee, her share depending on the number
of children surviving him.8" Of course, her portion of the property
would be subject to the mortgage; in order to free the property from
debt, she may still be required to pay the full amount of the encum-
brance.32 In doing so, the wife would also be paying the debt on
the portion going to the other heirs of the intestate, and she would
be able to hold the property as security until she was reimbursed.
88
If the other heirs decided to exercise their rights to their portion
of the property, she would then be able to recover from them the
amount of the debt attributable to such portion plus interest. There
would be no problem of evaluating the proportion which should be
paid by the holder of a life estate.
Roy H. MICHAUX, JR.
'8 For a determination of one's life expectancy, see the mortuary table in
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-46 (Supp. 1963). To calculate the present value of
an annuity based on one's life expectancy under the mortuary table, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-47 (Supp. 1963).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-4 (Supp. 1963).
"o N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1963).
"
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14 (Supp. 1963).
" See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
"II JONES, MORTGAGES § 1364 (8th ed. 1928); 2 WASHBURN, REAL
PROPERTY § 1142 (6th ed. 1902).
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Evidence-Admissibility in Civil Actions of Evidence Illegally Ob-
tained by Private Persons
Evidence illegally obtained by a trespass or a breaking and enter-
ing by private persons is freely admissible in civil actions. In
Sackler v. Sackler' the New York Court of Appeals rejected the
attempt of a lower court to abandon this universal rule.2 A divorce
granted to the husband on grounds of adultery was allowed to
stand, though the evidence used, including photographs, was ob-
tained by the husband and private detectives in a predawn forcible
entry of the wife's separately maintained apartment.8
The courts have constantly sought effective means of protecting
persons from illegal searches. In England in 1762-1763 messengers
of King George III conducted an infamous series of searches,
seeking evidence of seditious libel. General warrants issued as au-
thority for the searches were declared illegal, and trespass actions
instituted by the search victims resulted in substantial damage
judgments against the messengers and against the Earl of Halifax
who, as Secretary of State, issued the warrants.4 These actions
are early and prominent examples of the traditional means used in
the courts' attempts to control illegal searches-damages from the
searchers are relied upon to discourage such acts of trespass, how-
ever much success on the principle issue as a direct result of the
illegal search may encourage them.
1 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964), aflrming 16
App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61, reversing 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S.2d
790 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
'See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961) for the
rationale of the non-exclusionary rule. E.g.:
It does not, logically, follow, however that records, being obtained
can not be used as instruments of evidence, for the mere fact of [il-
legally] obtaining them does not change that which is written in them....
Suppose the presence of a witness to have been procured by fraud or
violence, while the party thus procuring the attendance of the witness
would be liable to severe punishment, surely that could not be urged
against the competency of the witness !
Stevison v. Earnest, 80 Ill. 513, 517-18 (1875). See also Commonwealth v.
Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841).
'33 Misc. 2d at -, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
'Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1742, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1765); Entick
v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765); Wilkes v. Wood,
2 Wils. 203, 95 Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B. 1763). More detailed reports of these
cases can be found at 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1001, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029, and
19 Howell's St. Tr. 1153, respectively.
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A concept of exclusion was introduced into American law in
1886 when the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Boyd v. United States.' In that opinion Mr. Justice
Bradley described Lord Camden's opinion in Entick v. Carrington6
as "one of the landmarks of English liberty' ' 7 and an incentive to
the adoption of the fourth amendment.' But in Boyd the Court
found it necessary to rely upon the fifth amendment's protection
against self-incrimination to declare erroneous and unconstitutional
the introduction of evidence obtained by a process it deemed an
illegal search.'
In Weeks v. United States,"° twenty-eight years after Boyd
and ten years after exclusion based solely on the fourth amendment
had been considered but rejected in Adams v. New York," the
Court finally made it clear that the federal rule would be to ex-
clude evidence in criminal cases when it had been seized in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. While limiting the rule to uncon-
stitutional searches made by officers of the federal government and
its agencies, 2 Mr. Justice Day, speaking for a unanimous Court,
reasoned:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment ... is of no value, and, so
far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution.'8
But in Burdeau v. McDowell" the Court refused to invoke
this protective rule when the unconstitutional searches or seizures
-116 U.S. 616 (1886).
'2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
1116 U.S. at 626.
'The amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
o Wigmore approves the decision as "dorrect on simple Fifth Amendment
grounds" but asserts that it made "fallacious conclusions" as to the fourth
amendment. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2184a at 32.10232 U.S. 383 (1914).
11192 U.S. 585 (1904). See 232 U.S. at 396, where the Weeks Court
attempts to distinguish the decision in this case.
12 232 U.S. at 398.8 Id. at 393.
'256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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were by private persons, even when federal officials proposed to use
evidence thus obtained in criminal prosecutions. 15 Mr. Justice
Day, speaking for the majority,16 said of the fourth amendment:
Its origin and history dearly show that it was intended to
be a restraint on the activities of sovereign authority, and was not
intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agen-
cies ....
In the present case the record clearly shows that no official
of the Federal Government had anything to do with the wrong-
ful seizure .... We assume that the petitioner has an unques-
tionable right of redress against those who illegally and wrong-
fully took his private property under the circumstances herein
disclosed, but with such remedies we are not now concerned. 17
In People v. Defore,'I a 1926 decision, Judge Cardozo, then on
the New York Court of Appeals, had to consider whether, in the
light of the federal exclusionary rule manifested in Weeks, the
state of New York should adopt a like policy. Both New York
and the Supreme Court had rejected such a policy in Adams.
Cardozo found nothing in the controlling New York statute"
whereby official trespasses and private are differentiated in re-
spect of the legal consequences to follow them .... Evidence is
not excluded because the private litigant who offers it has gathered
it by lawless force. By the same token, the State, when prose-
cuting an offender against the peace and order of society, incurs
no heavier liability.20
Cardozo found the federal exclusionary rule "either too strict
or too lax. . . . We must go farther or not so far."21 And he
chose not to go so far because
the Legislature, which created it [the statute], has acquiesced
in the ruling of this court that the prohibition of the search did
not anathematize the evidence yielded through the search. If we
had misread the statute or misconceived the public policy, a few
words of amendment would have quickly set us right.
22
18 Id. at 470, 476.
1 Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes dissented. Id. at 476.
17 Id. at 475.
18242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
"
8N.Y. Civ. RIGns LAw § 8. In 1938 this became part of the New
York state constitution. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 12. The law is identical in
wording with the fourth amendment. See note 8 supra.
2 242 N.Y. at 21-22, 150 N.E. at 588.21 Id. at 22, 150 N.E. at 588.
2
-Id. at 23, 150 N.E. at 588.
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The United States Supreme Court eventually concluded that
searches and seizures by state officers might violate the fourteenth
amendment when the fourth amendment standard of reasonableness
was not met, but for a long period the Court, like Cardozo, refused
to widen the consequences.3
Of course, Mapp v. Ohio24 changed all this. After refusing to
allow federal officers to continue to turn over illegally seized evi-
dence to state officers for state court prosecutions, 25 and destroying
the "silver platter" doctrine that permitted evidence of federal
crime illegally obtained by state officers to be used in federal
courts, the Court in Mapp forced the states, including New
York,2 7 to go just so far as the federal rule. The Court declared
that "time [had] . . . set its face against . . . the 'weighty testi-
mony' ,,28 of Defore and reasoned that a uniform, if still severely
limited, 9 rule of exclusion was "not only the logical dictate of
prior cases, but it also makes very good sense."' 0
" See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Salsburg v. Maryland,
346 U.S. 545 (1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).2 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
"' Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
"People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462
(1961).
28 367 U.S. at 653.
" As it now stands, the federal exclusionary rule in criminal cases: (a)
applies to evidence obtained as an indirect result of the illegal search-to the
"fruits of the poisonous tree," Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920), including verbal evidence obtained after an illegal
entry, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); (b) does not
operate to quash indictments based on tainted evidence, Lawn v. United
States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) ; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) ;
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) ; (c) probably need not be raised by
pretrial motion for suppression where the prosecution's evidence discloses
the illegality for the first time, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) ;
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) ; (d) applies to suppress contraband, though not to
compel its return, Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699 (1948) ; (e) does not apply to searches or seizures by private persons,
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); (f) applies only to searches of
"'persons, houses, papers, and effects,'"H ester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924), but automobiles are within the rule, Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925); (g) applies only to searches invading defendant's own
privacy, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) ; (h) may be invoked
by a corporate defendant, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra;
(i) applies only to evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment
standard, with rare exception, Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958)
(violation of D.C. local statute).
30 367 U.S. at 657.
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Against this progression on the criminal side, it is, at first,
strange that until Sackler was decided by the trial court no re-
ported American court, with one limited exception,81 had extended
any like protection on the civil side.82 However, since it is ap-
parently still the rule that evidence illegally seized by private per-
sons is not to be excluded in state88 or federal 4 criminal actions,
it is perhaps not so surprising, at least to one trained in legal
niceties. The trial court, in excluding the Sackler evidence, thought
the non-applicability of the exclusionary rule to seizures by per-
sons other than federal agents (state officers or private persons) 5
"appears to have been overruled by Elkins v. United States.""0
In his dissent, Judge Van Voorhis of the Court of Appeals also
thought the ElkinS' 7 rejection of the "silver platter" doctrine should
apply when the platter is offered by a private individual as well.8"
But the Court of Appeals majority's insistence that Burdeau's
"definitive holding that the Fourth Amendment has nothing to do
with nongovernmental intrusions . . . has never been overruled in
this respect," 30 is probably more accurate. This had been the
Appellate Division's conclusion in reversing the trial court. 0
If this is so, the fourth amendment is a poor peg on which to
hang a civil exclusionary rule. And, despite Judge Bergan's extra-
3 Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958). This case
would exclude evidence of alcohol in a blood sample taken from defendant by
a nurse at the direction of a state police officer, a violation of security of the
person, and its application is probably limited to such extreme facts. Com-
pare Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
" See, e.g., Hair v. McGuire, 188 Cal. App. 2d 348, 10 Cal. Rptr. 414
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (no violation of federal mail law in seizure of evi-
dence); Walker v. Penner, 190 Ore. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951) (personal
injury; error in excluding whiskey bottle illegally taken from defendant's
car by plaintiff's husband); Hartman v. Hartman, 253 Wis. 389, 34 N.W.2d
137 (1948) (divorce for adultery; no illegal search, but dictum that illegal
search would not prevent admission of evidence).
" See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 870, 315 P.2d 468 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1957).
' See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
8 Ibid.
"33 Misc. 2d at -, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 793. See also Williams v. United
States, 282 F.2d 940, 941 (6th Cir. 1960).
s Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
88 15 N.Y.2d at -, 203 N.E.2d at 484, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 87.8 Id. at -, 203 N.E.2d at 483, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
,0 16 App. Div. at -, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 63. Justice Hopkins disagreed.
Id. at -, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 67 (dissenting opinion).
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polation from Cardozo in Defore,41 similar state statutory or con-
stitutional provisions 42 are probably no better.
In England, where the doctrine behind such provisions first
developed, "the question [of exclusion] has apparently arisen very
infrequently, '4 on either the criminal or civil side. There has been
little discussion of illegal governmental seizures since the oft-quoted
Entick v. Carrington44 opinion of Lord Camden in 1765, and ex-
clusion of evidence so seized is apparently discretionary with the
trial judge.4 5 However, in one English civil case46 an exclusionary
policy was announced, the evidence being copies47 of privileged
communications between attorney and client obtained "by col-
lusion ' 4 between the defendant and the attorney's clerk. An in-
junction was allowed against production of the copies as evidence.
Cozzens-Hardy, Master of the Rolls, saw "no ground whatever
in principle why we should decline to give the plaintiff the protec-
tion which in my view is his right as between him and . . . [the
defendant] .-4
This is a somewhat backhanded statement of what perhaps
is a better basis for an exclusionary rule in civil actions. Not
the fourth amendment, but something akin to the equitable doc-
trine of clean hands50 and the common law maxim: "No one can
take advantage of his own wrong."'" However strictly a court is
" 15 N.Y.S.2d at -, 203 N.E.2d at 485, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (dissenting
opinion). See text accompanying note 21 supra.
E.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15, which provides:
General warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be com-
manded to search suspected places, without evidence of the act com-
mitted, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offense is not
particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty
and ought not to be granted.
,' Cowen, The Admissibility of Evidence Procured Through Illegal
Seizures in British Commonwealth Jurisdictions, 5 VAND. L. REv. 523, 528
(1952).
"2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
"15 HALsBURY's LAwS OF ENGLAND, Evidence § 487 (Simonds ed. 1956).
"
0 Ashburton v. Pape, [1913] 2 Ch. 469.
" Nor, because of the privilege, could the originals be introduced. Id. at
473. They had to be returned to the attorney. Id. at 472. Compare LeLong
v. Siebrecht, 196 App. Div. 74, 187 N.Y. Supp. 150 (1921). See generally 8
WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 2325, 2326; N.Y. CPLR § 4503.
" [1913] 2 Ch. at 471.
"Id. at 473.
oSee McCLINTOCK, EQuITY § 26 (2d ed. 1948).
"BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 952 (Gavit ed. 1941).
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engaged in the matter strictly before it, can it afford to ignore
the type of conduct its blindness may encourage in private per-
sons ?52 The traditional legal remedy of a trespass suit against the
illegal searchers is almost certainly inadequate.5
3
Something of this argument is implicit in the trial court's
decision in Sackler. There Judge Brenner pointed out that "the
divorce laws of the State of New York, confined as they are to
the single cause of adultery are outmoded and archaic .... Hence,
they foster disrespect of the law which the courts are powerless
to halt.""4 He also noted that direct evidence of adultery, as might
be obtained in a raid, frequently staged, is unnecessary. "The
continued disclosure of evidence of adultery procured in violation
of fundamental civil liberties thus works a double harm upon the
integrity of the judicial process.""6
Judge Bergan's dissent in the Court of Appeals echoes this
point:
It is not possible to draw a fully logical difference on the
question of admissibility between evidence wrongfully obtained
by a private citizen and evidence wrongfully obtained by public
authority. Indeed, since the motivation of public authority is the
common good of the community and the motivation of the pri-
"Plaintiff's conduct in Sackler was not the innocent procedural error so
often made by police, unskilled in constitutional subtleties, but a deliberate,
planned trespass. 33 Misc. 2d at -, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 794. Plaintiff was
accompanied by private detectives who had equipped themselves in advance
to take photographs of what they found. Suppose a raid had been conducted
by the wife instead of by the husband, and she had been the plaintiff in a
New York divorce action. Her conduct might have prevented her from
obtaining alimony. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 236, making the award of
alimony discretionary with the court. However, if the wife herself is guilty
of adultery, the court cannwt award her alimony, though her husband is guilty
of the same conduct, and no matter who seeks the divorce.
"' Quaere, if the wife-defendant in Sackler were to sue the husband-
plaintiff for trespass, would her loss of alimony be an element of damages?
Probably not; her recoverable damages may be purely nominal. But see
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925),
modifying 261 S.W. 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (damages allowed for
destruction of speculative value). Compare Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo.
166, 253 Pac. 862 (1927). See generally 11 CoRNEm L. Q. 416 (1926); 48
HARv. L. REv. 485 (1935); 4 TEXAS L. REv. 215 (1926); 36 YALE L. J.
1167 (1927). For the difficulties that arise in suing the perpetrators of an
unconstitutional search, see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), on remand,
71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
5' 33 Misc. 2d at -, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 796.5 Id. at -, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
"Id. at -, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
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vate citizen the advantage of his lawsuit, it might be supposed
we would more readily suppress wrongfully taken evidence in
the private suit than in the criminal action.57
In allowing the use of evidence obtained by illegal acts by
private persons is a court not involved in unconstitutional state
action as in Shelley v. Kraemer?" In Shelley it was held violative
of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause for a court
to enforce a privately-made restrictive covenant. Is not the Sackler
court, in allowing the illegally seized evidence, giving validity to an
act that would violate the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause if performed by any other branch of government? One
writer has distinguished the court's role in Sackler as merely pas-
sive,5 9 noting also that the concept of Shelley has yet to be ap-
plied to any but racial segregation cases."
As Sackler suggests, the present state of the law is "clear and
plain,"'" and the only hope for change is in state legislatures,
despite the Sackler defendant's attempt to ride "the crest of [Mapp
and subsequent] . . . holdings."62 Mapp, of course, indicates the
reluctance of many states to adopt an exclusionary rule on the
criminal side. But in civil litigation the interest that would be
harmed by an exclusionary rule, that of private litigants who have
committed illegal acts themselves rather than that of the public as
a whole, seems hardly as meritorious. Some moves have been
made. For example, New York has by statute adopted an ex-
clusionary rule as to wiretap evidence in civil actions, while per-
57 15 N.Y.2d at -, 203 N.E.2d at 485, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 88. Judge Bergan
also argues that the landmark New York decision (Defore) "makes [it]
quite clear that there is no distinction under the New York Civil Rights
Law ... between a private and a public invasion of privacy." Ibid.
"334 U.S. 1 (1948).
"46 MINN. L. REV. 1119 (1962). "In Shelley the lower court was asked
to compel a private citizen to do an act which would be unconstitutional for
the state to perform, whereas in the instant case the court was merely asked
to give evidentiary status to illegally seized information." Id. at 1124-25.
As to passive state action, consider Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n v.
Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983
(1956).6046 MINN. L. REv. 1119, 1125 (1962).
01 15 N.Y.2d at -, 203 N.E.2d at 484, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
"33 Misc. 2d at -, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
0" N.Y. CPLR § 4506. In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961), the exclusionary rule was applied to electronic eavesdropping by
federal officers.
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mitting such evidence in criminal cases.6 4 It hardly seems that
courts are significantly hindered in their search for the truth by
such rules. And, if exclusion is to continue to be the rule in
criminal cases, there is little logic in not extending it to civil
litigation as well. 5
CHARLES B. ROBSON, JR.
Guardian and Ward-Estate Planning-Gifts by Guardian from
Estate of Incompetent Ward
Petitioner in In re Trusteeship of Kenyan,' as trustee of the per-
son and estate of an incompetent ward, sought authority, pursuant
to legislative enactments,2 to make gifts from the ward's income;'
to make gifts from the principal of the ward's estate ;4 and, with
regard to an inter vivos trust created by the incompetent, to sur-
render a reserved right of revocation and to make charitable gifts
of the income therefrom which had been reserved to the incompetent
for her lifetime. 5 On the first appeal,' the lower court orders7 grant-
ing the requested authority were reversed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court on the ground that the lower court's finding that
the incompetent, if competent and heeding sound advice, would
make the gifts was not supported by the evidence. Petitioner, ap-
parently having relied solely on the statutes in his initial pleadings,
was given leave to obtain permission to amend his petitions to al-
" N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a; N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 12. See People
v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406, cert. denicd,
371 U.S. 877 (1962).6 With sponsorship of the Bar Association of the City of New York, a
commission to review and make recommendations on all aspects of the anti-
quated New York divorce laws has been proposed to the 1965 New York
Legislature. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1965, p. 38, col. 2. If such a
commission is established, it would be well for it to consider as a part of its
task the evidentiary implications of these laws as they are illustrated by the
Sackler case.
1261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85 (1963) ; 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).
2 N.C. GEx. STAT. §§ 35-29.1 to -29.16 (Supp. 1963).
' See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.1 to -29.4 (Supp. 1963).
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.5 to -29.10 (Supp. 1963).
' See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.11 to -29.16 (Supp. 1963).
'In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85 (1963).
Three separate proceedings took place in the superior court-one relating
to gifts from income, another to gifts from principal, and the last to sur-
rendering the right to revoke the trust and the lifetime income interest.
Thus, three orders were issued below, and the proceedings were consoli-
dated for purposes of appeal.
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lege that the authority he sought was something which the incom-
petent would do, if competent, and to offer evidence to establish the
truth of his allegations. On the second appeal,8 a divided supreme
court found the evidence adequate to support the lower court's
findings of fact that the incompetent would have made the gifts and
affirmed the judgments granting the trustee authority to make them
on her behalf.
The Kenan litigation involves the rule that the estate of an
incompetent may, with the approval of the court having jurisdiction,9
be applied for the benefit of those whom the incompetent probably
would have aided if of sound mind. The rule apparently finds its
first expression in the old leading English case of Ex parte Whit-
bread.'" There, a niece of the incompetent petitioned for an al-
lowance from the surplus income of the incompetent's estate. In
considering the petition, Lord Eldon set forth the following direc-
tive which subsequent cases have pursued: "[Tihe Court, looking
at what it is likely the Lunatic himself would do, if he were in a
capacity to act, will make some provision out of the estate for...
[the applicant].""
This doctrine does not apply, however, to the most frequent class
of applications-those by persons to whom the incompetent owes a
legal duty of support.12 Thus allowances have been made for hus-
bands, 3 wives,' 4 and minor children 5 of incompetents, not on the
8In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).
' In North Carolina jurisdiction over the affairs of incompetents is
vested in the clerks of superior courts. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-1 (Supp. 1963).
102 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816). A reporter's note to EX parte
Whitbread refers to the earlier case of In re Cotton, but this case is ap-
parently unreported. See Thompson & Hale, The Surplus Income of a
Lunatic, 8 HA.v. L. REv. 472, 474 (1895).
112 Mer. at 102, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
" The allowance to provide support for dependents of the incompetent
person does not involve the so-called doctrine of substitution of judg-
ment. That doctrine is called into being, in those jurisdictions wherein
it is recognized, when the court is asked to make an allowance out of the
incompetent's estate to persons for whom he is not bound to provide.
It re Beilstein, 145 Ohio St. 397, 404, 62 N.E.2d 205, 208 (1945) (con-
curring opinion).
I n re DeNisson, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d 1024 (1938) (husband
indigent; family expenses chargeable against husband or wife); Edwards
v. Abrey, 2 Phill. Ch. 37, 41 Eng. Rep. 855 (1846) (surplus after main-
taining incompetent wife to be paid to husband).
1" Booth v. Cottingham, 126 Ind. 431, 26 N.E. 84 (1891); Hallett v.
Hallett, 8 Ind. App. 305, 34 N.E. 740 (1893); Tiffany v. Worthington, 96
Iowa 560, 65 N.W. 817 (1896); Thomasson v. Thomasson, 310 Ky. 234,
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theory that the incompetent would have provided for them if sane,
but because his disability does not alter the incompetent's legal duty
to support his family, if able."0 Where the applicant is an adult
child, however, rather rigid adherence to requiring a finding that
the incompetent himself would have made the gift has prevailed.17
Exceptions to this requirement have been made where the adult
child was incapacitated and unable to provide for himself.', In
cases involving adopted children'" and stepchildren20 a finding that
the incompetent would have made the gift has likewise been re-
quired, though courts have allowed grants for illegitimate children
without specifying that the requirement be met.2 '
Allowances from the incompetent's estate have not been limited
to members of his immediate family, however, and it is in making
219 S.W.2d 957 (1949); Pearl v. McDowell, 26 Ky. 658 (1830); In re
Leech, 45 La. Ann. 194, 12 So. 126 (1893); In re Stewart, 22 At. 122
(N.J. Eq. 1891); It re Wilder, 174 Misc. 244, 20 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct.
1940); In re Taylor, 9 Paige 611 (N.Y. 1842); Snowdon v. Scranton-
Lackawanna Trust Co., 46 Pa. D. & C. 418 (C.P. 1942) (wife's funeral ex-
penses); In re Miegocki, 34 Luzerne Leg. Reg. Rep. 257 (Pa. C.P. 1940).
" Goskins v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 30 Cal. App. 2d 409, 86 P.2d
681 (1939); Brackett v. Glaze, 72 Ga. App. 314, 33 S.E.2d 733 (1945);
Hallett v. Hallett, supra note 14; It re Leech, supra note 14; Marsh v. Scott,
63 A.2d 275 (N.J. Super. 1949) ; In re Wilder, supra note 14; Cartwright v.
Juvenile Court, 172 Tenn. 626, 113 S.W.2d 754 (1938); Foster v. Marchant,
1 Vern. 263, 23 Eng. Rep. 457 (Ch. 1684).
10 Where the incompetent father's entire estate consisted of a railroad
relief pension, all of which was required for the father's needs, the court
exercised its discretion to deny an allowance for the support and education
of the father's minor child. It re Henderson, 45 Pa. D. & C. 359 (C.P.
1942). See also Dutch v. Marvin, 72 Iowa 663, 34 N.W. 465 (1887); In re
Bell, 56 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Sedar's Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C.
680 (C.P. 1937); Ex parte Weinrich, 20 Pa. Dist. 1070 (C.P. 1910).
"1in re Schwartz, 27 Del. Ch. 223, 34 A.2d 275 (Ch. 1943); Citizens
State Bank v. Shanklin, 174 Mo. App. 639, 161 S.W. 341 (1913); In re
Beilstein, 145 Ohio St. 397, 62 N.E.2d 205 (1945); In re Hare, 26 Pa.
D. & C. 553 (C.P. 1935); Farmer v. Farmer, 78 Tenn. 309 (1882) (requisite
intent found).
yi re Hall, 19 Ill. App. 295 (1885) ; Sheneman v. Manring, 152 Kan.
780, 107 P.2d 741 (1940); Paglia's Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C. 316 (C.P. 1936)
(burial expenses of tubercular daughter paid from incompetent mother's
estate). It can be argued that this is not an exception to the rule at all,
but rather that these are regarded as circumstances under which the incom-
petent would make the allowance.yi re Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch. 326 (N.Y. 1847).
"°In re Willoughby, 11 Paige 257 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).
"Halsey's Appeal, 120 Pa. 209, 13 At]. 934 (1888) ; Ex parte Haycock,
5 Russ. Ch. 154, 38 Eng. Rep. 985 (1828). "What if this family was il-
legitimate? The children, at least, were those of Siegfried, and could not
be turned out to starve just because they were bastards." Halsey's Appeal,
supra at 214, 13 Atl. at 936.
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grants to others that the Whitbread doctrine is most often ap-
plied.2 Courts have made allowances to the incompetent's parents,2 3
grandchildren2 4 brothers and sisters, 5 brothers and sisters of the
half blood,2 6 nieces and nephews,2" and cousins.2 s While these rela-
" The difficulty I have had was as to the extent of relationship to which
an allowance ought to be granted. I have found instances in which the
Court has, in its allowances to the relations of the Lunatic, gone to a
farther distance than grand-children-to brothers and other collateral
kindred; and if we get to the principle, we find that it is not because the
parties are next of kin of the Lunatic, or, as such, have any right to
an allowance, but because the Court will not refuse to do, for the benefit
of the Lunatic, that which it is probable the Lunatic himself would have
done.
Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 103, 35 Eng. Rep. 878, 879 (Ch. 1816).
Where the Whitbread doctrine has been rejected, it has generally been
on the ground that the state statute governing the powers of the court over
the property of an incompetent was restrictive and did not permit a general
application of the rule. See, e.g., Kelly v. Scott, 215 Md. 530, 137 A.2d 704
(1957); Binney v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 43 R.I. 222, 110 Atl. 615
(1920); Lewis v. Moody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261 S.W. 673 (1923).
"' Gamble v. Leva, 212 Ala. 155, 102 So. 120 (1924); Ex parte Phillips,
130 Miss. 682, 94 So. 840 (1923); State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo.
App. 154, 113 S.W.2d 143 (1938); O'Connor's Estate, 6 Pa. D. & C. 789
(C. P. 1925); It re Bala, 36 Luzerne Leg. Reg. Rep. 268 (Pa. C.P. 1941)
(for mother's funeral); Seley v. Howell, 115 Tex. 583, 285 S.W. 815 (1926) ;
Tn re Strozyk, 156 Wash. 233, 286 Pac. 646 (1930) (for expenses while
visiting incompetent). Allowances for parents were denied in Lewis v.
Koody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261 S.W. 673 (1923) (not within statute); In re
leck, 225 Wis. 636, 275 N.W. 520 (1937) (not within statute); and In re
Booth, 22 L.T.R. 249 (Eq. 1854) (no allowance for past maintenance).
One English case granted an allowance for a monument which the lunatic
had contracted to have erected to his grandmother. In re Dyce Sombre, 10
L.T.R. 362 (Eq. 1848).
"In re Schley, 107 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
" Farwell v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1930) ; In re Buckley's
Estate, 330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W.2d 33 (1951); In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d
544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1962); In re Battin, 171 Misc. 145, 11
N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1939); In re Calasantra, 154 Misc. 493, 278 N.Y.
Supp. 263 (Chautauqua County Ct. 1935); In re Gilbert, 3 Abb. N. Cas. 222
(N.Y. 1876); It re Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch. 326 (N.Y. 1847). Allowances for
brothers or sisters were denied in Stephens v. Marshall, 23 Hun 641 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1881) ; Monds v. Dugger, 144 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1940) ; and In re
Clark, 2 Phill. Ch. 292, 41 Eng. Rep. 951 (Ch. 1847).
So, where a large property devolves upon an elder son, who is a
Lunatic, as heir at law, and his brothers and sisters are slenderly or not
at all provided for, the Court will make an allowance to the latter for
the sake of the former; upon the principle that it would naturally be
more agreeable to the lunatic, and more for his advantage, that they
should receive an education and maintenance suitable to his condition,
than that they should be sent into the world to disgrace him as beggars.
Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 102, 35 Eng. Rep. 878, 879 (Ch. 1816).
" In re Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 181 App. Div. 642, 168 N.Y. Supp.
952 (1918), aff'd per curiam, 225 N.Y. 666, 122 N.E. 880 (1919).
" In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943) ; In re
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tives have been the most frequent beneficiaries, they have not been
the only ones. Grants have been made to elderly persons whom the
incompetent formerly had supported,29 to a retired servant,80 and
to a former paramour." And, though sometimes limited to those
which the incompetent had been in the habit of making, 2 charitable
gifts have also been allowed.88
While the general posture of the case law is undoubtedly to
the effect that the court will do for the incompetent what it finds
the incompetent himself would have done, 4 the rule probably
should have been that the court will do what it would have been
wise and prudent for the incompetent to have done.8" At first blush
the language of Ex parte Whitbread seems to indicate that the
former is the rule, for the case says the court looks at "what it
is likely the Lunatic himself would do, if he were in a capacity
to act .... -"" But closer scrutiny indicates otherwise, for it also
Ginsberg, 267 App. Div. 995, 48 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1944); In re Fleming,
173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Ih re Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., supra note 26; Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50 (1883); In re
Creagh, 1 Drury & Wal. 323 (1888); In re Sparrow, L.R. 20 Ch. 320
(1882); lit re Blair, 1 Myl. & C. 300, 40 Eng. Rep. 390 (Ch. 1836). An
allowance was denied when the incompetent's nephew wanted it for the
purpose of augmenting an idle and luxurious life. In re Kernochan, 84 Misc.
565, 146 N.Y. Supp. 1026 (Sup. Ct. 1914). See also In re Johnson, 111
N.J. Eq. 268, 162 AtI. 96 (1932); Lewis v. Moody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261
S.W. 673 (1923).
" In re Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415, 162 N.E. 471 (1928) ; In re Darling, 39
Ch. D. 208 (1888); In re Frost, L.R. 5 Ch. 699 (1870). Where the in-
competent had not even known of the existence of a cousin in distressing
circumstances, and no grounds existed for inferring an intention to aid him,
the application was denied. In re Evans, 21 Ch. D. 297 (1882). See also
Fixico v. Ming, 176 Okla. 358, 55 P.2d 1027 (1936).
" In re Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch. 326 (N.Y. 1847).
"oIn re the Earl of Carysfort, Craig & Ph. 76, 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ch.
1840).31 In re Parry, 7 L.T.R. 77 (Eq. 1846).
"lit re Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch. 326 (N.Y. 1847).
" See In re Hall's Guardianship, 31 Cal. 2d 157, 187 P.2d 396 (1947);
In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943); Citizens
State Bank v. Shanklin, 174 Mo. App. 639, 161 S.W. 341 (1913); In re
Heeney, supra note 32; In re Strickland, L.R. 6 Ch. 226 (1871).
" See, e.g., In re Brice's Guardianship, supra note 33; Ford v. Security
Nat'l Bank, 249 N.C. 141, 105 S.E.2d 421 (1958); It re the Earl of Carys-
fort, Craig & Ph. 76, 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ch. 1840). "The controlling
principle is that the court will act with reference to the incompetent and
for his benefit as he would probably have acted if sane." In re Brice's
Guardianship, supra note 33 at 189, 8 N.W.2d at 580.
" See Thompson & Hale, supra note 10, at 473-74, 479-80; Note, 9 VILL.
L. Rxv. 522 (1964).
" 2 Mer. at 102, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
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says that "what ... would be beneficial to ... [the lunatic] should
be done"'3 7 and that the court should apply the property as it thinks
"it would have been wise and prudent in the Lunatic himself to ap-
ply it."38 To allow the guardian to do for the lunatic what would be
wise for the lunatic himself to do is certainly more consonant with
the universal duty of the guardian to manage the ward's estate
prudently.3 9 Thus, it seems that in applying the Whitbread doctrine
the courts often have imposed a burden upon the guardian which
that opinion never envisaged 0 and one which may conflict with the
normal obligations of guardianship.
Although the Whitbread doctrine was recognized in North
Carolina in an early case,41 the court there indicated a disinclina-
tion to follow it. A rule that the dependents of an incompetent
would be provided for before creditors or others could share in
his estate became well established in North Carolina,42 but the court
indicated that it would not extend the bounty to collateral rela-
tions and married children of the lunatic. 43  Statutes44 passed in
1854, however, in effect provided for a limited application of the
Whitbread doctrine by allowing advancements from surplus income
to be made to designated relatives of the incompetent. In a recent
case,45 where the applicants were adult children of the incompetent
whom the court could not have aided under the old North Carolina
view,46 the court expressed its interpretation of the statutes in lan-
guage reminiscent of Whitbread: "If their father were mentally
27 Ibid.
Id. at 103, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
See Fratcher, Powers and Dtties of Guardians of Property, 45 IowA
L. REv. 264 (1960). "A guardian of property has power and, ordinarily, a
duty to collect and take possession of the assets of his ward including land
and personal property, manage them prudently, and protect them from de-
terioration or loss." Id. at 292, 294 (citing statutes and cases from numerous
jurisdictions).
,O For a more thorough critique, see Note, 9 VILL. L. REv. 522 (1964).
'
1 Brooks v. Brooks, 25 N.C. 389 (1843).
2 Read v. Turner, 200 N.C. 773, 158 S.E. 475 (1931) ; Lemley v. Ellis,
146 N.C. 221, 59 S.E. 683 (1907) ; In re Hybart, 119 N.C. 359, 25 S.E. 963
(1896); Adams v. Thomas, 81 N.C. 296 (1879); In re Latham, 39 N.C. 231
(1846).
, Brooks v. Brooks, 25 N.C. 389, 391 (1843).
" N.C. GEzr. STAT. §§ 35-20 to -29 (1950).
" Ford v. Security Nat'l Bank, 249 N.C. 141, 105 S.E.2d 421 (1958).
" "[O]ur courts may not be authorized to extend the allowance ... to
advancements to married children, as is done in England." Brooks v.
Brooks, 25 N.C. 389, 391 (1843).
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competent, would he not aid them? If so, the court has the au-
thority to use his money for that purpose."'
The Kenan litigation represents a response to further statutory
developments in North Carolina, designed to authorize charitable
gifts for estate planning purposes rather than to aid individual
beneficiaries. Statutes passed by the 1963 General Assembly spe-
cifically authorized the guardian or trustee of an incompetent, under
specified circumstances and with the approval of the resident judge
of the superior court, to make gifts from income' or principal4
for religious, charitable, educational, and other purposes, and to
surrender the right to revoke a trust created by the incompetent and
make a gift of the reserved life estate. 0 Although the statutes do
not contain the old requirement that the court, before authorizing
the gifts, must find that the incompetent, if sane, would have made
them, on the first appeal of the instant case51 the supreme court in-
sisted that this requirement must be met. 2 The majority thought
that to authorize the gifts merely because the guardian and the court
believed they should be made, though it was not what the lunatic
had done or would have done, would amount to a taking of property
in derogation of the lunatic's constitutional rights. 3 A pungent
dissent argued that the only taking was of the right of the trustee
to do with the estate what the General Assembly had authorized
him to do. 4
""Ford v. Security Nat'l Bank, 249 N.C. 141, 144, 105 S.E.2d 421, 424
(1958).
,8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.1 to -29.4 (Supp. 1963).
'8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.5 to -29.10 (Supp. 1963).
"0 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.11 to -29.16 (Supp. 1963).5 In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85 (1963).
"A court may authorize a fiduciary to make a gift of a part of the estate
of an incompetent only on a finding, on a preponderance of the evidence, at a
hearing of which interested parties have notice, that the lunatic, if then of
sound mind, would make the gift." Id. at 9, 134 S.E.2d at 91.53Id. at 9, 134 S.E.2d at 91.
"The plantive language of Justice Higgins's closing paragraphs merits
quotation:
The trustee seeks to follow . . . sound business practices, but the
Court says this is taking private property. To my single-track mind the
only thing taken is the right of the trustee, acting for his beneficiary, to
do with this vast estate what the General Assembly of North Carolina
authorized him to do. The relatives in this public spirited family who
are sui Juris appear to have joined in the trustee's requests. The authority
to follow the plan has been authorized by 170 of the people's representa-
tives in session on Halifax street. It is now set aside by a majority of the
seven on Morgan.
This decision will haunt us. I vote to affirm.
Id. at 17, 134 S.E.2d at 97.
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Because the court required a finding as to what the incompetent
would have done, the entire thrust of the case on remand 55 was
toward establishing that the incompetent, if competent, would have
made the gifts. Confronted with persuasive evidence presented in
the trial court on both sides, the supreme court again divided. A
majority found sufficient basis upon which to affirm the order
granting the petition in a showing that: (1) it was wise and prudent
to make the gifts; (2) the action was consistent with the trustee's
powers and duties under the North Carolina statutes; (3) the
natural objects of the incompetent's bounty would recommend to her
that she take the action; (4) her trustee would explain the facts
to her, if she were competent, and recommend that she make the
gifts; (5) others of her kin would so recommend; (6) several tax
and estate planning experts would advise her to take the action;
and (7) her brother, whose advice she had always taken on business
matters, would have advised her to make the gifts, and he believed
she would have followed his advice. Equally convincing, however,
are the factors compelling the dissent, viz.: (1) the incompetent's
charitable gifts for the eight years prior to declaration of incom-
petency had amounted to only 8,160 dollars annually; (2) the
largest single donation the incompetent had ever made was 25,000
dollars, though she was often solicited for much larger contribu-
tions; (3) there was no evidence she had ever considered donating
to several of the institutions to which gifts were now recommended;
(4) the incompetent had provided for certain charities in her will,
thus showing those causes to which she wished to contribute and
the amounts; (5) her will provided that anyone contesting or try-
ing to change its provisions in any way would forfeit his interest
thereunder; and (6) the incompetent had taken no steps toward
making large charitable gifts, although she was, in the dissenting
judge's opinion, fully aware of the impact of taxes, and also aware
that donations to charity would mean an actual outlay of only a
small portion of the gifts.5'
" See the report of the second appeal, In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 262
N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).
" The dissenting judge seems to base this statement on the notion that a
"financial expert and long-time friend" had informed her regarding these
matters. The testimony of this "expert" indicates otherwise. See Record,
vol. 1, pp. 237-47, especially pp. 239-42, In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 262
N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964). The following statement seems emphatically
to discredit such a notion:
I did not advise Mrs. IKenan in matters relating to estate planning,
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When the evidence in Kenan that the incompetent would have
made the gifts is contrasted to that in In re duPont,57 a recent
case in point, its tenuousness is accentuated. In duPont, the pro-
posed distributees were also the takers under the incompetent's
will,"' and the gifts thus would in no way alter the incompetent's
testamentary scheme apart from acceleration. 0 The incompetent
was a businessman of great experience and responsibility, was
sophisticated in the ways of taxation, and had previously made large
gifts to members of his family."0 Even more important, the in-
competent had stated by letter after executing his will his intention
to dispose of his property by lifetime gifts so as to reduce his estate
to a stated amount.61 Other documents indicated his concern for the
most advantageous distribution and his apparent knowledge of the
tax considerations involved. 2 Thus, there were not only acts and
circumstances meriting inference of an intent to make the gifts,
but also the incompetent's written declaration of his express resolu-
tion so to do.63
Seldom indeed, however, will there be evidence so favorable as
that in duPont, and to make allowances on evidence no greater than
that in Kenan is not unprecedented. In City Bank Farmers Trust
Co. v. McGowan64 substantial gifts had been allowed to a daughter,
nor did I advise her in matters relating to the disposition of her property
by Will or by gift. Estate planning was not a part of my duties, and I
have never held myself out to be an estate planner to Mrs. Kenan or to
anyone else.
Record, vol. 1, p. 240.
" 194 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1963) ; 52 CALIF. L. Rxv. 192 (1964) ; 24 MD.
L. Rrv. 332 (1964); 62 MicH. L. Rxv. 1471 (1964); 112 U. PA. L. Rv.
1083 (1964).8 194 A.2d at 310.
"oIn Kenan, by contrast, the vast majority of the proffered distributees
were completely omitted from the terms of the will.
194 A.2d at 311.
Ibid.
Ibid.
"The only unfavorable circumstance was that the incompetent never
executed his proposed plan. The court thought it a reasonable inference,
however, that he deferred the making of the gifts because of the DuPont-
General Motors anti-trust action which was pending from 1949 to 1962.
To have made the gifts might have been to lend support to the government's
contention that the incompetent and others had pursued a course of conduct
designed to keep control of the DuPont Company in the family. Id. at 312.
" 43 F. Supp. 790 (W.D.N.Y. 1942), aft'd, 142 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1944),
inodified, 323 U.S. 594 (1945). See also City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Hoey, 23 F. Supp. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1938). The cited cases are tax cases
arising from New York Supreme Court proceedings of January 14, 1927,
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to grandchildren, and to collateral heirs of the incompetent. Aside
from an annual pittance to one, the incompetent had never made
nor indicated any intention to make sizable allowances for the bene-
fit of the collateral relatives or the grandchildren.6" While she had
made annual allowances to her daughters, the gifts authorized
by the court far exceeded any the incompetent had ever made.6 No
need sufficient to prompt an altered pattern of giving by the in-
competent was shown on behalf of any of the applicants. 67 In short,
so deficient were data indicating that the incompetent would have
made the gifts, that Judge Learned Hand concluded that the in-
competent would have so acted only with the prospect of imminent
incompetency before her, for
the judges had no evidence whatever from her past conduct for
supposing that.., she would have given away every year to her
daughter, her grandchildren and her brother and sisters, more
than $160,000 out of the $250,000 which remained to her after
paying her taxes and expenses. The allowances she had thereto-
fore made did not remotely approach such figures.68
In Kenan, as in the duPont and City Bank Farmers Trust Co.
cases, the object of making the gifts was not to meet any needs of
the applicants, but solely to effectuate a sound estate plan. Reduc-
tion of the incompetent's taxable estate and a concomitant increase
in the amount available for the ultimate distributees was the com-
mon purpose. While the greatest savings ensue if the gifts escape
the estate tax and are taxed solely under the usually lower rates
of the gift tax, 9 substantial savings will nonetheless result even if
the gifts should be held to have been made in contemplation of
death70 and their amount restored to the gross estate for estate
tax purposes. In such a case the gift tax paid is available as a
credit against the estate tax,71 and more importantly, the amount of
and June 3, 1932, involving gifts from the estate of an incompetent ward.
The facts before the state court are adequately set forth in the reports of the
tax cases, and the discussion here is based thereon.
" 43 F. Supp. at 794.
0" Ibid.
oIbid.
68 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 142 F.2d 599, 601 (1944).
(Emphasis added.)
"Cf. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2011, 2502.70 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
'
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2012.
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the gift tax is not itself restored to the gross estate.72 As a result,
the making of the gifts would occasion a minimal savings of sixteen
million dollars in duPont7" and over four and one half million
dollars in the proceeding regarding the trust in Kenan.74
While the holding on the second appeal in Kenan made possible
execution of the proffered estate plan, the first appeal leaves the
law of North Carolina in an untenable state. To persist in requiring
a finding that the incompetent himself would have made the gifts
is to deny that sound estate planning is in itself sufficient reason to
authorize the guardian to act.75 Such tenacity seems inconsistent
with the original requirements of Ex parte Whitbread"0 and defies
sound policy and reasoning. The guardian is charged with manag-
ing the assets of his ward prudently and protecting them from de-
terioration and loss. 77 By refusing to allow him to do for the ward
what any reasonable man of property would do for himself, i.e.,
plan his estate, the court frustrates the guardian's attempt to per-
form this duty. Indeed, absent the finding that the ward would have
so acted, it positively insures his failure.
Moreover, in many cases, if not most, it will be quite impossible
for the court to divine just what the incompetent, when confronted
with extant tax laws, would do. The question thus becomes largely
one of policy, of deciding whether or not to do for the incompetent
' See Record, vol. 1, p. 317, In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 262 N.C. 627,
138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).
7 194 A.2d at 311.
"' See Brief for Appellee, pp. 36-38, It re Trusteeship of Kenan, 262
N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964) ; Record, vol. 2, pp. 314-17.
"A Pennsylvania court has held that tax avoidance is not a sufficient
motive to justify distributing the incompetent's assets before his death.
Bullock Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 682 (Orphans' Ct. 1957). But a New
York court has held that to make distributions for the purpose of saving
taxes and administration expenses is within the broad equity powers of the
court. In re Carson, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Such conclusion is fortified not alone by the savings which can be
effected but by the further consideration that to do otherwise would
result in a loss to the two principal objects of the decedent's bounty and
a gain only to the executors in the form of increased commissions and
the respective federal and state governments in the form of increased
taxes.
To do otherwise would lead to a result increasing estate costs to a
point hardly consistent with our modern concept of estate planning for
tax and other legitimate estate benefits.
Id. at 290.
78 See text accompanying notes 34-40 supra.
, Fratcher, Powers and Ditties of Guardians of Property, 45 IowA L.
Ray. 264, 292-94 (1960). See also Note, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 192, 194 (1964).
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that which the best interest of his estate dictates. In such circum-
stances no good reason exists for not resolving the inquiry in favor
of a statutory interpretation allowing the soundest estate planning.
Indeed, this is but to pursue the familiar legal standard of "the
reasonably prudent man under the circumstances," and some courts
have based distributions on this theory.78 Supporting argument can
be made that there is a pervasive tax avoidance motive in all persons
of property79 and that such may readily be imputed to the incom-
petent. Indeed, to presume otherwise is to impute a preference that
one's property go to the government rather than to the natural or
declared objects of his bounty-an unlikely predilection at best-
and to effect a blatant discrimination against the heirs of incom-
petents. It thus seems the sounder policy to allow guardians wide
discretion in planning their wards' estates, especially where, as in
Kenan, there has been a finding that the ward will never recover
competency8 0
To allow such discretion within prescribed bounds seems pre-
cisely what the North Carolina legislature has attempted to do.
The 1963 statutes" are so designed as to be applicable only to for-
tunes sufficiently substantial that estate planning is indispensable to
their preservation. Moreover, the permission to make gifts is so
circumscribed by conditions precedent that not only is harm to the
estate highly unlikely, but benefit is virtually assured. Conjecture
is inevitably involved in the common law approach of finding what
the incompetent would have done under the circumstances. The
statutory pattern, by contrast, posits an objective standard. When
the prescribed conditions are met, legislative purpose as well as sound
policy seems to demand a presumption that the incompetent would
then have made the gifts. Precedent for such a construction may be
found in the intestacy statutes, 2 which are presumed to reflect the
wishes of a decedent who has left no will, no finding of actual intent
being required. By reinvoking the requirement of finding what the
" E.g., Potter v. Berry, 53 N.J. Eq. 151, 32 At. 259 (Ct. Err. & App.
1895); In re Bond, 198 Misc. 256, 98 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1950); In re
Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Hamble-
ton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50 (1883); Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng.
Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816).
" See Note, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 192, 196 (1964).
" In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 261 N.C. 1, 6-7, 134 S.E.2d 85, 89 (1963).
a N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.1 to -29.16 (Supp. 1963).
'
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1 to -30 (Supp. 1961).
1965]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
incompetent would have done, the court seems to have modified the
legislative intent as well as to have rejected the sounder policy ap-
proach.
WILLIS PADGETT WHICHARD
Practice and Procedure-Review of Order Remanding to State Court
-Tactical Windfall Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 institutes a pro-
cedure unique in present trial practice.2 When a case, removed to
the United States district court under section 1443 of title 28, is
ordered remanded to the state court, that order may now be re-
viewed "by appeal or otherwise."3 This amendment of the former
rule exempting all orders to remand from review makes it possible
for the defendant who alleges that a question of civil rights is in-
volved to delay trial on the merits until the whole arsenal of fed-
eral review weapons has been exhausted. Extensive use of this
delaying tactic may lead to a narrowing of the scope of review of
these remand orders by legislative action or judicial interpreta-
tion.4
178 Stat. 266, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(d) (Supp. 1964).
'Unique as a practical matter; the United States may appeal from an
order of remand in cases relating to lands of the five Civilized Tribes of
Oklahoma. Act of Aug. 4, 1947, ch. 458, § 3(c), 61 Stat. 732. Professor
Moore calls this a "minor statutory exception." IA MOORE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 0.169 [2.-1], at 1452 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]. The
description seems appropriate.
'Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 901, 78 Stat. 266, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(d)
(Supp. 1964).
'Textual discussion here will be limited to the practical implications of
section 901; no attempt will be made to justify or condemn it. Congressional
debate on the merits of the amendment is summarized to exemplify the
legislative intent behind the provision:
Experience over a period of eighty years has demonstrated the wisdom of
making the decision of the judge of the U. S. District Court final in removal
proceedings. This amendment would give to the civil rights litigant alone a
right to appeal the remand order. This is an attempt to by-pass the state
and district courts. The removal process is simple, and once the petition is
filed the case is automatically removed. This deprives the state court of all
powers of process and of the power to enter any order while the case is
pending in the federal courts. [But cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1450 (1958).] Allow-
ing appeal from removal orders upsets the delicate balance of power between
the state and federal courts. 110 CONG. REc. 2769 (1964) (remarks of
Representative Tuck).
The first removal statute in the field of civil rights was enacted shortly
after the Civil War for the purpose of giving justice in civil rights cases.
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Section 1443 of title 28 is the successor of that legislation and that section
is not changed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 1447 is being
amended and there is precedent for this change in that from 1875 to 1887
appeal was allowed in all cases ordered remanded to the state court. It is at
least arguable that the 1887 law did not affect the right to appeal in civil
rights cases. In any event, section 1443 has been narrowly applied. Re-
moval is allowed under virtually one set of circumstances only, to wit, when a
state law or state constitution on its face denies equal rights to a defendant.
The Attorney General, in his testimony given when the bill was in com-
mittee, reported that without appeal section 1443 is useless. Proponents of
the legislation are not asking for an extraordinary remedy. They are asking
only that the useless law be reviewed, and that the appellate courts be able to
re-interpret the extent of section 1443 so that, hopefully, it would be held
to include state criminal prosecutions brought to intimidate the petitioner,
cases involving community hostility making fair trial in state or local
court unlikely or impossible, and other cases where circumstances make it
likely or certain that a fair trial is precluded. This legislation does not upset
the balance of judicial power and is not dilatory. Id. at 2770 (remarks of
Representative Kastenmeier).
Initially all federal questions were decided in state courts. When
removal to federal court was authorized by statute, no appeal was allowed
because this was not considered a final judgment but rather an interlocutory
decision. In 1885 [1875] legislation was enacted allowing appeals from all
orders to remand. In 1887 the former practice was restored. This act
would return the right to appeal in one class of cases only. What is thejustification for such a procedure? The 1887 act denied appeal because the
appeal procedure involves excessive delays. This is especially significant
because the state court loses all jurisdiction while the case is being con-
sidered in the federal court. The status quo cannot be maintained. [But see
28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1958).] No process can issue. Subpoenas may expire.
Witnesses may be lost. Substantive rights are still protected without legis-
lation as proposed by Title IX. The federal appellate procedure protection
from improper state court action is still available if constitutional rights
need to be protected. Id. at 2771 (remarks of Representative Poff).
The proposed legislation is a direct slap at all district court judges. It
will cause chaos in the administration of justice in state courts, for the
process of state courts in civil rights cases will be paralyzed. "It would
give so-called civil rights groups a special 'weapon' all their own, to use the
terminology of Attorney William M. Kunster, counsel for CORE. It would
effectively prevent for a long period of time any trial, Federal or State."
Since 1887 the only procedure that has proved feasible is to make the de-
cision of the district judge final. The devastating effect of the proposed
legislation is apparent. Removal is automatic. The legal relief is an ap-
plication for remand. The defendent already gets "two bites at the apple" in
that the district court can keep the case by denying the application to re-
mand, or, if the remand is ordered, an appeal in the federal courts is available
after the case has been through the state courts. Further, injunction of an
illegal act by the state court is nullified upon removal [contra, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1450 (1958)], and the question might be moot by the time of trial. In the
criminal context, removal might come minutes before trial, and "trial could
be put off almost indefinitely, especially considering the congested dockets of
the federal courts of appeal." As to the charge that the present section is
"useless," it is obvious that removal is useless where there is no federal juris-
diction. The inference of the Attorney General that judges of the federal
district courts "have been less than honest in testing their own jurisdiction"
1965]
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The first federal law allowing removal of a case from a state
court on civil rights grounds was enacted in 1866 and provided
that "citizens, of every race and color.., shall have the same right
S.. to full and equal benefit of all laws ... as is enjoyed by white
citizens." 5 The first case in which this statute was interpreted
was decided by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which held
that an allegation of local community racial hostility entitled the
defendant to remove.6 The present statute, which dates from 1911,7
provides that:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions,
commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant
is a serious charge against the judges or an indication of lack of under-
standing of the purpose of removal. The Attorney General may not under-
stand that the end does not justify the means. The wisdom of the end sought
here is very debatable. Justice is delayed, and an appeal from a remand is
not necessary to protect federal rights. Id. at 2771-73 (remarks of Repre-
sentative Dowdy).
The reason for the special rule in civil rights is that there is a special
problem which needs a solution. The proposed legislation provides a
procedual remedy to handle the special problem. There has been difficulty
especially in the voting cases. Id. at 2773 (remarks of Representative
Lindsay).
The proposed legislation is the work of "bleeding hearts." It provides
a special remedy for ten per cent of the population. Id. at 2780 (remarks
of Representative Watson).
This amendment of section 1447(d) of title 28 was not a part of the
original administration bill but rather was added by sub-committee. There is
little about the provision in three volumes of testimony before the sub-
committee. It is possible that this is an example of action without full reali-
zation. Dilatory practices are possible under this legislation, and it might
be a bad precedent. Id. at 2782 (remarks of Representative Meader).
Litigants may be frustrated at the district court level in cases of harsh
denial of constitutional rights if there is no right to appeal. "If the State
prevails, the State has a right to appeal, but the plaintiff does not. [sic] ...
[T] itle IX . ..will get at those cases which are most tragic and where
justice is in truth denied unless we can get the case to the appellate courts."
Id. at 2784 (remarks of Representative Corman).
Civil rights cases might be exactly the kind that should be reviewed.
The proposed legislation seeks to cure injustice. Id. at 2784 (remarks of
Representative Edwards).
Essentially the same arguments were made when the Senate considered
the bill sent up from the House. Id. at 6451 (remarks of Senator Dirksen),
6551 (Senator Humphrey), 6955 (Senator Dodd), 7784 (Senator Smathers),
11320 (Senator Sparkman), 11848 (Senator Humphrey), 13172 (Senator
Byrd of W. Va.), 13468 (Senator Ervin), 13879 (Senator Byrd of W. Va.),
14459 (Senator Morton).
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
'State v. Dunlap, 65 N.C. 491 (1871).
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 31, 36 Stat. 1096.
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to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the
courts of such State a right under any law providing for the
equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all per-
sons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any
law providing for equal rights, or refusing to do any act on the
ground that it would be inconsistent with such law.8
An order remanding a case to the'state court was made re-
viewable "on writ of error or appeal" in 1875. 9 Twelve years
later Congress stated categorically "that no appeal or writ of error
from the decision . . . remanding . . . shall be allowed." 10 This
practice, in substance, has been carried forward to the present
time. When the revisers of the Judicial Code inadvertently over-
looked the provision in the 1948 revision, an amendment was
hastily enacted to clarify the intention that orders to remand would
not be reviewed."1 This legislation stated concisely that "an order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is
not reviewable on appeal or otherwise."' 2 The Civil Rights Act of
1964 adds the exception "that an order remanding a case to the
State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443
of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise."'
3
The procedure to be followed to effect removal is uncomplicated
and is set out in the statute.' 4 All that is required is that the de-
fendant file a petition in the appropriate United States district
court. The petition must be verified and contain a concise state-
ment of the facts supporting removal. Copies of the process,
pleadings, and orders of the state court must accompany the pe-
tition. In civil cases the petition must be filed within twenty days
after receipt of the initial pleading or service of the summons, de-
pending upon the circumstances, and must be accompanied by a
bond sufficient to reimburse the plaintiff-respondent for expenses
incurred because of the removal proceedings if the district court
828 U.S.C. § 1443 (1958).
'Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472.
" Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552.
"MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JuDIcIAL CODE, 0.03(43) (1949).12Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 84, 63 Stat. 102.
1878 Stat. 266, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(d) (Supp. 1964).
1,28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1958).
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remands. In criminal cases no bond is required, and the petition
may be filed anytime before trial. In any case, if the defendant
is actually in custody, a writ of habeas corpus will issue and the
United States Marshal assumes custody of the petitioner. After
the petition is filed the petitioner must give written notice to all
adverse parties and file a copy of the petition in the state court.
The latter act effects removal, and the state court is then powerless
to proceed.
The procedural steps are relatively simple, but the courts have
required almost literal compliance :' facts, rather than conclusions,
must be alleged in the petition, and those facts must set forth a
proper basis for removal under the section of the statute relied
upon by the petitioner ;"6 this is particularly true in criminal cases ;17
the twenty day time limit in civil actions has been held to be a
clear legislative expression that standardization is to be enforced ;"8
in a criminal case, the action must have been commenced, e.g.,
arrest alone is not sufficient if an information has not yet been
issued;19 in all, "strict compliance with the express provisions of
the statute is required."2
These historical and procedural aspects of removal are not
of present concern, however, nor are the pragmatic arguments
for or against removal. The latter have been the subject of ex-
tensive study and publication. The conclusion usually drawn is
that so many variables are involved that no general rule can be
formulated. 2 The critical points for consideration here are con-
" 1A MooRE, 0.168[3.-1].
1" Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146 (1914); Smith v.
Southern Pac. Co., 187 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 823
(1951); Gratz v. Murchison, 130 F. Supp. 709 (D. Del. 1955).
"'Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 (1926); North Carolina v. Jackson,
135 F. Supp. 682 (M.D.N.C. 1955).
'
8 Richlin Advertising Corp. v. Central Fla. Broadcasting Co., 122 F.
Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
19 Michigan v. Banning, 88 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
'0 Kovell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 129 F. Supp. 906, 908 (N.D. Ohio 1954).
2 Some arguments which have been advanced are: (for removal) the
quality of jurors is higher in federal courts; federal juries return smaller
verdicts; federal rules of joinder are more liberal in states still bound to
code pleading; appeals in federal cases are generally confined to appeals from
final judgments; the federal judge has greater control over the jury, for ex-
ample by being able to comment upon the evidence; the federal jury must be
unanimous, absent agreement of the parties; et cetera; (against removal) in
some jurisdictions federal juries return larger verdicts; state court judges
have less discretion and are more susceptible to appellate reversal; the Erie-
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cerned with the strategic implications of this amendment which
provides for review of orders remanding certain cases to the state
court. What tactical advantage can be gained or lost? What cases
will be affected?
Assuming that the pragmatic factors affecting the desirability
of removal are balanced, the overwhelmingly significant aspect of
the availability of review of the remand order is that time will be
consumed in the appeal procedure. This problem was considered
in the congressional debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22
Senator Sparkman pointed out specifically that cases could be "tied
up for long periods of time on appeals and other Federal proceed-
ings on the Federal interest allegation that they pertain to equal
protection of the laws or civil rights."" It was also said that the
then existing law denying appeal after a remand order arose out
of the fact that such appeals delayed trial, and that state laws could
not be enforced while the appeal was pending.2 4 Arguing along the
same lines, Senator Byrd of West Virginia said that the new pro-
vision opened the door to dilatory tactics which might frustrate
state law enforcement. 5 Summing up this point of view, Senator
Morton stated that:
[T]itle IX . .. contains probably the most radical departure
from Federal rules and procedures of the entire bill....
Any lawyer can easily see that jurisdiction of any given State
court could be virtually stalled while endless litigation was car-
ried forth in the Federal courts appealing adverse decisions all
the way to the Supreme Court of the United States.
26
In answering these arguments, proponents of the bill admitted
that some delay would occur but felt that this was a small price
Tompkins doctrine gives no advantage in the application of substantive law;
pre-trial discovery procedures may be avoided; the state docket may be more
congested and allow more time before trial for a favorable settlement; the
jury will be selected from a more localized area in state court; et cetera.
See, e.g., 1A MoORE, 0.157 [13]; Rogers, Problems of Removal of Causes
from State to Federal Courts, 22 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 78 (1953).
2 See note 4 supra.
"110 CONG. REc. 11320-21 (1964).
" Id. at 13468 (remarks of Senator Ervin). That all review of orders
to remand is prohibited by statute, including review on mandamus, to obviate
delay is announced judicially by Judge John Johnston Parker in Ex parte
Bopst, 95 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1938).
" 110 CONG. REc. 13879 (1964).
" Id. at 14459. See also id. at 6451 (remarks of Senator Dirksen).
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to pay for "ensuring the proper administration of the removal
remedy provided by Congress." 7
Reports in at least one national news magazine indicate that op-
portunities will not be wasted:
[T]here is a prickly prospect that federal courts may be
deluged with every single state case bearing the slightest alleged
connection to civil rights. In short, Title IX might turn out to be
a gateway through which much state-court business will vanish.
Civil rights leaders are ecstatic at the possibilities. "It's a
tremendous device-how to screw up the system in one easy
lesson," says a Florida lawyer. "Anyone who wants to can delay
a case for two years."128
It is possible that the last statement is exaggerated, but there
can be no question that the dockets of the federal courts are
crowded and that litigation can be delayed. During fiscal year
1962 the following statistics were recorded: median time of eight
months from filing to disposition of civil matters not requiring
trial action (district courts) ;29 median time of seven months from
filing of a complete record to final disposition (courts of appeal) ;8o
median time of one and one-half months in civil cases and two
months in criminal cases from filing of notice of appeal in the
lower court to filing of a complete record in a court of appeal ;81
median time of twenty-six months in civil cases and eighteen
months in criminal cases from docketing in the lower court to
final disposition in courts of appeal. 2 Time studies are not avail-
able reflecting the status of the Supreme Court docket, but at the
end of the October term of 1962 that docket was behind 474 cases,
an increase of over ten per cent from the previous year. 8 Ob-
viously, delay will be present when a case is taken into the appel-
late courts. It was argued in the Senate that this time would be
cut to a minimum, for when the defendant-petitioner asks the
court of appeals to stay the remand order of the district court the
case will be examined and this examination will disclose whether
removal was clearly improper and, if it was, the stay will be
" Id. at 6955 (remarks of Senator Dodd).
"
8Time, Oct. 30, 1964, p. 88.
29 1963 DIR. oF ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. COURTS AN. REP. 209.30 Id. at 192.
"Id. at 193.32 Ibid.8IT. at 178.
[Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
denied.3 In short, the argument is that preliminary appellate de-
termination can effectively avoid abuse of the statute.3 5
Even minimal delay, however, may result in deterioration of
evidence,80 or place an emphasis on the desirability of settlement
or dismissal,37 or allow state subpoenas to expire, 8 or have any
one of an almost unlimited number of debilitating effects upon the
adverse party. Thus, it would be profitable for a "civil rights"
group using means that are, in fact, violent to avoid a hearing on a
temporary restraining order issued by a state court by petitioning
for removal to federal court and delaying the finality of decision,
by the appeal procedure if necessary, until after the return date
on subpoenas issued by the state court. In the meantime, arrange-
ments could be made for key witnesses to avoid later service
of process.3 9 It would likewise be advantageous for a gambler
free on bail and charged with contempt of the state court
for refusing to testify before a local grand jury to petition for re-
moval to federal court and appeal an order remanding the case.
40
It is to be expected that defense counsel for many reasons, proper
or improper, will attempt to shield their clients behind the delaying
buttress of appeal from an order remanding to state court. This
may be accomplished merely by an allegation that the defendant's
civil rights will be violated in the state court.
It is now well settled that a state statute or constitution that,
on its face, deprives a defendant of his civil rights provides a solid
basis for removal to federal court.4 ' The legislative history of the
amending statute would clearly seem to call for the federal courts
to now extend the right to remove to members of minority groups
who show that their defense in pending litigation is affected by
local prejudice, or by systematic exclusion from juries, or for any
reason involving the unconstitutional application of state laws.
4 2
3'110 CONG. Rzc. 6956 (1964) (remarks of Senator Dodd).
3r Ibid.
" ZEIsEL, KALVEN & BUCnHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT, at xxii (1959).
The state could minimize this danger, however, by adopting a practice similar
to FED. R. Civ. P. 26 providing for depositions pending the action.
* ZEISEL, KALVEN & BUCHHOLZ, op. Cit. supra note 36, at xxii.
88 110 CONG. REc. 2771 (1964) (remarks of Representative Poff).
Id. at 2772-73 (remarks of Representative Dowdy).See Time, Oct. 30, 1964, p. 88.
'
1 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). See generally 1A Moo1,
0.165.
," 110 CONG. REc. 6551, 6995 (1964) (remarks of Senators Humphrey
and Dodd).
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The legislative history also calls specifically for the courts to re-
determine the scope of the right to remove under section 1443.48
Probably the most significant question to be determined is whether
"civil rights" and "due process" are synonymous for this purpose.
The district courts have, in many instances, remanded litigation
which involved a denial of due process rather than the traditional
area of civil rights, race relations. For example, cases wherein
testimony before a state legislative committee was used to obtain
an indictment against the witness,4 4 wherein state law did not allow
a defendant to challenge a member of the grand jury after the juror
had been sworn,45 wherein failure to obtain trial in state court
resulted from inability to secure an attorney,46 and wherein it was
claimed that the city ordinances under which the defendants were
charged were vague and indefinite 7 have all been returned to the
state courts. Would the federal appellate courts now reverse any
or all of the orders to remand in these cases?
New, unresolved questions of due process are certain to arise.
For example, a case48 decided in a federal circuit court held that a
defendant testifying in his own behalf as to one element of the
offense charged may not be cross-examined as to another element
since this would amount to requiring the witness to testify against
himself in derogation of the fifth amendment. The case has been
cited with approval by the Supreme Court.49 North Carolina holds
that once a defendant testifies in his own behalf he opens himself
to cross-examination on all issues, the constitutional right having
been waived.50 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
never decided a case involving these facts, nor has the Supreme
Court directly considered whether due process is denied in this
situation. Would a federal court in North Carolina allow removal
on the petition of a defendant who alleged that he would be denied
due process in a state court because he anticipated testifying about
part of the charge against him but not all, in view of this conflict?
If not, would a federal appellate court reverse?
48 Ibid.
"New Jersey v. Weinberger, 38 F.2d 298 (D.N.J. 1930).
New Jersey v. Corrigan, 139 Fed. 758 (C.C.N.J. 1905).
Scott v. R.D. Kinney & Co., 137 Fed. 1009 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1905).
City of Birmingham v. Croskey, 217 F. Supp. 947 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
'
8 Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1925).
"Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926).10 State v. O'Neal, 187 N.C. 22, 120 S.E. 817 (1924).
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The questions can be answered only by the federal courts. This
is exactly the point. The range of cases that can plausibly be
argued, to the Supreme Court if necessary, on the basis of "civil
rights" is limited only by the imagination of counsel and his sense
of ethics. A uniform federal policy may emerge as a result of the
legislation, but a means of delay is now readily available to all who
would use it. Future events must be weighed. If the balance is
uneven because abuse becomes widespread it is to be hoped and
expected that the scope of the statute will be limited by legislation
or judicial action.
ROBERT A. MELOTT
Securities Regulation-Rule 10b-5-A Federal Corporations Law?
The plaintiff, a corporate director, brought a derivative action
in a federal district court against six of his co-directors, alleging a
violation of rule lOb-5. 1 This rule makes it unlawful for any person
to use any instrumentality of interstate commerce or any facility of
the securities exchanges to (1) "employ any device, scheme, or arti-
fice to defraud," or (2) "to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact... or" (3) "to engage in any
act.., or course of business which ... would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security."2 The defendants allegedly sought to perpetuate their
control by causing the corporation to issue treasury stock to one of
the defendants individually or to a third person who would vote the
stock as directed by the defendants. The fraudulent aspects of the
117 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1958).
2 The entire rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
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issuance were the alleged withholding from the board of the latest
financial statements, the arbitrarily ascribed value of the stock, and
the postponement of the annual shareholders' meeting. The plain-
tiff sought to have the issuance enjoined, but the action was dis-
missed on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject
matter.3 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Runkle v.
Roto American Corp.,4 reversed, finding the plaintiff had alleged a
claim for relief over which the district court had jurisdiction.
While the history of rule lOb-5 has involved critical questions
of interpretation and application,5 it has evolved as the major anti-
'Jurisdiction is provided in § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 902, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1958):
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive juris-
diction of violations of this chapter or the rules . . . thereunder ....
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chap-
ter or rules . . . may be brought in any such district or in the district
wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business,
and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which
the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be
found. ....
In the principal case, the lower court's decision to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction was based upon Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 98 F. Supp. 506
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 193 F.?d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952). What the court probably meant was that the plaintiff had
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court
undoubtedly had jurisdiction of the subject matter under Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946), since the plaintiff had stated a claim arising under
the laws of the United States. The court of appeals could therefore have
reversed the dismissal purely on the jurisdictional question without reach-
ing the merits of the case. See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§
17-19 (1963).
"CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91455 (2d Cir. Dec. 4, 1964).
The problems initially encountered by the courts where whether or
not the rule provided a private right of action and whether or not the rule
afforded the purchaser this right of action. The courts found that a private
right of action was implied by the rule. Kardon v. National Gypsum Corp., 73
F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964), the Supreme Court held that a private right of action was implied
under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 893, 15
U.S.C. § 78a (1958), (proxy solicitation provision) and thereby eliminated
any remaining doubts in this area. The private right of action was predi-
cated on the principles set forth in RESTATMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934).
See generally 3 Loss, SEcuRiTIEs REGULATION 1682-1861 (2d ed. 1961);
Ruder, Civil Liability Under Ride 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative
Intentt?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 627 (1962); 61 HARv. L. REv. 858 (1948);
Comment, 32 TEXAs L. Rrv. 197 (1953); Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120
(1950). The courts then held that the private right of action was not only
afforded to the seller but also to the purchaser. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). Although the purchaser's private right of
action was broadly based on public policy, it had theretofore been thought
that the purchaser's rights were exclusively vested in the other provisions
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fraud remedy for both purchasers and sellers of securities. The
requisite elements of a lOb-5 action are far fewer than its common
law counterpart of fraud and deceit.' The essential requirements
are a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact and detri-
mental reliance' on such by the party bringing suit. The transac-
tion must have used, either directly or indirectly, an instrumentality
of interstate commerce, 9 e.g., a telephone,10 the mails, or the facilities
of a securities exchange, and must have been "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." The security involved need
not be a stock or bond, for the act's definition of "security" is
exceedingly broad."
of the 1933 and 1934 acts. But the court in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd in part, revd in part, 188 F.2d
783 (2d Cir. 1951), held that even though the plaintiff had a right under
§ 11 of the 1933 act, when there was added the ingredient of fraud, then
the action could be maintained under lOb-5 whether or not he could main-
tain a suit under § 11 or some other provision of the act. See Ellis v.
Carter, supra. Another pressing problem was that of the statute of limi-
tations, since neither § 10(b) of the act nor the rule provided for one.
But it has been held that the statute of limitations for the state in which
the court is sitting is applicable to 10b-5 actions. Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
814 (1961); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Connelly v.
Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959). The courts have further
held that the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and laches are available to the
defendant. See Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th
Cir. 1962). See generally 73 YALE L.J. 1477 (1964). Note that it is still
significant that the private right of action is predicated in tort. See Crist
v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 230 F. Supp. 136 (D. Colo. 1964), where
the court held that a private right of action under lob-5 cannot be trans-
muted into an action on a contract, express or implied, which will sustain
attachment against a resident defendant, even though restitution rather than
a damage remedy was sought.
*At common law the elements of deceit were (1) a false representa-
tion of (2) a material (3) fact; (4) the defendant must know of the
falsity (scienter) but make it, nevertheless, for the purpose of inducing
the plaintiff to rely upon it, and the (5) plaintiff must justifiably rely
upon it to his (6) damage. For a comparison between the common law ele-
ments and those of rule 10b-5, see 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1431.
'Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); In the Matter of
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See generally 3 Loss, op. cit.
supra note 5 at 1430-44.
' See Howard v. Furst, 283 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 973 (1957); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
Cf. Kremer v. Selheimer, supra note 7.
0 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
10 See Fratt v. Robinson, supra note 9.
'x See Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1958).
It provides that the term "security" includes such things as any note, stock,
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In Roto the requirement "in connection with the purchase or
sale" takes on particular significance since there was only an
issuance of treasury stock involved. The court reasoned that the
issuance of stock by the corporation was a sale for the purposes of
10b-5. However, in early 10b-5 litigation this would have indeed
been a novel idea.' 2 The argumentum against the equation of sale
to issuance was based upon the SEC's power to regulate. The basis
of the power was two-fold: (1) to regulate in the interest of the
public and (2) to regulate for the protection of the investor. The
argument asserted that the corporation was not an investor in its
own stock and, therefore, the rules were not promulgated for its
protection.:" The courts rejected this in favor of the public policy
grounds of regulation, which were found to encompass protection to
an issuing corporation.14 The principle of equating an issuance to a
sale is now firmly established. The courts have given the corporation
standing to effectuate the protection by permitting it to bring the
action itself and by allowing derivative actions. The court in Roto
recognized a necessity for this standing by stating:
Barring suit by a corporation defrauded under those circum-
stances would, as a legal and practical matter, destroy any remedy
against the perpetrator of the fraud. Suits by individual share-
holders would either run afoul of the privity requirements ...
or result in smaller recoveries .... 15
The privity requirement referred to by the court has been a
source of judicial controversy since its introduction as a requisite
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other mineral rights, or any in-
terest or instrument commonly known as a security.Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp. 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 814 (1961).
28 Ibid.
"Ibid. Hooper is apparently the first case extending 10b-5 protection to
an issuing corporation. The court said:
It greatly expands the protection frequently so hemmed in by the tradi-
tional concepts of common law misrepresentation and deceit, the require-
ment of privity, proof of specific damage, inadequacy of the right of
rescission or right to recover up to par value of stock of a much greater
market value.
282 F.2d at 201. The inadequacy of a common law remedy and the proof
requirements were the prime reasons for extending the protection. For
other cases implying a private right of action for the issuing corporation,
without discussing the problem, see New Park Mining Co., v. Cranmer,
225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217
F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
" CCH FED. SEc. L. Rr. 91455, at 94769. (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
to a private right of action. It was first interjected when the court
in Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.6 unfortunately
stated:
A semblance of privity between the vendor and purchaser of the
security in connection with which the improper act, practice or
course of business was invoked seems to be requisite and it is
entirely lacking here.1 7
The privity with which the court was there concerned was privity
of contract. In other words, for a private right of action to exist, the
misrepresentation or omission must have been that of either a pur-
chaser or seller and not that of a third person. The doctrine of
privity prohibited either the purchaser or seller from suing a third
party if he was not an immediate party to the transaction."8 How-
ever widespread the necessity of privity became, it is now fairly
apparent that it is no longer requisite to a private right of action
under 10b-5.'1 Today, privity is generally recognized as an eviden-
tiary fact to be considered in conjunction with other material facts
in determining whether the duty created by 10b-5 was breached.20
However, there is a trend towards its total rejection for any pur-
pose.21 The courts adopting the trend permit a suit by either pur-
chaser or seller against any party making a misrepresentation, even
though he was not a party to the immediate transaction. The ques-
tion of privity was not before the court in Roto, but its references
99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
99 F. Supp. at 706. (Emphasis added.)
"The courts, in an effort to lessen the effect of privity and to extend
the scope of lOb-5, permitted a charge of conspiracy to sweep in peripheral
defendants. It is only necessary, therefore, for the plaintiff to prove that
one of the defendants was in privity with him, either as a purchaser or a
seller. See, e.g., Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Thiele v.
Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
"o See New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Texas Con-
tinental Life Ins. Co., v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky.
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); H. L. Green
Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
" Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. .207, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd,
294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
"1 See cases cited in note 19 supra. The proclivity of the courts toward
privity is lucidly shown in Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp.
33 (E.D. Pa. 1964), where the court, in making the latest pronounciamento
on the privity requirement, said: "I find it unnecessary to attempt a definition
of this, at best, cloudy phrase, for if 'a semblance of privity' means 'privity'
(like 'a little bit pregnant'), I reject it." Id. at 37.
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to privity as a requirement and to Farnsworth apparently mean that
it rejects the present trend. Such a result will not afford the investor
the maximum protection against any person who has defrauded him
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
Although Roto did not reject the privity requirement, it did
reject, for the purposes of this case, and perhaps for all lOb-5
actions, the doctrine that the directors constitute the corporation.
The rejection was out of necessity, for otherwise the result would
have been that the corporation had defrauded itself. The result is,
of course, justifiable since it prohibits directors from taking advan-
tage of their fiduciary capacity. Roto is not clear as to the per-
centage of directors who voted in favor of the issuance, but it is
fair to assume that a majority so voted. If such actually was the
case, the court's rejection of the doctrine seems to require a con-
ceptualistic realignment of fictions, for it has been held in other
contexts that board action is corporate action."
Roto is not important because it expands the interpretation of
any single element of a 10b-5 action, but rather because it exempli-
fies the widening application of the rule to acts of corporate mis-
management and breaches of fiduciary duties. The growing latitude
of application is succinctly stated by the court:
It is no answer simply to state that the federal security laws are
not concerned with corporate mismanagement or breaches of
fiduciary obligations. That Congress could not or did not attempt
to resolve all corporate ills, does not mean that it chose to leave
without the federal sphere problems basic to the entire regulatory
system.23
This statement in juxtaposition with the corporation's standing to
sue and the rejection of privity by other courts gives rise to the
implication that 10b-5 is more than an anti-fraud rule; it is a sub-
stantive federal corporations law.24
The idea of a federal corporations law based on 10b-5 was re-
jected in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.25 In that case the ma-
jority shareholder of Newport sold his controlling interest to Wilport
Co. at a premium, making misrepresentations to the minority share-
2 See, e.g., Baltimore & 0. R.R., v. Foar, 84 F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1936).
28 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91455, at 94769. (Emphasis added.)
" See Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corpora-
tions by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185 (1964).
"' 98 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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holders of Newport about a previous offer from another company.
The minority shareholders alleged that the misrepresentations con-
stituted a violation of IOb-5. The court, instead of finding a viola-
tion, took the narrow approach that the rule was aimed only at a
fraud perpetrated on the buyer or seller and had no relation to
breaches of fiduciary duty resulting in fraud on the minority."8 This
approach was taken before the introduction of privity, and one
commentator27 has concluded that the privity requirement as repre-
sented by Farnsworth was nothing more than an effort to keep the
question of corporate mismanagement in the state courts.
Notwithstanding Birnbaum and the privity requirement, the
limits of application of lOb-5 have greatly expanded. The duty of
disclosure under 10b-5 has been applied to the "insider," traditionally
a director, officer, or controlling shareholder.2" But the SEC in In
The Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.29 rejected the "insider" concept
as a limit to the duty to disclose and instead rested the obligation of
disclosure 0 upon two principal elements:
" For another approach to this case, see Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d
173 (2d Cir. 1955). For a discussion of corporate opportunities, see 74
HAR v. L. Rsv. 765 (1961).
" Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 725,
786 (1956). See generally 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1763-70.
See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
2040 S.E.C. 907 (1961). For comments on this case, see 30 U. CHaI. L.
RFv. 121 (1962); 71 YALE L.J. 736 (1962). The defendant in this case
was stock brokerage firm. One of the members was also the director of a
corporation listed on an exchange. Immediately after the corporation
voted to reduce its dividend, the director-associate relayed the information
to the defendant. Aware of the dividend reduction, defendant sold the stock
of the corporation held in discretionary accounts before news of the re-
duction reached the exchange. When news of the reduction did reach the
exchange, a decline in the market resulted. Failure to disclose the reduction
to the purchaser was found to be a violation of lOb-5. Here, there was no
intent to defraud, since normally the news would have already reached the
exchange except for the unexplained delay in communication.
"°In Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951),
the court's rationale foreshadowed that of the SEC in Cady, Roberts, but
seems to have been limited to the "insider" concept, which was rejected by
the Commission. The court said:
The rule is clear. It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stock-
holder, to purchase the stock of minority stockholders without disclosing
material facts affecting the value of the stock, known to the majority
stockholder by virtue of his position but not known to the selling minority
stockholder, which information would have affected the judgment of the
sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing
a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage
of the uninformed minority stockholder.
Id. at 828-29. The test as to what information need be disclosed seems to
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[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing.
3 1
The SEC found that the anti-fraud provisions were not intended
as a specification of particular acts of fraud, but rather as an encom-
passment of an infinite variety of forms and devices used to take
advantage of investors. The expansion of the duty to disclose seems
justifiable since it affords maximum protection to the investor.
Expansion in yet another direction is represented by New Park
Mining Co. v. Cranmer,32 where an insider took advantage of oppor-
tunities rightfully belonging to the corporation. Here, a corporation
sued a director, alleging three separate violations of the rule, each
involving a separate transaction. In the first transaction, the de-
fendant was negotiating the acquisition of stock in a new venture
for the corporation. Instead of acquiring all of the offered stock for
the corporation, he was able to appropriate for himself a sizeable
portion without consideration. The court found that this was a
fraud on the corporation because the defendant's acquisition propor-
tionately reduced the value of the shares acquired by the corporation.
In the second transaction the defendant induced a third party to
acquire mining leases, which had been offered to the corporation,
in the names of the third party and of the corporation. Again the
corporation furnished the sole consideration, and was defrauded by
purchasing the third party's interest for 40,000 shares of its own
stock, of which 11,000 went to the defendant. Within the same
time scope, the corporation was allegedly defrauded by its purchase,
at an inflated price, of its own stock from another third party. This
purchase was facilitated by the defendant. Both acts in the second
be inherent in Speed, viz., that information which would affect the judg-
ment of either the buyer or seller. At common law there was a duty to dis-
close "special facts" which used essentially the same test implied in Speed.
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). The test should apply a reasonable
man standard in determining which facts would affect the judgment, other-
wise it becomes subjective and allusive. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1963). See generally 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1456-66;
62 MicH. L. REv. 880 (1964).
8140 S.E.C. at 912.
* 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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transaction constituted a single violation of 10b-5. In the third trans-
action, the corporation was allegedly defrauded by the defendant's
failure to disclose to the corporation the fact that the defendant was
to have an interest in a venture that the corporation was to enter with
another company. The corporation lost a considerable amount of
money in exploration of the proposed venture, which proved to be
worthless. The court found that the agreement to purchase the half
interest was itself a purchase for the purposes of 10b-5. Note that
in none of the transactions did the defendant deal directly with the
corporation. The court said of the entire sequence of events:
A purchaser or seller of stock is not limited under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 to an action against the other party to the pur-
chase or sale; he can sue a third party if in connection with the
purchase or sale that person defrauded him.... It is immaterial
whether the purchase or sale was part of a larger scheme of
corporate mismanagement if the elements of a claim under Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are otherwise present. 33
The court was apparently willing to take cognizance of the entirety
of each transaction and not merely the 10b-5 violations. It is doubt-
ful that the court was willing to decide every appendant issue, since
the court was uncertain whether the money spent in exploration in
the third transaction was sufficiently connected to the 10b-5 violation
to permit recovery for the loss. This uncertainty implies that the
court was willing to apply a test of proximity, but it is difficult to
ascertain the degree of proximity necessary to justify deciding an
appendant issue.
Another approach generally taken in this area is that of in-
voking the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction,3 4 which permits a
federal court to decide non-federal claims when the non-federal
claim arises out of the same cause of action as a federal claim.35
This has traditionally meant that the federal and non-federal claims
constitute nothing more than a shift in the theory of recovery.
The difficulty with this approach lies in the fact that not all acts
of corporate mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duty can
be said to arise out of the same cause of action as that arising from
" Id. at 266.
8 Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1933).
"' Ibid. See generally WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 19, 78; 62 CoLum.
L. REv. 1018 (1962).
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the violation of the rule, and the courts would not have jurisdiction
of such claims under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.80
A third view would be to consider the acts of corporate mis-
management, in which the elements of lOb-5 are present, as "basic
to the entire regulatory system," and therefore, covered by the
rule itself. 7 Thus, once the elements of lOb-5 have been established,
the court will be able to decide all of the collateral questions without
the restriction imposed by pendent jurisdiction. The merits of
this view are the relative ease of deciding the jurisdictional prob-
lems and the avoidance of piecemeal litigation. The basis of this
view is in the assertion that lOb-5 is a federal substantive corpora-
tions law. Such an assertion is supported by Roto, and by the fol-
lowing language which foreshadowed Roto:
It creates many managerial duties and liabilities unknown to
the common law. It expresses federal interest in management-
stockholder relationships which theretofore had been almost
exclusively the concern of the states.... Section 10(b) provides
stockholders with a potent weapon for enforcement of many fi-
duciary duties. It can be said fairly that the Exchange Act ...
constitutes far reaching federal substantive corporation law.88
This approach represents a substantial change of attitude from
that expressed in Birnbaum, which now stands only for the propo-
sition that third parties cannot assert claims based upon a sale or
purchase to which they were not a party. 9 How much greater the
lattitude will become for calling collateral problems "problems basic
to the entire regulatory system" is open to speculation.
That 10b-5 has become a federal substantive corporation law
is apparent. Whether or not the rule itself is a sufficient basis for
such law is open to serious debate. At this stage in its expansion,
it would seem appropriate for the courts to apply at least a quantum
of restraint before the body of law developing appurtenent to
the rule, for deciding the collateral issues, becomes too encom-
" See, eg., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Wolfson v.
Blumberg, 229 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
" It is possible to state this in another way, namely, that a breach of
fiduciary duty is a genus of fraud which the courts are willing to treat
under the anti-fraud provisions, even though not traditionally considered a
"fraud." Cf. S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180
(1963).
8' McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 939 (1961).
" See Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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passing. If, in view of the growth of large interstate corporations
and the basic structure of the American economy, a federal corpora-
tions law would be advantageous or desirable,4 then it is for Con-
gress to so provide.
THOMAS C. WETTACH
Torts-Implied Warranty-Privity
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions reject the require-
ment of privity of contract between the consumer of a product and
the manufacturer in an action on an implied warranty.' In Terry v.
Double Cola Bottling Co.,- North Carolina retained its rule requiring
privity. The court there affirmed a compulsory nonsuit in an action
against the manufacturer where the plaintiff's evidence showed
that she had purchased from a lunchroom, an intermediate seller,
a bottled drink allegedly containing a green fly.3 However, Justice
Sharp, in a thorough concurring opinion,4 attacked the food manu-
facturers' fortress of privity under the present North Carolina law
and urged the court to adopt the majority rule. This case presents
the question: is it necessary to abandon the privity requirement in
order to provide adequate remedies for an injured consumer or
ultimate user?
At common law, the courts required privity of contract in a
negligence action against the manufacturer.' However, when man-
ufacturers began making extensive use of distributors and retailers
to peddle their products to the public, the courts realized the in-
justice of this requirement.' The initial onslaught began in Mac-
"0 Some of the obvious advantages would be in the relative ease of obtain-
ing service of process, the jurisdictional requirements, and the most im-
portant would be that of uniformity. For the problems appendant to 10b-5
as a corporation law, and its effect on such things as the stock market, di-
rectors, etc., see Ruder, supra note 24.
'Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sonier), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). Dean Prosser stated that no state has
adopted this privity requirement since 1935 but many have rejected it. Id. at
1110.
263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964).
Id. at 3, 138 S.E.2d at 754.
'Id. at 3, 138 S.E.2d at 754. Justice Sharp concurred because she found
a lack of evidence that the fly was in the bottle when it left the defendant's
control.
'Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842).
' See generally Prosser, supra note 1.
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Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 7 where the court discarded the need
for privity in negligence actions and imposed a duty on manufac-
turers to make their product reasonably safe for all foreseeable
users.' This rule has been accepted by all jurisdictions' and has
been extended by some to protect bystanders "within the vicinity
of probable use."'"
Apart from negligence, the courts held the manufacturer liable
in contract."' Where the manufacturer made express representa-
tions to the public about the quality of his product,12 almost all
jurisdictions have held him strictly liable to the consumer or ulti-
mate user.'" In absence of express warranties, the courts held a
food manufacturer, packer, or processor liable to the consumer on
an implied warranty only if they were in privity of contract.14 But,
because of modern merchandizing and public policy, a distinct ma-
jority of the jurisdictions completely abrogated the privity require-
ment and held a food manufacturer strictly liable to the ultimate
consumer. 5 The courts extended this warranty to nonfood manu-
'217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
8 For discussion of a manufacturer's negligence see Noel, Manufacturer's
Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of A Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816(1962). See generally 1 FRUMER & FRImEAN, PRoDucrs LIirBIIy §§ 5-15
(1964).
Prosser, supra note 1, at 1100.10E.g., Gaidry Motors, Inc. v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1954).
' See generally WILLISTON, SALES § 197 (1948).
12 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961)
(TV-"Nose, throat, and accessory organs not adversely affected by smok-
ing Chesterfields"); Maecherlin v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d
275, 302 P.2d 331 (Ct. App. 1956) (billboard--"Ten Year Warranty");
Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 272, 278 P.2d 723 (Ct.
App. 1955) (newspaper--"Boned Chicken"); Worley v. Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952) (label-"Kind to
Hands"); Randy Knitware, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5,
181 N.E.2d 339, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (magazine--"Will Not Shrink
or Stretch Out of Fit").
" Only three states appear to require privity in an action on an express
warranty: Barnard v. Pennsylvania Range Boiler Co., 216 F. Supp. 560
(E.D. Pa. 1963) (applying Massachusetts law) (water heater); Senter v.
B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954) (tire); Chanin v.
Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937) (applying Illinois law)
(windshield glass).
"'E.g., Race v. Krum, 222 N.Y. 410, 118 N.E. 853 (1918).
15 The jurisdictions of the following cases appear to require privity in
food cases for an action on an implied warranty: Birmingham Chero-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921) (fly in bottle); Nelson
v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S.W. 288 (1905) (deleterious
canned tongue); but see Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885 (Ark.
1964); Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W.2d 701 (1930)
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facturers,'8 and, again, a majority of the jurisdictions abolished
privity" and held the manufacturer strictly liable to foreseeable
users." As a final step in abolishing the entire privity concept,
some courts have held a manufacturer strictly liable in tort.' 9
(soda with arsenic); Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 A. 186 (1925)(pin in bread); Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316 (1943)
(sausage with trichinosis); Carlson v. Turner Centre System, 263 Mass.
339, 161 N.E. 245 (1928) (glass in bottled milk); Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942) (glass in coke); Thomason
v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935) (rat in sack of
flour); Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Corp., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d
701 (1955) (deleterious apricot juice); Whitehorn v. Nash-Finch Co., 67
S.D. 465, 293 N.W. 859 (1940) (poisonous candy); Burgess v. Sanitary
Meat Market, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785 (1939) (dictum). Some of the
theories utilized by the courts that have abrogated privity are: Williams v.
Campbell Soup Co., 80 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Mo. 1948) (rejected privity as
against public policy); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93
P.2d 799 (1939) (warranty from manufacturer to retailer inured to the
consumer's benefit); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176
N.W. 382 (1920) (manufacturer's marketing was a representation to the
public that the goods are merchantable) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons,
145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927) (warranty runs with the goods) ; Madouros
v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445
(1936) (retailer assigned his warranty to the consumer) ; Cohen v. Dugan
Bros., 134 Misc. 155, 235 N.Y. Supp. 118 (1929) (privity evaded by im-
pleader); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557
(1928) (consumer was a third party beneficiary of the retailer's contract
with the manufacturer). See generally Gillam, Products Liability in A
Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. Rzv. 119, 153-54 (1958).
"E.g., Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353
Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
1' In addition to the jurisdictions in note 15 supra, the following juris-
dictions still appear to require privity in nonfood cases: Barlow v. DeVilbiss
Co., 214 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wisc. 1963) (defective container) ; Larson v.
United States Rubber Co., 163 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mont. 1958) (rubber boots);
Jordan v. Worthington Pump & Mach. Co., 73 Ariz. 329, 241 P.2d 433
(1952) (pump); Behringer v. William Gretz Brewing Co., 53 Del. 365,
169 A.2d 249 (1961) (beer carton); Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79
Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 399 (1963) (ladder); Kennedy v. General Beauty Prods.,
112 Ohio App. 505, 167 N.E.2d 116 (1960) (hair dye); Odom v. Ford Motor
Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956) (tractor lift); Kyker v. General
Motors Corp., 381 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. 1964) (defective auto engine).
"Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960). The following are considered "foreseeable users:" Chapman v.
Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1962) (user-borrower); Simpson v. Powered Prods., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp.
409, 192 A.2d 555 (C.P. 1963) (lessee); Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp.
198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963) (repairman); and Jakubowski v. Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (1963) (employee).
However, the courts refuse to extend the benefit of this warranty to the
general public. Kuschy v. Norris, 206 A.2d 275 (Conn. 1964); Hahn-v.
Ford Motor Co., 126 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1964). But see Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra.
'" Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (applying
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North Carolina accepts the majority rule in only two instances
-where the action is in negligence 0 and where a food manufac-
turer has made express warranties to the consumer. 21 As exempli-
fied by Terry, the court continues to require privity of contract in
an action against a manufacturer on an implied warranty.22 How-
ever, in cases involving sealed food stuffs, North Carolina has
allowed a defendant seller to join his seller; thus the manufacturer
may eventually be brought in as a party defendant.23
A manufacturer is primarily responsible for the quality of its
products; moreover, it is usually financially more able than inter-
mediate sellers to redress harmful effects caused by its products.
As has been indicated, the remedies available to an injured con-
sumer or ultimate user against a manufacturer are limited in North
Carolina. Thus the question: are they adequate?
In a negligence action, the consumer or ultimate user is aways
confronted with the difficulty of proof.2 4  When there is no direct
evidence of negligence, a majority of the courts allow him to resort
Texas law); Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.
1963) (applying Louisiana law); and Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). This view is embodied in
the Restatement of Torts, RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402 A (Tent.
Draft No. 10, 1964).
" E.g., Gwyn v. Lucky City Motors, Inc., 252 N.C. 123, 113 S.E.2d 302
(1960).
"In Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940),
the court held that the statement "Amox is made for the purpose of killing
insects, it is not poisonous to human beings" was an express warranty ap-
pearing on a can of insecticide. However, this express warranty exception
"has been limited to cases involving sale of goods, intended for human con-
sumption, in sealed packages prepared by the manufacturer and having
labels with representations to consumers inscribed thereto." Perfecting Serv.
Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660, 668, 136 S.E.2d 56, 62-63(1964).
22E.g., Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., supra note 21
(non-food); Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30
(1935) (food).
" Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951). The opinion
emphasized that the distributor, a remote seller, was primarily liable. Id.
at 287, 63 S.E.2d at 826. Davis was limited by Perfecting Serv. Co. v.
Product Dev. & Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660, 136 S.E.2d 56 (1964), where the
court emphasized "that it was not intended to abandon the privity rule in all
warranty cases, but the procedure approved therein was to apply only to
sale of articles for human consumption sold in sealed packages prepared by
the manufacturer." Id. at 670, 136 S.E.2d at 64.
' For discussion of the difficulties involved in proving negligence, see
Ashe, So You're Going to Try A Products Liability Case, 13 HASTINGS
L.J. 66 (1961).
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to res ipsa loquitur.2 However, North Carolina rejects this doc-
trine in sealed food cases and requires the consumer to show "sim-
ilar instances,"2 6 an almost insurmountable task. In an action
on an express warranty, he has to show that the representations of
a food manufacturer do in fact constitute an express warranty.
28
Either because of lack of proof in negligence or lack of express
warranty, the consumer or ultimate user's only relief is an action
on an implied warranty. Because of the requirement of privity, he
cannot sue the manufacturer and is relegated to suing his immediate
seller, who may be equitably insolvent. Even under the joinder
procedure in sealed food cases, he is at the mercy of his immediate
seller and other interim sellers to join the manufacturer.2" In all
" 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 12.03 (1964).
"Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180 S.E. 582
(1935). In non-food cases, it seems that the court does not require a show-
ing of "similar instances" but allows the use of res ipsa loquitur if the
injured user can show that the product was under the exclusive control of
the manufacturer. See Wyatt v. North Carolina Equipment Co., 253 N.C.
355, 117 S.E.2d 21 (1960).
"' Graham v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 257 N.C. 188, 125 S.E.2d
429 (1962) (evidence that a bottle exploded without impact is not a similar
instance when the plaintiff's bottle exploded on a slight impact); McLeod
v. Lexington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 212 N.C. 671, 194 S.E. 82 (1937)
(evidence that two types of drinks bottled by the defendant contained foreign
substances was not a similar instance when the plaintiff's drink was of a
third type); Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180
S.E. 582 (1935) (evidence that other drinks bottled by the defendant con-
tained a "green looking thing," a dead fly, and a piece of glass was not a
similar instance when the plaintiff's bottle contained a mouse). But see
Caudle v. F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105, 16 S.E.2d 680 (1941)
(evidence that a plug of tobacco, a non-sealed product, contained a rat's
foot was sufficient to take the case to the jury even though the plaintiff's
plug contained a fish hook).
"A seller's representation about the quality of his product may be con-
sidered mere "puffing". Even though he may not specifically express him-
self in such words as "I promise you . . ." or "This product will not. . .," the
seller is constantly extolling his product as a "perfect product."
It is to shut one's eyes and ears in today's "world of advertising" to say
that, because no reassuring words appear on the product's container, the
manufacturer of a nationally advertised product has made no representa-
tion to the purchaser. He makes one every day-sometimes every hour
on the hour. Any [product] entitled to status as a "famous name brand"
has been warranted by the manufacturer to the consumer-very probably
in color !-in magazines, on billboards, and by "glamorous stars of stage
and screen" over radio and television.
Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 13, 138 S.E.2d 753, 761
(Sharp, J., concurring). However, the court must find positive express war-
ranty. See Murray v. Bensen Aircraft Corp., 259 N.C. 638, 131 S.E.2d 367
(1963).
=° See Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951).
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other instances, the consequence is a multitude of litigation of
buyer against seller. Thus, in many cases, the requirement of
privity leaves an injured consumer or user without redress from the
manufacturer. Moreover, it could leave him without relief from
anyone.
An injured consumer or user who is not in fact the buyer
cannot sue the retailer on an implied warranty since there is no
privity. Therefore, neither a purchaser's husband, employee, or
guest can sue the retailer in absence of an agency relationship."0
Apart from cases where the retailer of the defective product is
known, the buyer may be unable to determine who was the seller
of the defective product when he has made identical purchases from
various retailers. Thus, in some cases, the privity requirement is an
absolute bar to redress from anyone in the absence of a negligence
action against the manufacturer.
The Uniform Commercial Code would provide limited relief.
It abandons the privity requirement to the extent that a buyer's
family, or member of his household, or guest can sue the last seller.81
However, since the Code has no vitality in the distributive chain,82
it does not change the existing case law in determining whether a
buyer or those named third party beneficiaries can directly sue the
manufacturer on an implied warranty. Since the North Carolina
case law requires privity, the Code would be useless in allowing a
"°In Rabb v. Covington, 215 N.C. 572, 2 S.E.2d 705 (1939), the con-
sumer's mother purchased a package of sausage containing a piece of metal.
Indicating that she purchased it for her son, the court held the retailer liable
but made no reference to the agency relation.
8 "A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in
his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods . . . ." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
This provision was not adopted by California since their case law had al-
ready extended greater coverage than that provided by the Code. CAL.
Com. CODE § 2318, comment. Moreover, even though the legislature in
one state did adopt this provision, the court allowed a person not a named
third party beneficiary under this provision to sue the manufacturer on a
breach of an implied warranty. Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120(E.D. Pa. 1961). Some courts have construed the word "family" to include
"industrial family." Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885 (Ark.
1964). Contra, Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d
575 (1963).
"zUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, comment 3 (1962 Official Text
with Comments), provides that "the section is neutral and is not intended
to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's war-
ranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the dis-
tributive chain."
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suit against the manufacturer. Thus, privity must be abrogated
either by judicial decision or legislative enactment independent of
the Code.
The court in Terry could have easily adopted the majority rule
and eliminated privity without overruling any recent food case,33 or
it could have utilized a tort approach in holding the manufacturer
strictly liable to the consumer without impeaching the privity
requirement in warranty actions. 4 Moreover, it could have invoked
the majority rule35 that a violation of a pure food act36 is negligence
per se in a civil action.3? But the court refused to falter.
"8 It appears that the only food case expressly requiring privity was
Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935). How-
ever, this rule has been stated countless times by nonfood cases citing
Thomason. The court keeps repeating their impregnable rule requiring
privity and defying its common law capacity.
[The majority rule] truly exemplified the capacity of the common law
to originate, modify, abandon, extend or adjust ideas, theories and rules to
meet changing conditions or achieve greater perfection in rendering
justice. Those who would freeze privity at any one stage of its develop-
ment are both ignoring its common-law origin as an imperfect idea in the
fallible human brains of certain judges-not a divine unchanging prin-
ciple in which there can be no error-and denying its common-law ca-
pacity to develop. The truth is that privity was never a static concept,
and it should not now be any more static than the common-law is
static ....
Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 104-05 (D. Hawaii 1961), aft'd, 304
F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
'In Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951), the court
by dictum noted that a manufacturer's liability in sealed food cases was a
matter of "primary liability." Id. at 287, 63 S.E.2d at 826.
" Criswell Baking Co. v. Milligan, 77 Ga. App. 861, 50 S.E.2d 136
(1948) (contaminated pie); Myer v. Greenwood, 125 Ind. App. 288, 124
N.E.2d 870 (1955) (trichinosis); Kelly v. J. R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63,
181 P. 326 (1919) (impure pig's feet); Alpine v. LaSalle Diners, 197 Misc.
415, 98 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1950) (wire in pie); Mahoney v. Shaker Square
Beverages, 46 Ohio Op. 250, 102 N.E.2d 281 (1951) (exploding bottle);
Tedder v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 224 S.C. 46, 77 S.E.2d 293 (1953) (glass
in coke). Contra, Walter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47
N.E.2d 739 (1943) (paint in milk is evidence of negligence); Gearing v.
Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916) (unwholesome pork chops
is some evidence of negligence); Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690,
255 N.W. 414 (1934) (trichinosis is no evidence of negligence).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-120 to -145 (1960). The presence of a sub-
stance "natural" to the food is not an adulteration. Adams v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., 251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E.2d 92 (1960) (crystallized corn in
corn flakes).
"' In Ward v. Morehead Sea Food Co., 171 N.C. 33, 87 S.E. 958 (1916),
the court imposed civil liability for a violation of this statute but did not
resolve the question of whether such a violation was negligence per se.
It seems that no decision since Ward has considered this question. However,
the court has held that a violation of a safety statute having force as law is
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The most effective remedy for an injured consumer and ulti-
mate user is usually an action against the manufacturer on an im-
plied warranty. Since the Code is inadequate and the court appar-
ently refuses to alter the case law, the legislature should expressly
abrogate privity to provide adequate protection to the public.38
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negligence per se. Lutz Indus. Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332,
88 S.E.2d 333 (1955) (North Carolina Building Code). There, the court
said "it is well settled law in this jurisdiction, that when a statute imposes
upon a person a specific duty for the protection of others, that a violation
of such statute is negligence per se." Id. at 341, 88 S.E.2d at 339.
" Virginia has enacted such a statute.
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in
any action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to re-
cover damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negli-
gence, although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the de-
fendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller
might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the
goods ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-654.3 (Supp. 1964). A bill that would partially abrogate
the privity requirement had been introduced into the North Carolina General
Assembly, H.B. 251, 1965 Sess., but was killed in committee. News and Ob-
server, April 23, 1965, p. 12, col. 1.
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